海角大神

Two months after I arrived in Beijing in 2006 to head 海角大神's Asia bureau, North Korea exploded its first ever nuclear device. The chorus of international condemnation was loud and unanimous; the world agreed that this was intolerable.

Ten years later, two months before I leave this post, Pyongyang exploded a nuclear device for the fourth time, thumbing its nose yet again at UN resolutions forbidding such tests. Then it fired an illegal ballistic missile this month, just to make its point.

鈥淲e鈥檝e achieved nothing over the past decade,鈥� laments Winston Lord, a former US ambassador to China. 鈥淚n fact things have gotten worse and worse.鈥�

On Thursday, President Obama signed into a law a new set of US economic sanctions on North Korea that freeze the assets of anyone doing business related to North Korea's nuclear or missiles programs. But there is little reason to believe that they will prove any more effective than similar measures imposed in the past.听

Indeed, it is听entirely possible that by the time the next US president's first term ends, North Korea will possess a nuclear-armed long-range missile capable of striking American soil. And nothing appears to be happening, diplomatically or militarily, that might avert that prospect.

鈥淲e are heading in a very dangerous direction,鈥� warns Mike Chinoy, author of 鈥淢eltdown,鈥� a chronicle of repeated US and international efforts 鈥� and eventual failure 鈥� to rein in North Korea鈥檚 nuclear program. 鈥淚t is worrying on every count.鈥�

The prospect of a secretive, nuclear-armed, pariah regime with almost no stake in the international system frightens China and the rest of Asia as much as America.听 But nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang have been a 20-year, slow-motion diplomatic trainwreck, off the rails completely for the past four years. And though the North Koreans are often cast as the only villains, all the major players, including Beijing and Washington, have undercut negotiations at one point or another, contributing to the current stalemate.

The Americans, for example, along with allies Japan and South Korea, promised back in 1994 to build two light water reactors for North Korea if it shut down the nuclear plant from which it was reprocessing fuel for weapons. This was hailed as a landmark deal that would put an end to North Korea鈥檚 nuclear threat.听But amid mutual suspicions,听the allies put that project on the back-burner until the first concrete was poured听eight years later, and abandoned it in 2003.

Pyongyang was also angered in January 2002 when President George W. Bush called North Korea part of an 鈥渁xis of evil,鈥� along with Iraq and Iran.听This did not sit well with a US pledge听to North Korea鈥檚 leadership听two years earlier 鈥渢o make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.鈥�

'Don't count on China'

For its part, China has consistently shielded North Korea from strong UN sanctions that might听force听the regime to make concessions听on its nuclear program.听听A month after the latest nuclear test, the UN Security Council has still not agreed on new sanctions because Beijing is dragging its feet.

Beijing is fearful of听the fallout from regime collapse听and moved by traditional ties of friendship, says Sun Zhe, a diplomatic adviser to the Chinese government. As a result, 鈥淐hina has not done enough substantively鈥� to back President Xi Jinping鈥檚 declarations that North Korea should give up its nuclear weapons program.

鈥淒on鈥檛 count on China鈥� to get tough, he adds, even when North Korea disregards Beijing鈥檚 admonitions as cavalierly as Kim Jong-Il and his son Kim Jong-Un have ignored Washington鈥檚 warnings and UN resolutions.听听Time after time, in Sisyphean fashion, US negotiators have rolled the boulder of agreement with Pyongyang to the top of the mountain, only to watch the North Koreans push it down to the bottom again with a provocative action.

听The last such episode, four years ago, saw the US pledge food aid in return for a freeze on nuclear and missile tests.听What was the response?听Just听six weeks later, to celebrate the first听anniversary of Kim Jong-Il鈥檚 death, Pyongyang launched a satellite using a rocket that could double as a long range ballistic weapon.

鈥淭hat was the final nail in the coffin,鈥� recalls Mr. Chinoy,听a former CNN correspondent in Asia. 鈥淎ny appetite remaining in the Obama administration to talk to North Korea went out of the window.鈥�

Washington plumped instead for 鈥渟trategic patience,鈥� diplomatic-speak for doing nothing, and simply refusing to acknowledge North Korea鈥檚 claimed status as a nuclear power.

The limits of sanctions

The current US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, is trying to fashion a package of Security Council sanctions with teeth. South Korean President Park Geun-hye, who took office promising step-by-step trust-building measures with the North, has now 鈥済one into John Wayne mode,鈥� in the words of one observer, threatening 鈥渂one numbing鈥� sanctions.听

But even if China goes along, which nobody expects it will, what good would such sanctions do, wonders David Kang, head of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California.

鈥淣orth Korea meets pressure with pressure,鈥� he argues. 鈥淲hen we squeeze them, they squeeze back. If they didn鈥檛 crack in the mid-'90s when 500,000 people died in the famine, how can we possibly crack them now?鈥�

Prof. Kang believes the worm has been in the bud since the Bush administration abandoned the 1994 鈥淔ramework Agreement鈥� that had frozen North Korea鈥檚 nuclear program for eight years. 鈥淭hey thought Washington had moved the goalposts,鈥� he says.

Other analysts suggest that Pyongyang crossed the Rubicon with its first nuclear test in 2006; until then, Kim Jong-Il had seemed ready to use the nuclear program as a bargaining card he could use to win a security deal with Washington, eliminating the US threat that he felt. After the test, he regarded the program as his best guarantee of warding off that perceived threat, which perhaps loomed larger in his mind after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Setting preconditions

At one time, the North Koreans听saw听denuclearization as a route to normal relations and a peace treaty with the United States that would definitively end the Korean War; now they demand the establishment of diplomatic relations as a precondition for any talks on their nuclear ambitions. Washington rejects that formulation听outright.

鈥淭here is no way they will give up their nuclear weapons now; they have absolute priority for Kim Jong-un,鈥� says Ambassador Lord,听who served as assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the 1990s.听But the North Korean leader might be persuaded to at least freeze the nuclear program with a mix of US military pressure, really harsh听international听sanctions, and Chinese diplomatic pressure, he hopes.

The idea of accepting North Korea as a nuclear power is 鈥渢oo heretical in Washington鈥� to be discussed, says Scott Snyder, a Korea expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

As long as the 鈥渉ermit kingdom鈥� remains a hereditary Communist dictatorship, he predicts, US policy will remain unchanged. But with market forces rising in North Korea, he believes, the ruling elite is losing some of its control.听听Perhaps, Mr. Snyder suggests, some sort of 鈥渞egime transformation ... towards an authoritarian system rather than a personal fiefdom鈥� might pave the way for more fruitful talks. But he sees no hope of the current regime accepting such a transformation, and 鈥測ears of debate in Washington鈥� over the value of such a change even if it happened.听听So that does not appear to be a realistic way out.

Nor does forcible听US-led听regime change, as seen in Iraq and Libya, where US policy did not achieve the desired goals. This Middle East experience - and a reluctance to infuriate Beijing - rule out a military option.