NATO strikes balance between protecting Ukraine 鈥 and itself
The United States and NATO have scrambled to help Ukraine defend itself, but some question whether that is leaving member countries vulnerable on defense.
The United States and NATO have scrambled to help Ukraine defend itself, but some question whether that is leaving member countries vulnerable on defense.
Pentagon officials laud Ukrainian soldiers for 鈥渘ot asking anyone to fight for them,鈥 as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin often points out. 鈥淎ll Ukraine is asking for is the means to fight 鈥 and we鈥檙e determined to provide that means.鈥
That equals weapons and ammunition 鈥 lots of it 鈥 and it鈥檚 no small feat to keep it coming. American military stockpiles are now 鈥渄angerously depleted,鈥 warned a July report from the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C.听
But senior U.S. officials have answered, in effect, 鈥淲e鈥檝e got this.鈥 These reassurances have not wavered despite lingering concerns about how, exactly, the United States and its NATO allies will balance their considerable support for Kyiv with the need to make sure they have enough arms to defend themselves if an adversary attacks.听
Still, helping Ukraine repel Russia is worth taking some risks, many military analysts say. 鈥淲e鈥檝e not been in a position where we鈥檝e got only a few days of some critical munition left,鈥 Pentagon comptroller Michael McCord told reporters recently. 鈥淏ut we are now supporting a partner who is.鈥澨
What have the U.S. and its NATO allies already given Ukraine, anyway?
The U.S. has听tapped into its听existing听weapons stockpiles 26 times since February, committing more than $19 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, Pentagon officials say. It鈥檚 a big jump 鈥 between 2011 and 2015, for example, the U.S. drew down stockpiles 13 times to help allies globally.听This amounts to 56% of military aid to Ukraine among听40 major donor countries, according to the Kiel Institute in Germany.
This includes Javelin missiles; anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; hundreds of Humvees and light tactical vehicles; millions of rounds of small arms ammunition; hundreds of generators, tents, and heaters; and 鈥渟everal thousand pieces鈥 of cold-weather gear for the approaching winter, to name just a few key pieces of kit.听
The Pentagon has also announced that it is doubling to roughly 40 its听shipments of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to Kyiv because of their 鈥渙utsize鈥 impact on the battlefield.听
NATO allies are also opening their weapons stores to Ukraine. Slovenia pledged 40% of its tanks and Norway 45% of its howitzer long-range weapon supplies, according to Kiel Institute analysis. Russian neighbor Estonia has given the equivalent of one-third of its defense budget to Ukraine, Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said in recent remarks at the German Marshall Fund.
Is the U.S. giving Ukraine its best stuff 鈥 and should it?听
Despite pleas from Ukraine and even some NATO allies, the U.S. has not sent fighter jets, tanks, or its Patriot air defense systems to the battlefield.听
These decisions are the result of a confluence of concerns: the risk of escalating the war with Moscow or technology falling into Russian hands, and the fact that some weapons are simply too high-tech for Ukrainian soldiers to quickly learn to operate and 鈥 equally tricky 鈥 to maintain on an unrelenting battlefield.听
Still, some NATO allies have lobbied hard for policy changes. When Germany offered to deploy Patriot missile systems听along Poland鈥檚 border with Ukraine, Warsaw suggested Berlin instead deliver the systems to Kyiv. Poland made a similar suggestion earlier in the war, offering to transfer its U.S.-made fighter jets to Ukraine.
These proposals have been rejected. A single Patriot battery requires about 90 troops to operate it 鈥 troops the U.S. and Germany refuse to send to Ukraine, since should they be harmed, NATO would be forced to retaliate against Russia, catastrophically widening the war.听
There is widespread agreement that this is the right approach. At the same time, having seen the Ukrainian military in action, the U.S. has reevaluated its position to some extent, says Max Bergmann, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.
After the first Russian invasion, which resulted in the annexing of Crimea in 2014, the U.S. remained reticent about 鈥減roviding Ukraine with any sort of advanced technology, including Javelin missiles, to a military infected with Russian agents,鈥 Mr. Bergmann says. 鈥淣ow, the U.S. has opened its aperture when it comes to military technology, because Ukraine鈥檚 needs outweigh the risks of Russia getting its hands on it.鈥澨听
Will the U.S. and NATO allies have enough weapons in their stockpiles to defend themselves in the future?
The U.S. is certainly running through stockpiles of some of its weapons 鈥 an estimated one-third of its inventory of Javelin and Stinger missiles, for starters, according to a CSIS analysis. Others 鈥 guided TOW anti-tank missiles and launchers among them 鈥 remain 鈥減lentiful鈥 alternatives. The U.S. has given more than 1.5 million 155 mm projectiles to Kyiv, 鈥減robably close to the limit鈥 that Washington can give 鈥渨ithout risk to its own war fighting capabilities,鈥 the report adds.
Given battlefield demand and profit potential, defense contractors are increasing production. Lockheed Martin plans to boost output from 60 HIMARS to 96 annually, for example. These ramp-ups can take months or even years, however.
In the meantime, while officials understandably dislike dipping below designated stockpile levels, there鈥檚 always the possibility of adjusting these to 鈥渁bsorb a little more risk, and I think that鈥檚 something worth doing,鈥 Mr. Bergmann says. 鈥淚f a Russian tank is destroyed, that鈥檚 ultimately depleting your adversary. I think that鈥檚 something that has to be taken into account here.鈥澨