海角大神

鈥�A version of this post originally appeared on the author's personal blog. The views expressed are her own.聽

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir聽sacked Vice President Riek Machar聽and dissolved the government Tuesday, leaving undersecretaries of various ministries to run said ministries until further notice. Although there had been a few聽recent indications聽of internal fissures within the ruling Sudan Peoples鈥� Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the cold war between Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar had been聽heating up since the spring, I don鈥檛 know that anyone had been anticipating anything this drastic. Indeed, national and international observers聽expected Kiir to eventually fire Machar, but I don鈥檛 think anyone expected him to nuke his entire cabinet.

For those unfamiliar with the history between these two men: Machar and Kiir were both senior commanders in the Sudan Peoples鈥� Liberation Army (SPLA) during Sudan鈥檚 Second Civil War (1983-2005). In August 1991, Machar, along with Lam Akol and Gordon Kong, issued a paper entitled聽鈥淲hy John Garang Must Go Now, 鈥澛�criticizing the leadership of the head of the SPLA and launching a聽breakaway faction of the movement.

(This is a vast oversimplification of the events leading to what is called the Nasir Coup and what the implications were for the SPLA and South Sudan, so I recommend reading Douglas H. Johnson鈥檚聽The Root Causes of Sudan鈥檚 Civil Wars,聽Robert O. Collins鈥櫬�A History of Modern Sudan, and John Young鈥檚聽The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process.)

The split within the SPLA was detrimental because up until that point, the SPLA had been beating the Sudanese military on the battlefield. (Matthew Arnold & Matthew Leriche鈥檚聽South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence聽is a great source for understanding the ebb and flow of SPLA strength from 1983 through independence.) However the SPLA鈥檚 rear base in Ethiopia and support from the Derg regime of聽Mengistu Haile Mariam聽there聽went away when that聽regime聽fell in May 1991, leaving the SPLA extremely vulnerable.

Thus, on top of the crisis of losing Ethiopia鈥檚 support, the coup not only further weakened the SPLA, but also fanned the flames of a brutal decade of South-South (Dinka-Nuer, Nuer-Nuer) violence in the Greater Upper Nile region (present day Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states) from which South Sudan is still recovering.

The Nasir Coup did not, in fact, result in an uprising against Mr. Garang within the SPLA, so over the next decade Machar went on to lead many alphabet soups worth of rebel movements and even formed a tactical alliance with the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) / National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum. He reconciled with Garang in 2002, and became Kiir's vice president upon Garang鈥檚 death in July 2005.

Due to Machar鈥檚 betrayal of the SPLA in 1991 and the fact that the Nasir Coup precipitated South Sudan鈥檚 鈥渃ivil war within a civil war鈥� in the 1990s, his presence in the government had always been a marriage of convenience, and even of necessity. As a former rebel leader and a influential politician from the聽Nuer聽ethnic group (second largest in South Sudan after the聽Dinka), having Machar in such a high position was one of the ways to demonstrate that the Republic of South Sudan would not suffer from 鈥淒inka hegemony.鈥�

To fast forward to today鈥檚 events 鈥� fortunately (or unfortunately?) Salva鈥檚 entire cabinet has been sacked, so this hopefully will not be interpreted as specifically targeting Machar or collectively, the Nuer, for marginalization. Note that Deng Alor (former Minister of Cabinet Affairs, and previously Foreign Minister and a Dinka)聽had already been sacked last month聽and is said to be under investigation for corruption, while Pagan Amum (SPLM Secretary General, from the聽Shilluk聽ethnic group) was also part of today鈥檚 mass firing.

Therefore, until we see what South Sudan鈥檚 new cabinet looks like, it鈥檚 going to be difficult to see who鈥檚 been marginalized and speculate as to what they might do about it. But just to plant this idea in your mind 鈥� the previous period of political competition in South Sudan leading up to and following the 2010 elections聽corresponded with a proliferation of armed groups聽led by or supported by individuals excluded from the country鈥檚 new political dispensation. So the recomposition of Salva鈥檚 cabinet and how the SPLM handles the runup to the 2015 elections will be critical in determining whether or not we see armed movements re-emerging.

For insight on why today鈥檚 developments are such a big deal, I highly recommend the聽International Crisis Group鈥榮 April 2011 report,聽Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan. By many accounts, comparisons between Kiir and his predecessor, Garang, distinguish between Garang鈥檚 authoritarianism and Kiir鈥檚 efforts to be more conciliatory towards his opponents inside and outside of the political elite.

This approach, one could argue, is what enabled southern Sudan, which was emerging from south-south violence during the 1990s, to come together to vote for independence in the January 2011 referendum and to become the Republic of South Sudan just over two years ago.

Conciliation and compromise on the part of Kiir led to him bringing former adversaries into the SPLM/A fold 鈥� into his large tent, as the report describes it. Viewed positively, these characteristics led to the signing of the 2006聽Juba Declaration, which neutralized the threat armed groups posed to the government of South Sudan in the immediate aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Viewed negatively, Salva鈥檚 need for consensus coupled with the weakness of his government meant that he could, until recently, only pay lip service to tackling聽massive corruption within his government, lest his allies and former adversaries turn against him.

Throughout his time in power, Kiir has played a delicate balancing act, trying to remain in control of South Sudan while bringing rebels and dissenters into the fold. Sacking the entire cabinet and dissolving the government, however, doesn鈥檛 track with anything he鈥檚 done as a leader thus far.