海角大神

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi used a press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin in September to publicly criticize Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine 鈥� 鈥淭oday鈥檚 era is not of war,鈥� Mr. Modi said 鈥� Washington and other Western capitals cheered the show of independence from Moscow.

But Mr. Modi struck an equally independent stance when the Biden administration sought India鈥檚 condemnation of Russia over Ukraine at the United Nations. In a similar fashion, India has stood firm as the United States has ramped up pressure on India to stop buying Russian oil. In fact, Russia moved up several notches to become India鈥檚 top oil supplier in October, surpassing Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

These events and more suggest how India鈥檚 vision of its role in the world is changing, as it rises from its longtime status as the world鈥檚 largest democracy 鈥� though a poor and underdeveloped one 鈥� to a middle economic and political power on the cusp of surpassing China as the world鈥檚 most populous country.

For decades India was a leader of the 鈥渘onaligned movement鈥� of developing countries struggling to advance in a post-World War II international system designed by the U.S. and other wealthy Western powers. Its closest ally was the Soviet Union.

But India under Mr. Modi increasingly sees itself as what officials and diplomats describe as an independent 鈥渕iddle power,鈥� partnering with the U.S. on a range of strategic issues based on common goals and values, but aligning itself with no single power or group of countries.

鈥淚ndia is at a flexion point in its international relationships,鈥� says Indrani Bagchi, CEO of the Ananta Aspen Centre in New Delhi and a prominent analyst of Indian foreign policy. It is 鈥減ivoting from its legacy relationships, such as with Russia,鈥� to the political and economic 鈥渁lliances that will serve India most as it seeks to emerge as a global economic power and further the objective of balancing China,鈥� she says.

鈥淚n this emerging context India won鈥檛 be 鈥榥onaligned鈥� or allied with any one country or power,鈥� she adds, 鈥渋nstead it will be 鈥榤ulti-aligned鈥� according to national interests.鈥�

Officials and foreign policy experts say India will deepen partnerships that fit its needs. That means relations with the U.S., which have warmed and strengthened considerably over the past two decades, are likely to continue their upward trajectory.

鈥淚ndia is trying to create an enabling environment for its own transformation,鈥� says Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian ambassador to China who served as national security adviser to former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a big job, and we can鈥檛 do it without good relations with the United States.鈥澛�

Opportunity to lead

At the same time, India will try its hand at leading when it believes it can make a difference.

India鈥檚 presidency over the next year of the G-20 group of major and middle economies is an example of this brand of leadership, experts say.

Mr. Modi will use the coming year in the global diplomatic spotlight to pursue goals ranging from climate justice and mitigation to equitable green economic development from the perspective of the 鈥済lobal south鈥� economies, Indian observers say. He also sees the G-20 presidency as an opportunity to shape global perspectives of India, they add.

But some say this approach will include a dose of realism and self-awareness of the limits a rising but still developing power like India faces internationally.

鈥淢odi wants to boost India鈥檚 international stature, but at the same time he knows that India is not at the point either politically or economically of assuming the role of a great power,鈥� says Pramit Chaudhuri, who heads the Eurasia Group鈥檚 India activities in New Delhi. 鈥淭hat means focusing on the international issues that matter most to India, like China and climate change, while downplaying the issues where India realizes it doesn鈥檛 have the clout or diplomatic bandwidth to make a difference.鈥�

He notes, for example, that when the Group of Seven leading industrial nations asked India to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, Mr. Modi declined 鈥� recognizing, Mr. Chauduri says, that India was unlikely to succeed in such a high-stakes role.

鈥淚ndia wants to position itself lower down the rungs, away from high-profile roles,鈥� Mr. Chaudhuri says. As evidence, he points to how Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has over recent months 鈥渞eframed his own description of India from 鈥榣eading power鈥� to 鈥榓spiring to be a leading power.鈥欌��

Coalition of the willing

India鈥檚 focus on alignments that can serve its purpose while not boxing it in makes the Quad grouping of Indo-Pacific powers 鈥� the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India 鈥� a particularly attractive partnership for New Delhi, Indian experts say. A relative newcomer to global partnerships, the Quad was formalized in 2007 after the four countries worked together successfully on the 2004 Aceh tsunami.聽

鈥淚n this context where 鈥榤ulti-alignment鈥� is the new mantra, the Quad is the right fit because it offers the flexibility India wants,鈥� says Ms. Bagchi. 鈥淔or India, the overarching draw of the Quad is its ability to collectively counter China,鈥� she says. But unlike a constraining alliance, the Quad also offers India the 鈥渇lexibility鈥� that suits it, she adds.

The Quad has 26 working groups that members participate in or not according to their strengths and interests, an organizational model she says works well with India鈥檚 vision of its international role.

鈥淚t鈥檚 what George Bush used to call 鈥榗oalitions of the willing,鈥欌�� Ms. Bagchi says, 鈥渁nd that鈥檚 the kind of 鈥榗oalition鈥� India is comfortable with as a rising power at its stage of development.鈥�

With its focus on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region and freedom of maritime navigation, the Quad fits with India鈥檚 aim of balancing China in the region. India on its own doesn鈥檛 give China much pause in its regional pursuits, Indian analysts say, but India teamed up with the U.S. and the other Quad partners is more to reckon with.

鈥淐hina sees India as too poor, too undisciplined, too chaotic to deal with as a peer power, but that has changed as we have moved closer to the United States, and to Japan,鈥� Ms. Bagchi says. 鈥淎s India has warmed to the U.S. and joined the Quad, the Chinese have taken full notice.鈥�

Goals and values

Another factor explaining India鈥檚 warming towards the U.S. is a youth population more drawn to the values of freedom and individual merit than to the collectivist ideologies popular in post-independence India. Thus one survey this year showed Indian youth anticipate a growing shift in India away from traditional partners like Russia towards closer links with the U.S. and other Western countries.

During a visit to Washington in September, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar extolled the strengthening and warming of U.S.-India relations over recent decades and credited ever-closer ties between the two countries鈥� people with providing the foundation for the growing friendship.

India is also tailoring its international partnerships to take full advantage of Western economies鈥� accelerating decoupling from China as their principal economic partner.

India鈥檚 GDP may only be one-fifth of China鈥檚 currently, but Indian officials thrill to contrasting their country鈥檚 growing young and educated population with China鈥檚 aging population.聽

And global tech giants and others have taken notice. In September, Apple shifted some of its iPhone 14 production to a Foxconn plant in Chennai, India. In a report the same month, J.P. Morgan projected that Apple鈥檚 twofold goal of meeting smartphone demand in the booming Indian market while also shifting manufacturing away from China will result in India producing about 25% of all iPhones by 2025 鈥� up from about 5% today.

For Mr. Chaudhuri, India understands that dampening China鈥檚 intentions of becoming the Indo-Pacific region鈥檚 dominant power will require India becoming an economic, political, and military power to be reckoned with.

鈥淚ndia now realizes that the best way to challenge China鈥檚 regional goals is to keep it wary of you and convinced that you can match them if they push,鈥� he says.

And that, analysts say, explains Mr. Modi鈥檚 dual focus on growing India鈥檚 economy and its international partnerships with like-minded powers that count with Beijing.

鈥淚ndia and the U.S. see pretty much eye to eye when it comes to the importance of counterbalancing China,鈥� Mr. Chaudhuri says. 鈥淭hat goes a long way in explaining the upward trajectory in U.S.-India relations.鈥�