In deterrence we trust? Cold War nuclear questions make a comeback.
The risks of nuclear weapons have reappeared in global headlines. Containing those risks may hinge on communication as well as a 鈥減eace through strength鈥 tradition.
The risks of nuclear weapons have reappeared in global headlines. Containing those risks may hinge on communication as well as a 鈥減eace through strength鈥 tradition.
The Cold War never fully thawed in this single-stoplight town, nestled in a county of fewer than 4,000 people that seems built for a populace twice its size. Empty storefronts tell that story of six decades ago, when the nuclear missiles moved in.
The weapons lie scattered beneath the high plains here 鈥 some a few miles from a school. Up to 400 of these intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, remain on alert in rural parts of the American West, ready to launch at the president鈥檚 call.
Some outsiders may see Kimball as a sacrifice. Rich Flores calls his community 鈥減atriotic.鈥
鈥淭he people here, in my opinion, believe that we have 鈥榩eace through strength,鈥欌 says Mr. Flores, a county commissioner, echoing a line popularized by President Ronald Reagan. As he chats over coffee, an American flag pin glints from his chest.聽
鈥淲ho wants to attack a country that鈥檚 strong?鈥
This is the logic of deterrence in a nutshell. Though the staggering cost of an upcoming missile upgrade in this region has ignited discussion about the necessity of America鈥檚 vast nuclear arsenal, the fact that the nation hasn鈥檛 used these weapons since World War II seems to deepen, for many, trust in their necessity.
But as global conflicts involving nuclear powers escalate, this trust is being tested. In Kimball and beyond, questions about America鈥檚 nuclear strategy 鈥 and how people feel about it 鈥 are taking on more urgency as concern about the likelihood of a nuclear attack is on the rise.聽
Senior U.S. military officials describe the world鈥檚 nuclear landscape as 鈥渂reathtaking鈥 in its potential for escalation. The United States, they warn, is now on the verge of having not one but two nuclear 鈥減eer鈥 adversaries, as the Department of Defense calls them. China鈥檚 rapid buildup of its nuclear forces means it could have at least as many ICBMs as either the U.S. or Russia by the decade鈥檚 end, analysts say. Russian President Vladimir Putin is expanding his nuclear arsenal and rattling these sabers toward the West in his war against Ukraine.
As a result, the U.S. now faces threats that it 鈥渄id not anticipate and for which it is not prepared,鈥 a bipartisan commission appointed by Congress concluded last autumn.聽
While risk of a 鈥渕ajor nuclear conflict remains low,鈥 the nation needs to 鈥渦rgently鈥 prepare to take on adversaries who want to impose undemocratic values on the free world, according to the report.聽
Part of that preparation will occur around Kimball, which is set to see nearby missile fields upgraded over the next decade with a new weapon system called Sentinel.
Advocates for nonproliferation say America has more than enough nuclear weapons to deter opponents. Their imperative, rather, is reopening communication lines 鈥 laying the groundwork for lapsing or nonexistent arms control agreements 鈥 to restore a sense of safety and trust in what can seem like a precarious time. And some see promising developments along these lines.
鈥淥ne of the most important things that we can do is to head off unconstrained nuclear competition between the U.S., Russia, and China,鈥 says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.聽
鈥淭aboos against nuclear weapons still exist,鈥 he adds, 鈥渁nd each generation needs to ensure they鈥檙e not broken.鈥
American trust in nuclear weapons聽
In the nearly 80 years since the U.S. dropped the only two nuclear weapons ever used in war, movements to abolish or champion nukes have ebbed and flowed.聽
Currently, Americans grapple with mixed views about the country鈥檚 nuclear weapons. A Chicago Council-Carnegie Corporation survey last year showed that 47% of U.S. adults believe the nuclear arsenal makes the U.S. safer. (Older adults are more likely than younger adults to say this.)
Moreover, China and Russia aren鈥檛 the only countries that worry Americans, who rank the development of nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea as two of the top three 鈥渃ritical threats鈥 to the U.S., according to Gallup.聽
As U.S. leaders face a public that鈥檚 conflicted about trusting in deterrence, better communicating the country鈥檚 nuclear capabilities, some say, could help.聽
Nuclear nonchalance or confidence?
Retired Gen. John Hyten, who had been serving as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 2019, recalls receiving a July 2021 phone call 鈥渟o important that I went running to鈥 the chairman and the secretary of defense after hanging up.
It was top-secret news of 鈥渢he most significant launch that had happened during my lifetime鈥: a Chinese hypersonic missile designed to elude U.S. detection systems and potentially be used as a first-strike weapon in a nuclear war.聽
It threatened the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, which is composed of ICBMs, like those kept around Kimball, as well as stealth bombers and nuclear-armed submarines.
General Hyten spent the last three months of his tenure working to get news of China鈥檚 hypersonic missile declassified, he said in a February discussion at the University of Virginia鈥檚 Miller Center.
In November 2021, he got the Pentagon green light to air his concerns on CBS News. The sense after the broadcast was that it was going to 鈥渃reate a ruckus in this country like nobody鈥檚 seen before,鈥 he recalled. 鈥淎nd like three days later, it had disappeared from the news.鈥澛
He grapples with nuclear nonchalance in America, but admires the general trust that citizens seem to have in the government鈥檚 ability to keep them safe.聽
鈥淵ou know, I actually want to be the citizen of a country where people ... don鈥檛 worry about this stuff. They go to bed at night, and they sleep like babies,鈥 he said. 鈥淏ut somebody鈥檚 got to think about it.鈥澛
Feeling like a target聽
As a high school social studies teacher in Kimball, Jeri Ferguson is one of those people who thinks about the question of trust in聽nuclear arms. She recalls safety-in-numbers logic that could evoke either confidence or unease during the Cold War.聽
鈥淚 was in my car, driving in college, and with the radio on: 鈥楻ussia has enough nuclear weapons to kill us four times over. But we have enough to kill them 10 times over,鈥欌 she recalls. 鈥淚 remember thinking, 鈥極nce is probably enough for me!鈥欌
On a recent afternoon, Ms. Ferguson began a unit on that history with a class of seven juniors.
鈥淲hat do you think the Cold War was about?鈥 she asks the group. 鈥淕lobal warming?鈥澛
No, the class groans, and volleys back more jokes. It was about 鈥減ower,鈥 says a boy. 鈥淒uring the winter!鈥
The teacher turns the focus closer to home 鈥 the Sentinel upgrade that could swell the local population with workers. The class seems vaguely aware of the missile silos scattered across the county.
鈥淚f there鈥檚 a nuclear war, guess where the first bombs are coming?鈥澛
鈥淯s,鈥 a student says. The jokes hit pause.
Restoring transparency 鈥 and talking to each other聽聽
The renewed conversation about nuclear arms in America points to a tension between the fear these devastating weapons inspire and the belief that the country wouldn鈥檛 be safe without them.聽
These are concerns that hint at the importance of bolstering transparency and communication to build trust not just in the weapons but among humans, too.
The global nuclear stockpile has declined significantly since the Cold War, from roughly 70,300 warheads in 1986 to some 12,100 in 2024, the Federation of American Scientists estimates. But聽most of these reductions happened in the 1990s. Since then, the pace has slowed.
Transparency is also on the decline. While the U.S. used to make its stockpile size public, this stopped under the Trump presidency. The Biden administration restored these disclosures at first, but then suspended them again.聽
While it鈥檚 difficult to know precise reasons the government is now refusing declassification requests, it may be that the transparency is politically difficult to justify given Russian and Chinese opacity, says Matt Korda, senior research fellow in the Nuclear Information Project at the federation.聽
The State Department, in a written response to the Monitor, said that declassification 鈥渄oes not occur on a planned calendar鈥 and that the 鈥渧alue of transparency and its contributions to stability is increased when OTHER states take parallel steps.鈥
That said, a State Department official added on background that the U.S. 鈥渃ontinues to view transparency among nuclear weapon states as extremely valuable for purposes of building confidence, avoiding misperception, and encouraging dialogue that can help mitigate the risk of costly arms competitions.鈥
Transparency, in other words, can be diplomatically productive. Exposing Chinese officials to complex internal U.S. policy debates could help catalyze China鈥檚 internal discussions, says Tong Zhao, senior fellow with the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
There are movements on this front. At a summit last November, U.S. and Chinese diplomats discussed whether states are at risk of ceding too much nuclear oversight to artificial intelligence systems. Though no agreements came of it, China鈥檚 willingness to discuss high-level principles of conduct could potentially be a productive wedge issue into other discussions, Dr. Zhao adds.
Russia for now appears to be stiff-arming the idea of nonproliferation talks with Washington, citing U.S. support for Ukraine, even as the sole remaining arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia 鈥 the New START Treaty 鈥 will expire in February 2026.
The prospects for treaty renewal look remote for now, but surprising breakthroughs have emerged before. Even after President Reagan called the USSR an 鈥渆vil empire,鈥 for example, the two nations in 1985 agreed that 鈥渁 nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,鈥 notes Dan Smith, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Though straightforward, this sentence was considered a landmark declaration, and Russia, China, the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom reaffirmed it in 2022. Beyond being a hopeful signal, these sorts of statements 鈥渁ctually inform the thinking鈥 of governments, Mr. Smith adds.聽聽
鈥淜eep engagement alive鈥澛
At the same time, these governments are wrestling with the prospect of increasing U.S. isolationism, which many analysts point to as one of the most troubling deterrence trends.聽
The possibility of a Trump presidency, for example, is prompting European allies, who benefit from America鈥檚 nuclear umbrella, to question whether it will hold 鈥 or whether they should pursue their own nuclear programs.聽
It doesn鈥檛 help that Ukraine, which voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is now bearing the brunt of as yet unsated Russian aggression.
Countering isolationist inclinations will mean聽renewed civic education, cultural dialogue of the sort that emerged in wake of the recent 鈥淥ppenheimer鈥 film, and聽more,聽says William Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.聽
In places like Kimball, there鈥檚 less opportunity for disengagement.聽
Student Jessica Terrill says she鈥檚 used to seeing missile silos, like one near her aunt鈥檚 house.聽
鈥淭hat鈥檚 definitely kind of scary sometimes,鈥 says the high school senior. 鈥淚t鈥檚 like, oh man. If those go off, we鈥檙e going to know.鈥