For Kremlin, divide with West isn鈥檛 just geopolitical. It鈥檚 moral.
After years without pushing a dogma, the Kremlin is espousing social conservatism as a defense against what it perceives as an amoral West. Ironically, Moscow鈥檚 concern may be a reflection of the West鈥檚 own culture wars.
After years without pushing a dogma, the Kremlin is espousing social conservatism as a defense against what it perceives as an amoral West. Ironically, Moscow鈥檚 concern may be a reflection of the West鈥檚 own culture wars.
For over a decade, experts have noted that Russian political culture has been drifting away from the pragmatic, technocratic authoritarianism that characterized the first stage of the Vladimir Putin era, which was open to all sorts of cooperation with the West.
Now, it is taking a more ideological stance that sees the West as not merely a geopolitical foe but also the source of destructive moral and cultural contagion.
Russia is considering a law that will require any foreigners entering the country to sign a 鈥渓oyalty agreement,鈥 pledging not to defame Russia鈥檚 history or state institutions, nor to advocate for any 鈥渘ontraditional鈥 sexual ideas while visiting the country. Under the proposed legislation, which is being prepared by the Kremlin, there will be legal consequences for violators.
Another bill presently before the Duma, Russia鈥檚 lower house of parliament, would target foreigners and Russians living abroad for statements and actions deemed 鈥淩ussophobic鈥 鈥 expressing hatred or contempt toward Russia or things Russian. Punishments could include confiscation of property within Russia or a ban on entering the country.
In Soviet times, there was a coherent state ideology strictly curated by the Communist Party. But Russia鈥檚 emerging order seems a mix of tough but often vaguely worded laws designed to limit critical speech and public protest, strengthen military preparedness, and ban 鈥渄eleterious鈥 Western influences such as聽gender-affirming care and public homosexuality. At the same time, the government is pushing an ill-defined campaign to celebrate Russia鈥檚 distinctly conservative civilizational qualities, historical greatness, and adherence to 鈥渢raditional鈥 moral values.
鈥淭his is a way of consolidating the 鈥榞ood Russians,鈥 the patriotic ones, around [President] Putin and the Kremlin,鈥 says Maria Lipman, co-editor of the Russia Post, a journal of Russian affairs published by George Washington University. 鈥淭he government is the main trendsetter, but there are many public actors who put forward their own initiatives, sometimes a bit too much. But in the present atmosphere, it鈥檚 unacceptable to come up with any progressive proposal, but perfectly OK to float any socially conservative idea.鈥
An anti-progressive atmosphere
The Duma has erected a legislative fortress aimed at blocking the penetration of Western influence, beginning in 2012 with laws against foreign-connected civil society groups. Those laws have since led to the banning of most big, internationally connected organizations and the extension of the 鈥渇oreign agent鈥 label to hundreds of groups and individuals that are critical of authority.
The pace of anti-Western measures has intensified amid Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has convinced most Russians is a struggle for survival against a West united in its hostility.
While the Kremlin鈥檚 legal campaign is sweeping, lower-level officials are often eager to push further with their own socially conservative proposals, says Ms. Lipman. Some regional officials have suggested measures to prohibit young women from wearing pants, while a leading Duma deputy recently suggested the restoration of traditional shop classes in which girls learn to make borscht and boys learn to use tools.
鈥淪ome of these ideas are too much, and not likely to get official support,鈥 she says. 鈥淏ut they have the effect of changing the atmosphere, and driving public moods further in the same direction.鈥
For example, growing calls to ban abortion, despite having support of the Russian Orthodox Church, will probably not go far in a society in which women tend to be better educated than men and have been part of the workforce, with full rights to control their private choices, for about a century.
But the mounting campaign against the 鈥減ropaganda of nontraditional sexual identity鈥 is another matter. Experts say that LGBTQ+ people enjoy very little public support in Russia, and hence the intensifying measures against them have received no pushback over the past decade. Any open expression of gay identity has been criminalized,聽gender transition has been legally prohibited, and depictions of any 鈥渘ontraditional鈥 behaviors have been banned from social media as well as from movies and TV.
Late last year, Russia鈥檚 Supreme Court branded the 鈥渋nternational LGBT movement鈥 as an 鈥渆xtremist organization,鈥 a move that suggests authorities believe gay identity isn鈥檛 a native trait but must be a destructive import from abroad.
鈥淭his would be funny if it weren鈥檛 so sad,鈥 says Boris Vishnevsky, a liberal deputy of the St. Petersburg city council. 鈥淭hey banned an organization that doesn鈥檛 exist, so no representatives were able to come forward and speak on its behalf. The effect of this absurd decision will just be to further silence the voices of anyone who has what they call a nontraditional orientation. Now they will be associated with that nonexisting extremist organization, and face criminal prosecution.鈥
Winning converts
Alexander Verkhovsky, director of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, which tracks extremist trends, in Moscow, says that much of the official worry over 鈥渨oke鈥 ideas is, ironically, inspired by Western right-wingers whom the Kremlin sees as a simpatico force.
鈥淭here are a lot of connections between Russian conservatives and especially those in the U.S.,鈥 he says. 鈥淚t seems they adopt some of their issues, such as opposing abortion and [gender-affirming care], even though these do not have very much relevance for Russian society. But it becomes part of the toolbox for propaganda and indoctrination.鈥
Opinion polls show that the Kremlin has been steadily winning its argument that the West is an implacable enemy whose malign influence needs to be resisted by means of strong laws, tougher social control, and vigorous propaganda.
鈥淭here is no longer a disbelief among the public when the government says the West is an enemy, as there used to be in the past,鈥 says Ms. Lipman. 鈥淢ost pro-Western liberals have left Russia since the war began and are no longer part of the internal discussion. Meanwhile Western leaders are sanctioning Russia, helping Ukraine, and openly saying their goal is to weaken Russia. Not surprisingly, Putin鈥檚 anti-Western stance has never been so convincing to the broad Russian public as it is today.鈥