海角大神

In the spring of 2019, Matt Pottinger,听then the Asia director for the National Security Council,听was working at his office in the White House when a rare document caught his attention.

A secret speech delivered by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to China鈥檚 Communist Party Central Committee in 2013, not long after Mr. Xi took power, had just been published in China鈥檚 top party journal, Qiushi. Mr. Pottinger found it especially revealing of Mr. Xi鈥檚 worldview.

鈥淭he language was so explicit,鈥� Mr. Pottinger recalls of the speech, in which Mr. Xi laid out an ambitious strategy for China鈥檚 Communist Party to win a fierce ideological struggle against the capitalist West. 鈥淐apitalism,鈥� Mr. Xi said, 鈥渋s bound to die out.鈥澨�

The stark difference between Mr. Xi鈥檚 internal call for party leaders to steel themselves for protracted conflict with a hostile West and his outward promotion of 鈥渨in-win鈥� cooperation abroad underscored what Mr. Pottinger saw as a pattern of deliberate deception and dual messaging by Beijing.听

鈥淚 was struck by how wide the disparity was,鈥� says Mr. Pottinger, a fluent Chinese speaker听who helped craft a major U.S. policy shift on China during the Trump administration.

In recent years, trust between Washington and Beijing has hit rock bottom. At the root of the mistrust is Washington鈥檚 belief that China seeks to undermine the current international order, and Beijing鈥檚 view that the United States seeks to curb China鈥檚 rise and overthrow its Communist Party leadership. Exacerbating such fears on both sides are deep feelings of betrayal 鈥� over words and actions that don鈥檛 align.

鈥淭hat鈥檚 the danger 鈥� you have these behaviors that are not in line with what each country is saying publicly, and they are regarded by the other as ... hypocrisy, if not betrayal, in original understandings and commitments,鈥� says Michael Swaine, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft听and听expert in Chinese defense and foreign policy.

From engagement to suspicion

For decades, the U.S. had operated on a strategy of engagement. It was predicated on the belief that China鈥檚 market reforms and opening would promote the country's integration into the U.S.-led, liberal post-World War II order 鈥� as well as, possibly, political reforms.

Yet Beijing鈥檚听increasing assertiveness abroad and repression at home听convinced Mr. Pottinger and other senior U.S. officials that such assumptions were wrong, and that China鈥檚 leaders had disguised their true intentions. The 2017 national security strategy that Mr. Pottinger helped design labels听China as a threatening, 鈥渞evisionist鈥� power determined to reshape the international order and displace America in Asia 鈥� a position shared by the current administration.

Trust, some officials concluded,听was no longer relevant in U.S.-China relations. 鈥淭he idea that you can build trust鈥� with China鈥檚 leaders 鈥渋s an oxymoron,鈥� says Mr. Pottinger, now chairman of the China program听at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank focused on national security, and author of the forthcoming book 鈥淭he Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps To Defend Taiwan.鈥�

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel, who also served in the Clinton and Obama administrations, put it bluntly on a Wall Street Journal podcast last August. 鈥淲e鈥檇 like to have a great relationship [with China], but if they are going to keep lying and cheating as a modus operandi of the state ... you would be a fool to go into that ... negotiation not cognizant of what they鈥檙e doing,鈥� he said.

For its part, Beijing, too, is suspicious of what it views as incongruity between U.S. words and U.S. actions. It sees growing American support for Taiwan 鈥� especially military听sales and training听鈥� as violating past U.S. commitments, with the aim of making Taiwan a sovereign security ally and weakening China.

鈥淭he U.S. has no heart to honor its commitment to China ... no intent to preserve the consensus reached with China [on Taiwan],鈥� says Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based international relations scholar and expert on U.S.-China ties. 鈥淭he U.S. wants to stop China from attaining unification.鈥�

Beijing sees U.S. controls on technology exports to China not as valid national security measures, but as part of a broader plan to hurt China鈥檚 economy and threaten the party鈥檚 legitimacy. Beijing believes 鈥渢he U.S. wants to prevent China from challenging America, to sustain America鈥檚 overwhelming dominance,鈥� Dr. Shen says.

The spiral of mistrust assumes a life of its own, leading 鈥渂oth sides to double down on signals of resolve,鈥� and fueling extreme, at times cartoonish, narratives about the other, says Dr. Swaine.

Last fall, the two countries clashed over deception itself. After a U.S. State Department report said Beijing was funding a multibillion-dollar global disinformation campaign, China鈥檚 Foreign Ministry shot back, calling the U.S. the 鈥渆mpire of lies.鈥�

Building a 鈥渨orkable paradigm鈥�

To be sure, trust between nation states is often challenging. A level of suspicion has always existed between the U.S. and China. But today鈥檚 extreme trust deficit is leading to alternative approaches 鈥� ones that stress top-level communications, transparent competition, and reciprocity 鈥� as ways to promote predictability, experts say.

President Joe Biden and Mr. Xi have pressing domestic priorities 鈥� China鈥檚 economic woes for Mr. Xi, and reelection for Mr. Biden 鈥� and amid the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, they both seek to lower U.S.-China tensions.

The two leaders signaled their interest in a more stable relationship when meeting outside San Francisco last November. Asked whether he trusted Mr. Xi, Mr. Biden responded, 鈥溾�楾rust but verify,鈥� as the old saying goes. That鈥檚 where I am.鈥� He added that, over many hours of meetings, Mr. Xi has 鈥渂een straight.鈥�

Regular calls and meetings between the presidents can help avert misunderstandings, experts say, especially given Mr. Xi鈥檚 concentration of power and mistrust within China鈥檚 opaque system, which could limit what lower officials tell Mr. Xi.

The Biden-Xi meeting has led to other critical dialogues between the governments. High-level military communications have resumed after more than a year鈥檚 hiatus 鈥� a step toward preventing dangerous miscalculations.

鈥淲e鈥檙e definitely at a better place,鈥� says Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a think tank focused on issues related to global peace. 鈥淭he two governments can actually talk to each other without ... having a complete meltdown.鈥�

Both sides are also encouraging ties between ordinary American and Chinese people, whose friendly bonds can flourish despite official mistrust.

鈥淣ow鈥檚 the time to look for the opportunities that remain to expand relationships鈥� among scholars, students, and other individuals, says retired Gen. H.R. McMaster, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, who served as national security advisor from 2017 to 2018.

Greater stress on reciprocity 鈥� in trade and other exchanges 鈥� is also creating opportunities for progress, experts say. Unlike during the trade war, reciprocity could be used as positive leverage moving forward, says Yasheng Huang, a professor of global management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 鈥淵ou lob tariffs on me; I lob tariffs on you 鈥� that is reciprocity but in a negative way,鈥� says Dr. Huang, author of 鈥淭he Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead To Its Decline.鈥�

Instead, for example, Washington could hold off on tariffs for six months, giving Beijing a chance to act to avoid them. 鈥淵ou give the other side some optionality ... rather than immediately undertaking punitive action,鈥� Dr. Huang says.

Moreover, as the two countries vigorously compete in pursuit of their divergent national interests, clarity around their priorities can promote stability, even when trust is absent, experts say.听

鈥淭he more candid we are about things that Beijing does that harm our interests, the closer we are to a workable paradigm,鈥� Mr. Pottinger says.