海角大神

The Trump administration says it wants to bring back a 鈥渨arrior ethos鈥� to the Pentagon, and it is spelling out exactly what that means.

鈥淚t鈥檚 lethality, lethality, lethality,鈥� Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has said. 鈥淓verything else is gone.鈥�

That includes the top lawyers for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, who were fired a little less than a month after the new defense secretary was sworn in.

Though he gave scant reasons for the dismissals, Secretary Hegseth has derided the military鈥檚 judge advocate general (JAG) lawyers, who advise commanders in matters like rules of engagement and war crimes.

There is a course on civil-military relations that newly promoted one- and two-star officers are required to take, co-taught by Richard Kohn, former chief historian for the Air Force. In it, some generals serving during the first or second Trump administrations have expressed 鈥渨orry鈥� about the possibility of having to field 鈥渋llegal orders, or orders that are not exactly illegal but improper 鈥� immoral or unethical,鈥� says Professor Kohn, now professor emeritus at the University of North Carolina.

Secretary Hegseth, who as an infantry officer saw combat during his 2005-2006 deployment to Iraq and later served at a training center in Kabul, Afghanistan, has lobbied for pardoning war crimes committed by U.S. troops. He has also spoken about his decision to ignore an order not to fire on Iraqi fighters unless they raised their weapons first.

鈥淚 remember walking out of that briefing and pulling my platoon together and being like, 鈥楪uys, we鈥檙e not doing that,鈥欌�� Mr. Hegseth said last November on a podcast.

Americans 鈥渟hould not fight by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms eighty years ago,鈥� he argues in his book 鈥淭he War on Warriors,鈥� referring to the sorts of established treaties meant to prevent war crimes.

Yet U.S. commanders care about laws of warfare not because they鈥檙e nice, analysts say. It鈥檚 because, among other benefits, they see those guidelines as essential to protecting their own troops, to the extent they can, from having to make complicated ethical decisions in the midst of battles 鈥� choices that can set them up for struggles down the line.

Specialists in military psychology, like psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, have written about moral injury, for example 鈥� what he calls 鈥渋ndignant rage鈥� from witnessing the 鈥渂etrayal of 鈥榳hat鈥檚 right鈥� by a commander鈥� or leader during a war.

For this reason and others, 鈥淎n overemphasis on war fighting, lethality, and similar notions鈥� has historically been regarded as ill-advised and even amateurish by top military strategists, says retired Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, former deputy JAG officer for the Air Force. He cites the axiom that 鈥淎mateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.鈥�

General Dunlap points to the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu鈥檚 observation that 鈥淭o win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.鈥�

As Mr. Hegseth endeavors to bring his own brand of warrior ethos to the Department of Defense, experts in law and armed forces history are considering ways commanders can prepare for the potential impact.

Differences between lethality and violence

Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 deployments were formative experiences 鈥渃olored by contact with an enemy that鈥檚 trying to kill you,鈥� says Brent Sadler, a senior fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank.

For this reason, he says, Mr. Hegseth tends to conflate lethality, or the ability to harm or damage, with actual violence, and his warrior ethos comes with particular regard for those who pull the trigger.

Mr. Hegseth put the safety of U.S. troops at risk, some argue, when he recently shared information about an imminent military attack on Houthi forces in Yemen in a Signal chat group to which a journalist, Jeffrey Goldberg, had been inadvertently added.

The information Secretary Hegseth added into the chat, including the time and delivery means in advance of the strike, would have been considered classified at the time he shared it, according to military experts. But Mr. Hegseth dismissed the severity of the leak, calling Mr. Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, one of America鈥檚 oldest and most serious-minded publications, 鈥渉ighly discredited鈥� and arguing that the shared information didn鈥檛 constitute 鈥渨ar plans.鈥�

Operations like this often depend on surprise. But military effectiveness always hinges on the threat of lethality, or 鈥渃apacity to inflict extreme violence,鈥� says Mr. Sadler, a retired U.S. Navy captain. 鈥淭he more that we try to water that down, we get away from the real mission of the military.鈥�

Ideally, political leaders should set the goals for military missions, while rules of engagement 鈥渞eally should be more for the uniformed officers, with the advice of JAGs, to determine so that they can meet the president鈥檚 objectives,鈥� Mr. Sadler says. 鈥淭oo often, though, there鈥檚 micromanagement鈥� of these rules that can increase risk to U.S. forces.

As the dictum from Sun Tzu hints, the capacity to inflict violence might not lead to actual combat, but the U.S. military鈥檚 propensity for it gives adversaries pause, he adds.

In his first appearance before the Pentagon press corps last week, the Defense Department鈥檚 chief spokesperson, Sean Parnell, spoke frequently of his own combat experience in Afghanistan during a 30-minute briefing on Yemen 鈥� seeming to suggest, some analysts said, that under Mr. Hegseth鈥檚 leadership, the bona fides of battle are key to credibility.

鈥淚 know what it鈥檚 like to be in a situation when you鈥檙e under fire by the enemy,鈥� Mr. Parnell noted in discussing Houthi rebels targeting U.S. sailors in the Middle East. 鈥淗aving been in enemy combat before, the fog of war is a real thing,鈥� he explained after a question about civilian casualties in the strikes.

And, after a reporter from a conservative news outlet asked whether the Pentagon would 鈥渃ommit to firing or otherwise disciplining鈥� leaders involved in America鈥檚 chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, during which 13 U.S. service members were killed, Mr. Parnell said they should be held accountable.

鈥淭he men in my platoon ... we bled the ground red in Afghanistan,鈥� he said.

The administration鈥檚 newly adopted warrior ethos does not shy away from the violence of war. It also appears to include admiration for those who impart it in other arenas.

Last month, a Pentagon press release celebrated the visit of Conor McGregor, an Irish mixed martial artist who was found liable for rape by an Irish high court in a civil case last fall. During their convivial Pentagon meeting, Mr. McGregor and Mr. Hegseth posed for pictures and lamented how immigration is destroying the culture of their countries 鈥渇rom within,鈥� as Mr. McGregor put it.

The Defense Department鈥檚 press release about Mr. McGregor鈥檚 visit also said that 鈥渋ncreasing lethality鈥� will make troops 鈥渕ore suited for defending the nation.鈥� Those defense efforts, it noted, currently include posting troops at the border to help stop illegal immigration.

Giving and getting when it comes to violence

As much talk as there is about imparting lethality, the Trump administration鈥檚 Pentagon leaders are clear, too, on their frustrations with being on the receiving end of it.

At the Pentagon press briefing, Mr. Parnell pointed out that his unit had an 85% casualty rate. 鈥淵our life is at risk. The life of your friends and your battle buddies is at risk.鈥� In the midst of combat, restrictions on returning fire, he said, created for him 鈥渁 hellish situation that I wouldn鈥檛 wish on my worst adversary.鈥�

This point is a pivotal one for Mr. Hegseth, who decries 鈥渁cademic rules of engagement which have been tying the hands of our war fighters for too long鈥� and the military lawyers he holds responsible for enforcing them.

But these lawyers do not make the rules of engagement. That鈥檚 the job of civilians and high command. Instead, their job is to help leaders interpret and adhere to them, says General Dunlap, now executive director of the Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University鈥檚 Law School.

For this reason, 鈥淛AG lawyers, like all good lawyers, try to find lawful ways for their 鈥榗lient鈥� to do what the client wants to do,鈥� he adds, 鈥渆ven if the JAG personally disagrees.鈥�

If the goal behind firing the military鈥檚 top lawyers is to turn the 鈥淛AG corps into partisan rubber stamps by removing their most senior leaders, I predict that issue will surely fail,鈥� General Dunlap says. 鈥淪ometimes the only right legal answer is no.鈥�

For now, the Trump administration is loosening rules on commanders conducting military raids and airstrikes, expanding the range of people and places that can be targeted.

鈥淚t鈥檚 a much broader set of targets,鈥� said Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, director of operations for the joint staff, in the press briefing last week. 鈥淪o that allows us to achieve a tempo of operations where we can react to opportunities that we see on the battlefield.鈥�

鈥淎wful but lawful鈥� orders

Professor Kohn says that as the generals in his class survey the current military landscape, they often have the impression that they can choose not to follow orders they consider immoral or unethical.

This is not the case. Mr. Kohn鈥檚 co-teacher, Peter Feaver, director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, calls them 鈥渁wful but lawful鈥� orders.

As the U.S. Military鈥檚 Manual for Courts-Martial explains, 鈥淭he dictates of a person鈥檚 conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse disobedience of an otherwise lawful order.鈥�

But, Professor Kohn says, 鈥淲hat you can do is you can say, 鈥榊ou know, sir, this forces us to do unethical or immoral things that are not going to produce the outcome you want.鈥欌��

To help students develop these skills, the professors guide them in the art of 鈥渓eading from the middle.鈥�

This involves not only relaying orders to subordinates, but also reacting to orders from above 鈥渢hat you think are not in the best interest of the command or the country,鈥� Professor Kohn says.

鈥淵ou try to persuade them out of that. You speak up. You speak up quietly.鈥�

And if orders are illegal, or if, for example, the risk to troops posed by newly prescribed rules of engagement is too great 鈥� 鈥渋f [the commanders] have a moral problem with it, because, again, it鈥檚 not a question of legality,鈥� Mr. Sadler of The Heritage Foundation says 鈥� then those commanders have another option.

鈥淭hey need to resign and then make a very public statement,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 how that鈥檚 supposed to play out.鈥�

Editor鈥檚 note: This story was updated soon after publication with an additional quotation about rules of engagement.