海角大神

Sitting beside President Donald Trump in the White House Tuesday, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz looked the part of the dutiful ally. Just days before, Mr. Merz had offered some of the strongest words in defense of the American and Israeli attacks on Iran.

鈥淭his is not the moment to lecture our partners and allies,鈥� he said. 鈥淒espite our reservations, we share many of their objectives.鈥�

In truth, he embodies Europe鈥檚 predicament. He needs to be playing for time.

Around Europe, many leaders are looking with some envy at Spain, where Prime Minister Pedro S谩nchez has blocked the United States from using its air bases. On Wednesday, he delivered a national address in which he called the Iran airstrikes a 鈥渂reakdown of international law.鈥�

Yet Germany and Spain are, in many ways, playing the same game. Europe is now determined to free itself from reliance on the U.S. for security. But that will take years. What should it do in the meantime? Spain and Germany show two different approaches, yet the goal is broadly similar: managing the difficult relations with the U.S. until Europe can stand on its own.

In Spain and the United Kingdom, the shadow of the Iraq War, launched in 2003, plays a crucial role. Both paid a significant political price for joining the U.S.-instigated war, and both are drawing lines now to try to prevent that from happening again. But everywhere, there are signs small and large that Europe is no longer the dutiful ally it once was, even if it seems that way in front of the klieg lights.

鈥淗ow do we become more independent without having Trump cut us off?鈥� asks Kristina Kausch, deputy managing director of the German Marshall Fund鈥檚 South and Wider Europe program.

In some ways, the best measure of Europe鈥檚 changing security mindset this week came in a development that had nothing to do with Iran. France announced that it was expanding its nuclear arsenal, and it would use its nuclear capabilities to defend several other European nations, including Germany and Poland.

It provides a different, and perhaps more accurate, view of Mr. Merz鈥檚 priorities, says Ms. Kausch. While he is publicly trying to prevent a rupture with the U.S., he is working behind the scenes to wean the country off its reliance on the U.S. for protection.

In this case, France is stepping up as the only EU nation with nuclear weapons. 鈥淔rance can protect its vital interests, and European security is French security,鈥� says Camille Lons of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 鈥淪o if an EU partner gets attacked, it can fall under what we consider sufficient reason for using a nuclear weapon.鈥�

Spain and the U.K. have made more headlines by drawing their own lines on the Iran airstrikes.

Spain has particular reasons to be the only major European power to openly criticize the U.S. and Israel. Some of it is internal politics, with a left-leaning socialist party in power. But through its connections to Latin America and Africa, Spain also has 鈥渁 privileged relationship with the Global South,鈥� says Jos茅 Ignacio Torreblanca, senior adviser to the Madrid office of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

That makes it sensitive to anything with a scent of big-power interventionism. Spain has been an outspoken critic of Israel on Gaza, and it condemned the U.S. operation in Venezuela.

Echoes of the Iraq War also linger. Support for the U.S.-led invasion led to the fall of Spain鈥檚 ruling party after the war. While the current government allowed the U.S. to use Spanish bases for limited airstrikes against Iran last year, the open-ended nature of the new conflict played on old fears.

There was a strong sense that 鈥渨e cannot be dragged into this again,鈥� says Dr. Torreblanca.

The U.K. has tried to walk the same line, though more daintily. It denied the U.S. access to its bases for the initial strike. But Iranian counterattacks, including one on a British base in Cyprus, persuaded the U.K. to make its bases available for 鈥渄efensive鈥� operations.

The Iraq War is never far from the discussion. 鈥淲e鈥檝e learnt the lessons from Iraq,鈥� said Darren Jones, the prime minister鈥檚 chief secretary, to LBC Radio. 鈥淲e don鈥檛 want to go back into war in the Middle East where there is no clear plan and no legal basis to do so.鈥�

To some, Europe鈥檚 reaction doesn鈥檛 amount to much. 鈥淪imply spineless,鈥� says Douglas Webber, an emeritus political scientist at INSEAD in Paris.

Europe will face much more of the blowback than the U.S. 鈥� in the form of higher prices on energy and goods and potentially an influx of people migrating to Europe to escape violence, he says. 鈥淭he EU is condemned to their role of helpless bystanders,鈥� adds Dr. Webber.

Others see more nuance. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a divorce, and the weakest partner doesn鈥檛 have the resources to leave the house,鈥� says Dr. Torreblanca of the ECFR.

But Iran has made something else plain: The U.S. needs Europe and its bases for security, too. The responses of Spain and the U.K., and the French nuclear deal, point to a Europe trying new things, probing the boundaries of a complicated and evolving relationship.

鈥淭hat is not limited to the Iran situation,鈥� says Ms. Kausch of the GMF. 鈥淭here is a broader context. Europe is finding its voice.鈥�