海角大神

New weapons and big-ticket items, including聽American-made聽F-16 fighter jets, have been surging into Ukraine this month, giving striking steam to the nation鈥檚 latest efforts to beat back the Russians, including a cross-border foray into Kursk.聽

The region鈥檚 governor reported to Moscow聽this week聽that Ukrainian forces have made it more than 7 miles, across a聽25-mile聽front, into Russian territory.聽

Fueling such efforts is the major defense aid package that Congress released for Ukraine earlier this year. Indeed, the question of how to keep track聽of聽all that money聽鈥� $58 billion committed in security assistance聽鈥� has increasingly been on the minds of American military聽officials and聽experts.

That鈥檚 because corruption can threaten Ukrainian morale and success 鈥� and聽make U.S. lawmakers skeptical of providing more aid in the future.聽

U.S. officials聽are keenly aware, however, that it鈥檚 a tricky topic to raise. Graft seems a bit pedestrian compared with, say, Ukraine鈥檚 battle against Russia.聽

Ukrainians deserve their 鈥渨ell-earned status as noble warriors for a righteous cause,鈥澛爊otes聽Col. Patrick Sullivan, director of the Modern War Institute at West Point. Still, he adds, 鈥淩ighteousness and corruption can coexist.鈥澛�

Corruption has long been a large problem in Ukraine 鈥� President Volodymyr Zelenskyy鈥檚 election campaign railed against it 鈥� and it would be unwise to ignore its聽pervasiveness and聽insidious effects, analysts say.

For starters, back-burnering malfeasance,聽usually聽in the form of graft,聽risks repeating the kind of聽disastrous mistakes that the United States made in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul never gained聽full聽legitimacy among the people, due in no small part to corruption, and ultimately failed to win its war against the Taliban.聽This despite the two decades that U.S. troops spent training local forces as well as several hundred billion dollars鈥� worth of U.S. military aid.聽

Mr. Zelenskyy seemed to reinforce ongoing corruption concerns when he last year聽fired聽his defense minister 鈥� widely liked in the West and key to putting together聽an arms聽coalition 鈥� for failing to root it out. Earlier this year, Kyiv鈥檚 new defense minister suspended a senior official being investigated for graft while buying weapons.聽

Still, the U.S. must do its part, too, analysts say. It has yet to hire an independent special inspector general to track U.S. security assistance to the country, for example, despite calls to do just that. A U.S. government watchdog earlier this year found that after providing more than $42 billion in security assistance since February 2022, the Pentagon 鈥渄oes not have quality data to track delivery of defense articles to Ukraine.鈥�

Such data is essential not just to avoid wasting vast sums of money聽or聽putting it in the pockets of criminals, but also for the U.S. to have clarity on what makes for effective聽fighting.聽

鈥淚t鈥檚 not entirely altruistic when we support other nations with our arms,鈥� says Colonel Sullivan. It allows the U.S. military to test weapons and teaches Pentagon planners tactical and strategic lessons. Only if the equipment is properly tracked, however, can America聽best assess its efficacy in聽future wars, he adds.聽

Calling on the 鈥減residential drawdown authority鈥�

Today, the sheer 鈥渧alue of the defense articles provided [to Ukraine] and the speed with which it has been delivered has raised concerns from congressional stakeholders about efforts to monitor鈥� it, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned in a report released earlier this year.聽

Since 2021, the U.S. has used what鈥檚 known as the presidential drawdown authority to send weapons to Ukraine. In this case, the president can authorize the immediate transfer of arms and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding ceiling, in response to an 鈥渦nforeseen emergency.鈥�

Historically, U.S. law has capped the maximum value of defense goods provided under聽the presidential drawdown authority at $100 million per year. For Ukraine, however, Congress increased this cap from $11 billion in 2022 to $14.5 billion in 2023. As of last September, the president had approved 47 separate drawdowns, which聽amount to some $24 billion, according to the GAO.聽

Under the separate Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 鈥� created in 2015 after Russia鈥檚 2014 invasion of Crimea 鈥� Congress has spent some $19 billion to buy artillery, ammunition, tanks, and medical supplies, along with services like vehicle maintenance, directly from the private sector or foreign partners on behalf of Kyiv.

Pentagon lacks a single standard for tracking weapons shipments

Amid all this, the Pentagon must determine to what extent providing ammunition and weapons from its own stocks reduces the arms available for training U.S. troops and responding to America鈥檚 own emergencies.

To this end, it helps to know where all of these arms are at any given time. As they make their way to Ukraine, however, the separate U.S. military services use vastly different methods of determining when weapons and supplies arrive at their destination.聽

The Army, for example, considers weapons and supplies聽delivered 鈥渁s soon as they begin movement from Army points of origin, which are generally storage facilities in the U.S.,鈥� the GAO notes. The Navy,聽by contrast,聽checks this box聽鈥渙nce they arrived聽at their designated overseas delivery location,鈥� rather than when delivered to Ukrainian officials. For the Marines, it鈥檚 鈥渨hen they receive email confirmation.鈥� The Air Force 鈥渉ad not determined a standardized delivery confirmation process,鈥� the GAO report notes.

鈥淲ithout clarifying the guidance for data entry or taking steps to address potentially inaccurate data,鈥� the report says, 鈥淒OD will be unable to assess the extent to which the defense articles are meeting recipients鈥� needs or U.S. objectives in Ukraine.鈥澛�

It concluded, 鈥淔or the purposes of advising their Ukrainian counterparts, [defense officials] were confident they had reliable information,鈥� though 鈥渢hey acknowledged there continued to be weaknesses that warranted attention.鈥澛�

Does U.S. need an independent inspector general for Ukraine?

Such聽attention should聽include聽establishing an independent inspector general for Ukraine, says retired Col. Mark Cancian, who worked for years on Pentagon budget strategy and war funding issues.聽

Though he sees no current evidence of widespread corruption connected to U.S.聽weapons flowing into Ukraine 鈥� and though there are inspectors general at the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies who already monitor aid 鈥� critics in Congress 鈥渁re ready to pounce鈥� on any cases of graft that might come to light, says Mr. Cancian, now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.聽

Colonel Sullivan agrees,聽citing benefits that聽an independent inspector general would bring to聽U.S. national security as well.聽

U.S. strategic planners are carefully tracking how Russia wages war,聽mostly聽to learn how to best respond should the need arise.聽

Without accurate monitoring of equipment, those insights could be flawed, limiting not only U.S. strategic gains but also Ukraine鈥檚聽war-fighting聽effectiveness.聽

鈥淚f you鈥檙e losing a lot of tanks or losing a lot of personnel because of bad tactics or bad operational decisions 鈥� or if there鈥檚 something about the technology that鈥檚 ill-suited for the battlefield 鈥� then you鈥檒l adjust your tactics,鈥� says Colonel Sullivan.

But first,聽the U.S. must be very clear on 鈥渉ow this stuff is being employed,鈥澛爃e adds, 鈥渁nd to what effect.鈥�