海角大神

To illustrate the challenges President Joe Biden faces as he struggles to redirect America鈥檚 strategic focus to countering a rising China, Margarita Konaev cites one of the world鈥檚 renowned international affairs analysts.

鈥淎s Mike Tyson once said, 鈥楨verybody has a plan until you get punched in the face.鈥欌��

And President Biden has taken a few punches over his first year in office 鈥� from Vladimir Putin鈥檚 Russia, from an Iran barreling toward nuclear capability, even from a much-weakened but recalibrated ISIS. Those hits have distracted the United States from its long-envisaged 鈥淎sia pivot,鈥� says Dr. Konaev, adjunct senior fellow in technology and national security at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

After two draining Middle East wars, America is viewed internationally and on a divided home front as both tired of expectations that it provide international leadership, and distracted by conflicts in regions where it has traditionally had influence.

For many, the question now is whether the United States has the superpower heft and domestic support to carry out an effective counterbalancing effort to an increasingly aggressive and economically powerful China.

Indeed, for some national security experts, the attention-grabbing security challenges presented by Russia in Europe and by Iran in the Middle East place Mr. Biden鈥檚 plans to shift America鈥檚 focus to the Indo-Pacific at a critical juncture.

鈥淲e鈥檙e on the knife鈥檚 edge right now. We鈥檙e going to figure out in the next six months or so whether this administration can successfully develop the shift in attention and resources to Asia that has been the stated priority for nearly two decades now 鈥� or whether we鈥檙e going to have our fourth failed Asia pivot,鈥� says Hal Brands, senior fellow in defense strategy and U.S.-China relations at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

The Asia pivot is most closely associated with former President Barack Obama, but as Dr. Brands notes, it got a tentative start under George W. Bush 鈥� before being stalled by the Iraq war.

Now the Biden administration is doing its best to show the world 鈥� and the home audience 鈥� that the Asia pivot is on track.

Flying the flag

Despite the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been in the Indo-Pacific region this week, meeting with foreign ministers of the so-called Quad countries 鈥� Australia, India, and Japan, besides the U.S. 鈥� the leaders of Pacific Island nations, and then with the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea in Hawaii. Secretary Blinken made the long trip to Australia even as Mr. Biden and the Pentagon remained focused on the Ukraine crisis and the broader destabilization of Eastern European allies.

The weeklong trip seemed designed in part to demonstrate that the U.S. has not taken its eye off what the administration insists remains its top international priority.

鈥淲ith Secretary Blinken鈥檚 trip to the Pacific and with a number of other diplomatic and military actions, the administration has been trying to signal that it can walk and chew gum at the same time,鈥� says Dr. Brands, author of 鈥淭he Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today.鈥�

But he adds that the Biden administration is now confronting a problem 鈥渢hat is not of its making but which has been building over a decade now, and that is the growing gap between our commitments and our ability to fulfill them 鈥� especially if those demands are made simultaneously.鈥�

Secretary Blinken has been at pains throughout his trip to demonstrate how he鈥檚 keeping tabs on Ukraine. After ticking off to the traveling press a list of the issues he鈥檚 addressing in Asia 鈥� the pandemic, climate change, China鈥檚 provocative moves in the South China Sea, North Korea鈥檚 recent ballistic missile tests 鈥� he went on to聽underscore his split-screen agenda.

鈥淲e鈥檙e covering quite literally as well as figuratively a lot of territory [on this trip],鈥� he said, and added: 鈥淢eanwhile ... even as we鈥檙e doing this we will be on the phones, on the video conference with other countries and counterparts, back in Washington, given everything that鈥檚 going on in Europe.鈥�

Clearing the decks

Mr. Biden came into office a year ago declaring an authoritarian and economically potent China as America鈥檚 chief strategic and ideological rival, the only one, his national security strategy declared, able to 鈥渕ount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.鈥� At the same time, he was cognizant that in order to counter China in the vital Indo-Pacific region, other drains on attention and assets would need to be managed to secondary status 鈥� or taken off the plate altogether.

Thus Mr. Biden ended America鈥檚 longest war in Afghanistan and has sought to quickly return the U.S. to the Iran nuclear deal.

Moreover, he crossed the Atlantic in June for a summit with Mr. Putin, with the stated goal of establishing a 鈥渟table and predictable鈥� relationship with America鈥檚 Cold War nemesis.

Then came those Tysonian punches.

Far from quickly reviving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limiting Iran鈥檚 nuclear program, the administration has been stymied by drawn-out yet unfruitful talks with Iran. Tehran has used the months without limits on its program to stockpile enough fuel to deliver a nuclear bomb in a month or less, some experts say.

Talks with Iran and other world powers reconvened in Vienna this week, but U.S. officials warn that without a deal very soon, Iran鈥檚 nuclear progress will make a deal moot and put the international community back on crisis footing in the region.

As for Mr. Putin鈥檚 Russia, his amassing of more than 130,000 troops on Ukraine鈥檚 borders and his demands of Western acknowledgment of a Russian 鈥渟phere of influence鈥� over much of the former Soviet Union have prompted Mr. Biden to dispatch 3,000 troops to fortify NATO鈥檚 eastern flank. The Ukraine crisis has required the administration to focus more attention than anticipated on transatlantic relations.

The home front

Yet as challenging as those crises will be to a superpower Dr. Brands describes as 鈥渙verstretched,鈥� some international security experts say a deeply divided domestic political environment poses just as great a threat to America鈥檚 ability to lead in successfully countering China.

鈥淢ost people and countries in the region worry about what they see as a decline in the United States鈥� ability to continue to underwrite the Indo-Pacific鈥檚 security and prosperity, let alone its ability to do more in the face of an increasingly powerful China,鈥� says Ramesh Thakur, emeritus professor at the Australian National University in Canberra and senior fellow at the Toda Peace Institute in Tokyo.

The Asia-Pacific region became accustomed over the decades since World War II to an 鈥渋ndispensable鈥� American presence, he says, 鈥渂ut the bigger worry now in the region is over the United States鈥� ability to deal with its domestic tensions and political divisions in a way that allows it to lead,鈥� he says. 鈥淲e watch in horror as events unfold within [the U.S.] that cast doubt on its continued leadership of the kind of free and open and prosperous region most people want.鈥�

Others agree that the image the U.S. offers to the world will play as important a role in determining a successful Asia pivot as defense policies and diplomatic forays.

鈥淲ith China challenging U.S. leadership with its own vision of managing international affairs, people in Asia, like people and countries elsewhere, are asking, 鈥榃hat does America have to offer?鈥欌�� says Dr. Konaev, of the Center for a New American Security. 鈥淭hat means a first step to a successful Asia pivot, as much as other factors, is to get our own house in order and narrow the political divisions that weaken our image and our ability to lead.鈥�

Dr. Konaev says she鈥檒l be looking for U.S. investment in 鈥渃ritical emerging technologies鈥� to compete with China and wants to see even more emphasis on strengthening alliances with Asian partners to fortify the 鈥渇ree and open鈥� region the Biden administration talks about. But she cautions that fostering an Indo-Pacific region with Western ideals cannot come at the expense of America鈥檚 traditional alliances, first and foremost with Europe.

鈥淚t makes sense for the U.S. to shift its primary focus to Asia to build alliances based on ideals of free and open economies and societies with democratic systems and respect for human and civil rights,鈥� she says, 鈥渂ut if we don鈥檛 stand up for those principles where they are most threatened right now, what鈥檚 the point of mounting this competition with China?鈥�

Dr. Thakur agrees that the guiding principles for a 鈥渇ree and prosperous鈥� Indo-Pacific region are what鈥檚 most at stake.

鈥淭he U.S. continues to speak of China as a 鈥榬ule-breaker鈥� in the international system that the U.S. itself has led in the region and globally,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut the reality is that unless the Western-led system is strengthened and China is challenged, we鈥檙e going to find that China has become the new rule-maker.鈥�