海角大神

What to do about the 24-hour mutiny launched a week ago by Wagner mercenary group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is an internal matter for Russians alone to address 鈥� as President Joe Biden and other Western leaders have made a point to affirm.

However, the repercussions of such a revealing and 鈥� for Russian President Vladimir Putin 鈥� embarrassing and destabilizing event are virtually certain to spill over Russia鈥檚 borders, senior U.S. officials and international affairs analysts say.

The United States, these officials and analysts add, should anticipate that a weakened Mr. Putin will continue to seek to reassert his control over what looked to many during the crisis like a Potemkin state, and move to reestablish a perception of Russia as a power to be reckoned with.

The U.S., therefore, must prepare for a world where the keeper of the largest nuclear arsenal is unstable and threatening.

The crisis in Russian leadership 鈥渋s not over. It may have only started, and that means greater uncertainty, more instability, and therefore we are reaching a point of maximum danger,鈥� says Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO who is now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

鈥淭he concern for the U.S. and others as well is that Russia is turning into an irregular, unpredictable, and rogue-like state,鈥� he says. 鈥淭he outcome we have to prepare for is that a weaker Russia will try to reassert itself by lashing out with more roguish activities,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭hat is why this is such a dangerous time.鈥�

Helping Ukraine

The U.S. should also be seizing on the moment as an opportunity, others say: to do more for Ukraine, for example, as it pursues its counteroffensive to take back as much Russian-occupied territory as possible.

鈥淲hat I really hope 鈥� is that NATO leans forward on taking advantage of Russian weaknesses right now to push in Ukraine,鈥� says Seth Jones, director of the International Security Program and Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. 鈥淭his [moment] does present an opportunity to provide a range of assistance on the battlefield.鈥�

Others in Washington hold similar views.

鈥淲e should take steps to help the Ukrainians take advantage of the confusion in the upper echelons of the Russian military,鈥� says Luke Coffey, a senior national security fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. 鈥淥f course there are things we can do now to help Ukraine win on the battlefield.鈥�

Moreover, he adds, the U.S. should prepare for the 鈥渃oming chaos in Moscow鈥� by stepping up diplomatic outreach to Central Asian countries bordering Russia 鈥� like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

The 鈥渞oguish activities鈥� that some like Ambassador Daalder foresee a weakened Russia resorting to could have global implications.

For starters, there is the nuclear threat 鈥� something Mr. Putin has already dangled before the world鈥檚 eyes, notably last fall as Ukraine鈥檚 initial counteroffensive in Russia鈥檚 war was making impressive gains. Mr. Putin hinted that Russia, with more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, could be pushed to use tactical nuclear weapons in the fighting.

Ukrainian officials, who have fresh in mind the catastrophic collapse this month of the Nova Kakhovka Dam, are warning Western partners that Russia could destroy the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant it controls on occupied Ukrainian territory.

Authorities in Finland say they are seeing signs that Russia may be planning to resort to disinformation and other unconventional methods to foment instability on the two countries鈥� long border.

Even the already acute global food security crisis could be further exacerbated by steps a wounded Russia could take, some warn 鈥� like ending the United Nations-brokered grain deal that has allowed Ukrainian grains to reach key African and Middle East markets.

NATO summit

Senior U.S. officials have been very careful in their comments on the Russian leadership crisis and the potential steps the U.S. could take in response.

Russia鈥檚 crisis 鈥渋s a moving picture, and I don鈥檛 think we鈥檝e seen the last act,鈥� was as far as Secretary of State Antony Blinken would venture in comments Wednesday at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Mr. Putin 鈥渉as a lot of questions to answer,鈥澛燬ecretary Blinken noted, while adding that the U.S. before this crisis was already focused on confronting a 鈥渞evanchist Russia.鈥�

But he has also hinted this week that the U.S. and NATO will both be announcing new assistance and cooperation measures with Ukraine in the context of the alliance鈥檚 summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, next month.

That new assistance could very well include the ATACMS long-range missile system Ukraine has long pressed Washington to provide, Dr. Jones says, as well as accelerated steps for providing Kyiv with F-16 fighter jets.

Looking more long-term, NATO was already expected to offer Ukraine some form of security partnership short of membership at its summit. But events in Russia underscore the urgency of such a step, some say, and are likely to bolster support for moving forcefully in that direction.

Beyond Ukraine, Russia鈥檚 sudden instability and unpredictability have almost certainly moved Russia up on the NATO summit agenda, Ambassador Daalder says. Among other things, plans already in the works for reinforcing alliance-wide defenses, especially in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, will be treated with greater urgency.

鈥淢ilitary alliances are in the business of preparing for worst-case scenarios 鈥� and what the recent Prigozhin affair and the fallout proves is that this regime is actually a lot more fragile and unstable than we perhaps previously thought,鈥� says Sean Monaghan, visiting fellow in the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.

鈥淣ATO鈥檚 job is to have a range of defense plans for a range of contingencies,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd I think this will be a big focus at Vilnius.鈥�

Engaging China

Then there is the matter of China and what President Xi Jinping has said is his country鈥檚 鈥渦nbreakable鈥� strategic partnership with Mr. Putin鈥檚 authoritarian Russia.

Now that the U.S.-China dialogue has come out of the deep freeze following Secretary Blinken鈥檚 recent trip to Beijing, the U.S. should be laying out for an order-craving and image-conscious China why a tight bond with Russia may not be in its best interests.

鈥淲e should remind the Chinese that with friends like these, who needs enemies?鈥� says Ambassador Daalder. Citing Mr. Putin鈥檚 use of nuclear blackmail or Russia鈥檚 mounting war crimes and human rights violations 鈥渃an encourage them to think about how they may be linking themselves to behavior they ultimately don鈥檛 want to be associated with,鈥� Ambassador Daalder says.

Nevertheless, Mr. Coffey at Hudson says Washington has to remember that in some ways China is benefiting from Russia鈥檚 weaknesses in the wake of its disastrous foray into Ukraine 鈥� for example, by the access Beijing has had to discount-priced Russian energy.

Yet, beyond all that, it might be enough just for Washington to point out how recent events suggest a prolonged period of instability in Russia, Ambassador Daalder says.

鈥淚 think we should say that on top of everything else, Russia is unstable to boot,鈥� he says. 鈥淎nd that鈥檚 the one thing the Chinese worry about most.鈥�