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Al Qaeda not only remains a threat to the United States, but its capabilities and scope are expanding, a new analysis from a respected think tank has concluded.

鈥淭here has been a net expansion in the number and geographic scope of Al Qaeda affiliates and allies over the past decade, indicating that聽Al Qaeda and its brand are far from defeated,鈥� argues Seth Jones, an analyst at the RAND Corporation and the study鈥檚 author.

Why, after a decade of wars 鈥� the longest in America鈥檚 history 鈥� is the terrorist organization that the US military set out to defeat still active and growing? And does it really have an impact on the everyday safety of most Americans?

There are a few reasons for the growth of the terrorist group, Mr. Jones argues. 鈥淥ne is the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across North Africa and the Middle East, creating an opportunity for Al Qaeda affiliates and allies to secure a foothold.鈥�

This expansion 鈥� coupled with the weakness of central Al Qaeda in Pakistan 鈥� 鈥渉as created a more diffuse and decentralized movement,鈥� Jones added in little-noted testimony last week before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the topic of 鈥淩e-examining the Al Qaeda Threat to the United States.鈥�

As a result, most of Al Qaeda鈥檚 local affiliates 鈥渓argely run their operations autonomously, though they still communicate with core leadership in Pakistan and may seek strategic advice.鈥�

The good news is that within this disparate movement, most Al Qaeda affiliates and allies are not actively plotting attacks against the US homeland, according to the RAND analysis.

鈥淐ontrary to some arguments, most Al Qaeda leaders are not interested in establishing a global caliphate and do not seek to overthrow regimes in much of the world,鈥� Jones writes.

Instead, they tend to have rather more parochial goals. 鈥淭hey want to establish Islamic emirates in specific countries or regions, though they may be agnostic about a broader violent jihad.鈥�

The goal for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, is to overthrow regimes in North Africa, particularly Algeria, and replace them with an Islamic government, Jones notes.

In many cases, 鈥淔rance, rather than the United States, is the most significant foreign enemy.鈥�

Captured Al Qaeda documents show that both Osama bin Laden and the current Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, primarily emphasized guerrilla campaigns to overthrow 鈥渁postate鈥� governments in the Middle East.

Indeed, approximately 98 percent of Al Qaeda attacks between 1998 and 2011 鈥渨ere part of an insurgency where operatives tried to overthrow a local government or secede from it 鈥� and were not in the West.鈥�

That said, Al Qaeda affiliates do pose some threat to US citizens overseas. The RAND analysis notes that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies were involved in the 2012 attack that killed US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, Libya, for example.

There also have been a growing contingent of foreign fighters 鈥� perhaps several thousand, according to Jones, who has served as an adviser to the Pentagon 鈥� traveling to Syria to fight. Many of these volunteers are coming from Europe.

This is a problem because 鈥渧olunteering for war is the principal stepping stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy,鈥� Jones argues. 鈥淲hen Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their home country right away, but travel to a war zone first.鈥�

So what should US officials do about these expanding networks?

鈥淚n areas where Al Qaeda does not pose a significant threat to the homeland, the US government should support local countries and allies as they take the lead 鈥� much like the United States did in supporting France鈥檚 counterterrorism efforts in Mali in 2013,鈥� notes the RAND analysis.

When they do pose a direct threat, the key is 鈥渋mplementing a light footprint strategy that focuses on covert intelligence, law enforcement, and Special Operations Forces to conduct precision targeting of Al Qaeda and its financial logistical support networks,鈥� Jones says.

鈥淚n Afghanistan, for example, 鈥渢he United States should withdraw most conventional forces, relying primarily on clandestine operatives as it has done in Colombia, the Philippines, and other counterinsurgencies.鈥�

That鈥檚 because most of the terrorists involved in serious homeland plots after Sept. 11 鈥� from Jose Padilla鈥檚 plot to blow up apartment buildings in the US to Najibullah Zazi and Faisal Shahzad鈥檚 plots to conduct terrorist attacks in New York City 鈥� 鈥渨ere motivated by large US conventional military deployments overseas.鈥�

The US should also engage more robustly in psychological warfare, according to the report. Unlike the role of the US Information Agency, which was disbanded in 1999, there is no government department responsible for taking the lead role in countering Al Qaeda ideology.

鈥淭he CIA is involved in some clandestine activity, but most senior officials do not view undermining Al Qaeda ideology as its core mission,鈥� Jones says. 鈥淯ltimately it is the president and the national security staff鈥檚 responsibility to appoint a lead agency and hold it responsible.鈥�

The bottom line is that US policymakers, the analysis ominously concludes, 鈥渟hould view the Al Qaeda threat as a decades-long struggle like the Cold War.鈥�