海角大神

The Iran war is still widening. Yet no matter how and when it ends, one thing has become clear during its first tumultuous days: the emergence of Israel as a regional superpower intent on redrawing the politics聽鈥� and the map聽鈥� of a transformed Middle East.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 confidence in being able to do so rests not only on Israel鈥檚 own military, technological, and intelligence edge over its neighbors.

It鈥檚 because of another transformation: President Donald Trump鈥檚 break with previous administrations鈥� efforts to influence and sometimes restrain Israeli policy, and his elevation of the United States鈥� security alliance with Israel into something far closer to a full military partnership.

The depth of that partnership was underscored by the opening strike in the war on Iran: the joint Israeli-U.S. attack on Tehran on Saturday that killed Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In fact, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested this week that the timing of the war had been dictated by Israel, which he said had decided to attack Iran on its own.

Still, just as the war has drawn in other countries, Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 vision of a postwar Middle East could face obstacles once the bombs and missiles finally fall silent.

His vision is clear. Presiding over the most right-wing government in Israel鈥檚 history, he has extended his country鈥檚 鈥渟ecurity鈥� borders in recent months by taking control of an area inside Syria and reinforcing Israel鈥檚 hold on Gaza.

This week, he moved to reassert military control over parts of southern Lebanon in response to missile fire from Iranian-allied Hezbollah.

The prime minister is also determined to quash any possibility of a Palestinian state, and to push ahead with the de facto annexation of the West Bank as a permanent part of Israel.

And he envisages that key Arab Gulf states, above all Saudi Arabia, will move quickly to establish normal ties with Israel once the war has unrecognizably weakened Iran.

There are potential obstacles, however.

One example: Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil states in the Gulf region.

Their leaders had urged Mr. Trump to seek a negotiated deal with Tehran and to avoid war 鈥� fearing, rightly as it has turned out, that Iran would respond by firing missiles and drones not just at Israel, but at their countries, too.

They鈥檙e deeply uncomfortable with the prospect of Israel exercising unfettered regional dominance. That鈥檚 especially so after the devastation in Gaza caused by Israel鈥檚 response to Hamas鈥檚 cross-border killing and abduction of hundreds of civilians in October 2023, as well as Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 ruling out the idea of a two-state peace with the Palestinians.

And while the Gulf states are no match for Israel militarily, they can make their voices heard. They have political, military and 鈥� above all 鈥� economic ties of their own with Washington.

The key imponderable, however, might be Mr. Trump himself.

The U.S.-Israeli alliance has a long history, underpinned by ties between the countries鈥� military and security sectors, and, since the late 1970s, by nearly $4 billion in annual U.S. aid.

Yet the unprecedented level of support and partnership in the past year has been rooted in the relationship between Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Trump. They鈥檝e bonded politically over a shared, strongman approach to domestic politics and a muscular, 鈥済reat power鈥� view of the world.

The administration鈥檚 recent National Defense Strategy called Israel a 鈥渕odel ally.鈥� It had proved 鈥渁ble and willing to defend鈥� itself and needed to be empowered, not reined in.

But, especially with the Iran war expanding unpredictably, Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 ability to set the terms for a postwar Middle East could stumble if his political interests and those of Mr. Trump diverge.

Both leaders face electoral tests in the coming months: the U.S. midterms and an Israeli parliamentary election that will determine whether Mr. Netanyahu remains in office.

No matter how the war ends, the Israeli leader can claim to have vindicated his decades-old insistence on the need to confront the theocratic regime in Tehran. He has also secured the greatest level of support from Israel鈥檚 critical ally, the U.S., in the history of the alliance.

That鈥檚 a political windfall. He hopes it will cancel out many voters鈥� anger at his government鈥檚 inability to foresee, prevent, or quickly respond to the Hamas attack of 2 1/2 years ago.

Mr. Trump鈥檚 calculus, however, could depend on the course of the conflict with Iran 鈥� especially if market turbulence and rises in oil and gas prices persist, there鈥檚 no political exit ramp in sight, and his political opponents raise the specter of a 鈥渇orever war.鈥�

He might then disengage, or pivot to the more politically palatable endgame both he and Mr. Netanyahu cited at the start of hostilities: a wider regional peace.

That would mean moving ahead on the stalled implementation of his 20-point plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. And it could mean the expansion of the main foreign policy achievement of Mr. Trump鈥檚 first term, the Abraham Accords normalization agreement between Israel and several Arab states.

The problem for Mr. Netanyahu?

Both initiatives would require buy-in from the most influential Arab Gulf state: Saudi Arabia.

And the Saudis seem certain to insist, at a bare minimum, on Mr. Netanyahu鈥檚 commitment to keep open the path to an eventual two-state peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

And that could pit President Trump鈥檚 Middle East vision against that of his model ally.