Why Congress is AWOL on national security policy
Congress is ineffective by design and has been rendered much more so by the imposition of a parliamentary style of lockstep partisan voting upon a system that鈥檚 supposed to force cross-cutting compromise.
Congress is ineffective by design and has been rendered much more so by the imposition of a parliamentary style of lockstep partisan voting upon a system that鈥檚 supposed to force cross-cutting compromise.
Matt Bennett and Mieke Eoyang, both former Washington staffers, explore 鈥淲hy Congress is AWOL on national security policymaking today.鈥� Contrasting Rep.聽Ron Dellums鈥檚 two-decade-long campaign to end apartheid in South Africa, they argue that today鈥檚 members lack the staying power to exert major influence.
Now, all of those things are true. But even at the time that Dellums was a House freshman, there were cries of an 鈥渋mperial presidency鈥� with regard to foreign policy. Going back at least to FDR鈥檚 time in office, foreign policymaking 鈥� and especially the war power 鈥� had shifted almost completely to the White House and the national security staff. As the pace of decisionmaking sped up, Congress became less influential.
Still, it鈥檚 not hard to think of major Congressional interventions in national security policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The聽War Powers Resolution. The聽Church Committee. The聽Boland Amendment. The聽Goldwater-Nichols聽and聽Cohen-Nunn聽reforms. Congress took an active role in backing the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet invaders, the fights in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the first Gulf War, and the reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Still, they鈥檝e largely deferred to the executive 鈥� or the executive has simply gone around Congress 鈥� for most of the modern era.
Bennett and Eoyang conclude,
In fairness, Congress did participate in a significant聽reorganization of our national security apparatus in the wake of 9/11, most notably the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the restructuring of our airport security system, and a modest reshuffling of the intelligence community. There鈥檚 also been the USA Patriot Act and various other efforts.
Certainly, Congress is at least debating what to do about Iran鈥檚 nuclear program. And the administration, as administrations are wont to do, is arguing that Congress is mucking things up and endangering the great work being done with the administration. Nor has Congress been silent on Pakistan or Russia. But our national security experts 鈥� whether in government or out 鈥� have no good solution for these crises. It鈥檚 almost unfathomable that Congress will come up with one.
To a large extent, Congress is seemingly ineffective on national security affairs because, well, it鈥檚 ineffective. It鈥檚 ineffective by design and has been rendered much more so by the speed of modern communications and the imposition of a parliamentary style of lockstep partisan voting upon a system that鈥檚 supposed to force cross-cutting compromise.
It鈥檚 also gotten worse partly because it鈥檚 gotten more democratic. In the era Bennett and Eoyang pine for, Democrats controlled the House of Representatives from 1955 to 1995 with no聽interruptions and the GOP only controlled it for two Congresses from 1931 to 1995. 聽The Senate was more competitive but Democrats still controlled it, often with filibuster-proof majorities, from 1955 to 1981 and 1987 to 1995. While there was doubtless a laudable civility that came with that order, the committee chairmen were聽mandarins with inordinate power聽and the minority had every incentive to compromise given their permanent status in that role.聽It鈥檚 not a slam dunk that that was better.
James Joyner is editor of the Outside the Beltway blog at http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/.