海角大神

A huge red banner lining a corridor in a warehouse-like Shanghai quarantine hospital declares Chinese leader Xi Jinping鈥檚 exhortation in bold white characters: 鈥淧ersistence is Victory!鈥�

Mr. Xi鈥檚 call for persistence聽is now China鈥檚 watchword 鈥� not only in the battle to contain the country鈥檚 biggest COVID-19 outbreak but also across many other fronts. His overarching goal:聽to prevent social unrest and political doubts in the run-up to the crucial 20th Congress of the ruling Communist Party this fall, when Mr. Xi is expected to win a rare third term in power.

鈥淧ersistence means hardship, exhaustion, and holding on with gritted teeth,鈥� said a commentary last week in the Communist Party鈥檚 main newspaper, People鈥檚 Daily.

Staying the course will be difficult, China experts say, because Mr. Xi鈥檚 bold domestic and foreign policies are controversial. His strict zero-COVID-19 strategy, his staunch support for Russia, and a recent crackdown on tech giants have broad popular support, but their economic price has nonetheless sparked intense debate among Chinese analysts, stakeholders, and the public.聽

Yet analysts expect Mr.聽Xi will continue to double down on聽his policies,聽at least until the party congress, lest any adjustments offer ammunition to his critics. Any hint of uncertainty could complicate Mr. Xi鈥檚 plans to extend his rule as China鈥檚 most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, and to buttress it through the promotion of trusted allies.

In China鈥檚 political culture, 鈥渢he reorientation of policy ... raises a lot of questions. The first question is, was that policy wrong?鈥� says Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington. 鈥淲ith his policy currently, he鈥檚 already creating a lot of complaints and ... dissatisfaction within the country, so for him to change the policy now is going to be politically even more risky than not changing it.鈥�

More broadly, Mr. Xi has centralized power since he took charge a decade ago, making the party and government less flexible and pragmatic, experts say. Mr. Xi has strengthened the party by rooting out corruption and indiscipline, but he has also transformed it into 鈥渁 top-down and single-leader dominant institution 鈥� not one that is responsive to the needs and input from other actors inside and outside the system,鈥� says David Shambaugh, founding聽director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

Maintaining the status quo

As the congress approaches, Chinese authorities across the country are stepping up efforts to head off any potential disruptions.

Security officials have launched a drive to eliminate social and political 鈥渞isks鈥� and ensure the 鈥渧ictorious hosting of the 20th Party Congress,鈥� said Chen Yixin, secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, China鈥檚 top law enforcement body, at a meeting in April, according to the commission鈥檚 official social media account.

鈥淢aintaining a stable domestic environment in the lead-up to the party congress is the top priority 鈥� every policy is made to ensure that goal,鈥� says Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Beijing.

The congress is an event held once every five years at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to set major policies and select top leaders 鈥� including the roughly 370-strong Central Committee and 25-member Politburo. In backroom deliberations, senior party leaders select the Politburo鈥檚 Standing Committee, the pinnacle of party power.

While Mr. Xi鈥檚 securing of a third term is virtually guaranteed, the success of those he will seek to promote is less so.

鈥淭he ... probable outcome is that Xi is appointed ... but maybe he will not get up around him all the folks that he wants,鈥� constraining his power in a third term, said Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society and the former prime minister of Australia, at a recent online talk at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

One indicator of Mr. Xi鈥檚 strength will be what happens to his prot茅g茅 Li Qiang, Shanghai鈥檚 Communist Party leader. Although he was once tipped for the Standing Committee, Mr. Li鈥檚 unpopularity over his management of a punishing lockdown in Shanghai might prompt Mr. Xi to jettison him in order to salvage his own credibility, Dr. Sun suggests.

Lockdown woes

This month, Mr. Xi presided over a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee that issued a stern warning over any wavering from China鈥檚 zero-COVID-19 policy, indicating concerns about dissenting views. The group pledged to 鈥渞esolutely struggle against all words and deeds that distort, doubt and deny our epidemic prevention policies,鈥澛燼ccording to official press accounts.聽

Pro-government commentators, epidemiologists, business executives, and many ordinary people have questioned the zero-COVID-19 strategy and its mounting economic and social costs.

鈥淭he Shanghai lockdown ... indicates the limits in what individual Chinese citizens can tolerate in terms of a COVID policy,鈥� says Jennifer Hsu, research fellow in聽the聽Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Program聽at the Lowy Institute in Australia. 鈥淲e can definitely see people鈥檚 patience for that kind of extreme policy measure reaching almost a breaking point. When it starts to affect people鈥檚 livelihoods, people鈥檚 ability to source and acquire goods for basic survival, the state has to take note of that.鈥�

Yet, she says, 鈥渁ny backtracking by Xi would be particularly fraught ... because he has invested so much of his personal capital into that policy which he has deemed for saving lives.鈥澛�

China has so far succeeded in keeping COVID-19 cases and deaths extremely low by global standards. Mr. Xi and the party have argued that any loosening of the policy could risk causing an overwhelmed medical system and large-scale illness and fatalities, especially among the 50 million people in China聽over the age of 60 who are not yet fully vaccinated.

Seeking to prevent instability, Mr. Xi will not deviate from the zero-COVID-19 approach and instead will 鈥渄o all things to maintain the status quo 鈥� he will not challenge himself,鈥� says Alfred Wu, associate professor in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. 鈥淗e will take a 100% sure approach in terms of his third term.鈥�

Russia concerns

Beijing鈥檚 staunch backing for Russia and Moscow鈥檚 position on Ukraine has also generated debate within China 鈥� yet again, the consensus among experts is that Mr. Xi will persevere with the strategy.聽

China鈥檚 public is generally supportive of Russia, reflecting in part the pro-Russia stance in official media and the distribution of Russian state broadcasts here. Yet privately, among policy experts and some ordinary people, debates have been intense, experts say.

鈥淚t鈥檚 one of the most divisive issues in recent years that really set different groups of people arguing fiercely against each other, including in the expert community,鈥� says Dr. Zhao.

鈥淢any experts are against this war. They blame Russia for the invasion, and they don鈥檛 want China to be seen as part of this block that supports Russia,鈥� he says. Another concern is that China will be 鈥渆ntrapped鈥� and its interests and international reputation potentially compromised by future actions of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, he says.

One prominent expert, Hu Wei, vice chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the聽Counselor鈥檚 Office of the State Council, published an article in early March urging Beijing to change course. 鈥淭o demonstrate China鈥檚 role as a responsible major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should take concrete actions to prevent Putin鈥檚 possible adventures,鈥� he wrote, in what experts called an open bid to influence official policy.

China鈥檚 alignment with Russia, intended as a strategic counterweight to the United States, was advanced in a Feb. 4 joint declaration stating that the friendship between the two countries had 鈥渘o limits.鈥� Mr. Xi鈥檚 鈥減ersonal inclination to forge this very strong and close strategic partnership with Russia has been one of the main drivers of the bilateral relationship,鈥� Dr. Zhao says.

Beijing has聽reaffirmed that聽it will stick to this policy, despite its potential to damage long-term relations with Europe and the U.S., he says. Still, in the context of the upcoming 20th聽Party Congress, 鈥渢he war is not good news for China,鈥� Dr. Zhao adds. 鈥淚t has all sorts of implications that could perhaps destabilize the domestic situation and could cause unprecedented economic ... shock waves.鈥�

Economic toll

The promise of rising economic prosperity remains the bedrock of party legitimacy,聽yet聽China has now fallen into its worst slowdown since early 2020,聽according to the latest聽economic data聽released Monday by the National Bureau of Statistics. Industrial production slumped 2.9% 鈥� and retail sales 11.1% 鈥� from a year earlier. 鈥淭he increasingly grim and complex international environment and greater shock of COVID-19 pandemic at home obviously exceeded expectation,鈥� the bureau said. 鈥淣ew downward pressure on the economy continued to grow.鈥澛�

China鈥檚 economic growth for this year 鈥� targeted at 5.5% 鈥� is now forecast by financial analysts to be about 4%. Already, growth had been slowly declining amid long-term challenges of an aging population, a shrinking workforce, heavy local debt, and an economic policy that favors less efficient state enterprises over the private sector.聽

Earlier this year, Mr. Xi unveiled a campaign for 鈥渃ommon prosperity鈥� that included swift regulatory crackdowns on big tech firms, business magnates, and industries such as private tutoring and gaming. The campaign follows Mr. Xi鈥檚 successful poverty alleviation drive and is intended to boost his already strong popularity among China鈥檚 large low-income population. But the drastic, overnight regulatory moves spooked overseas investors and Chinese entrepreneurs.

鈥淗e wants to please very much the grassroots people and show he cares about income distribution,鈥� says Dr. Wu.

Now, COVID-19 restrictions in major cities are disrupting businesses and production nationwide, drawing complaints from foreign chambers of commerce. Costs to fiscal revenue are mounting from mass testing requirements. Unemployment in 31 major cities surged to a pandemic high of 6.7% in April, leading Premier Li Keqiang to warn this month of a 鈥済rave鈥� job market, and labor protests have also increased, according to the China Labor Bulletin.

While Mr. Xi has heralded China鈥檚 advance to become a 鈥渇ully developed, rich and powerful nation鈥� by 2049, his growth-dampening policies are making China鈥檚 economy and society less dynamic, experts say. Politically, his dominance over decision-making is limiting China鈥檚 leeway for making course corrections.

Persistence may well lead to victory in China, but how that victory is defined and by whom is another question.