海角大神

With world attention focused yet again on Pyongyang, thanks to US government claims that the modern-day Hermit Kingdom is behind the cyberattacks on Sony Pictures over the release of a move that depicts the assassination of Kim Jong-un, we鈥檙e once again seeing reports that聽the Kim regime鈥檚 sponsors and protectors in Beijing may be growing frustrated with it:

If there鈥檚 anything that鈥檚 as difficult as reading the tea leaves out of Pyonyang, it is, of course, reading the tea leaves out of Bejing. Even in what is by all accounts a new, slightly more open era, the Chinese leadership is notoriously secretive about its intentions and its attitudes, albeit not nearly as closed as the Kim regime. One of the few places one can look for clues to the debates that are likely going on inside the Chinese leadership are the official newspapers that are published out of Beijing, in no small part because it鈥檚 unlikely that we鈥檇 see something that calls official policy into question unless it was authorized. That鈥檚 what makes the article by General Wang, which appears to have been drafted before the news of the hacking of Sony鈥檚 computers broke, so interesting. The possibility that the Chinese may be losing patience with the regime in Pyongyang, something that seems to have become more of a public issue since Kim Jong-un rose to power in the wake of his father鈥檚 death, raises some rather obvious questions about the future of the Kim regime itself. By all accounts, if the Chinese decide to start withdrawing their support, economic and otherwise, then the collapse of the Kim regime wouldn鈥檛 be far behind. This is why, as has been the case for some time now, the real key to controlling North Korean behavior lies not in further economic or other sanctions, which at this point would have only a limited impact on a nation that is likely cut off from the rest of the world, but聽through Beijing and persuading the Chinese to use their influence with the Kim regime聽to put tighter control on North Korean behavior.

All that being said, it is likely best to view reports of Chinese 鈥渇rustration鈥� with Pyongyang with a grain of salt, at the very least. For one thing, the reports noted above are all that different from reports that we鈥檝e seen in the recent past. There were聽similar reports four years ago based on information contained in diplomatic cables disclosed by Wikileaks, for example, and聽then again in 2013聽when the North Koreans began heating up tensions on the peninsula in advance of their eventual third nuclear test,聽a test which the Chinese condemned.聽Later, China was among those nations that聽pressured the Kim regime to return to the nuclear talks聽that had been abandoned some years earlier. Finally, just about a year ago, renewed reports about Chinese unease with the political situation in Pyongyang resurfaced聽in the wake of the news of the arrest and execution of聽Jang Song-Thaek,聽the uncle of Kim Jong-un who had long been seen as the second most powerful man in the country and was, by all accounts, China鈥檚 most reliable ally in the North Korean leadership. Despite聽reports earlier this year that North Korea was 鈥渙n the verge of collapse,鈥澛爐hough, and speculation during the late summer over the reasons behind Kim Jong-un鈥檚 prolonged disappearance from the official media in North Korea, the Kim regime has survived for another year and collapse seems unlikely in the near future.

Kevin Drum聽correctly points out what seem to be the two major factors influencing Chinese policy toward Pyongyang:

Perhaps, but if that day comes, then I suspect that it will come in one of two ways. Either some other force inside North Korea, most likely the military, will rise up against the Kim regime and pull off the聽coup d鈥檈tat聽that everyone in the Kim regime seems to be afraid of the most. In that case, we鈥檇 likely see some form of liberalization inside the DPRK from the bizarre despotism that the nation has lived under since the end of World War II, but we鈥檇 be unlikely to see reunification with the south any time soon, and the DPRK would remain a client state of China. The other alternative is that North Korea descends into chaos to such an extent that the Chinese send in the People鈥檚 Liberation Army to 鈥渞estore order鈥� and, of course, install a regime palatable to Beijing in the process. What China is unlikely to allow to happen, though, is an outcome that essentially extends the borders of the Republic of Korea, a close American ally of long standing, to the Yalu River. Either of these events could happen very quickly, seemingly overnight and without warning, but when they happen is likely to be largely within the discretion of the Chinese government and, for the moment, they seem willing to let the status quo continue.

Doug Mataconis appears on the Outside the Beltway blog at http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/.