海角大神

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Time to be clear on Taiwan? 鈥楽trategic ambiguity鈥 faces test.

Facing an assertive China, some members of Congress want Washington to promise to defend Taiwan. But most experts support continued 鈥渟trategic ambiguity.鈥

By Noah Robertson, Staff writer

At a CNN town hall in late October, President Joe Biden was asked whether the United States would defend Taiwan if China attempted an invasion. His answer was simple.聽

鈥淵es, we have a commitment to do that,鈥 the president said.聽

But official U.S. policy is a good deal less clear, as the White House clarified immediately afterward. That鈥檚 deliberate. For more than 40 years, the U.S. has adopted a position of 鈥渟trategic ambiguity鈥 toward Taiwan. The stance has helped keep the peace so far, but as China grows more powerful and more aggressive, some in Congress wonder whether the policy is obsolete.

What is strategic ambiguity?

It鈥檚 a guessing game. Officially, the U.S. won鈥檛 commit to defending or discarding Taiwan during any invasion by China.聽

鈥淲e do not say that we will come to Taiwan鈥檚 defense, and we don鈥檛 say that we won鈥檛 come to Taiwan鈥檚 defense,鈥 says David Sacks, a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

How did it become U.S. policy?

During the Chinese Civil War, the United States backed the losing side, the Nationalists, who fled to Taiwan and set up the Republic of China there.

Mao Zedong repeatedly threatened to 鈥渓iberate鈥 Taiwan and bombed islands off its coast. Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek wanted U.S. support to 鈥渞escue鈥 the mainland.聽

Meanwhile, the U.S. wanted to avoid war, says Dennis V. Hickey, a professor emeritus* at Missouri State University. America didn鈥檛 help Chiang attack the mainland, but it did sign a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in 1954.

That treaty lapsed in 1979, when the U.S. switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the Communist government in Beijing, and Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act. Strategic ambiguity was born.

The U.S. has two obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act: to sell it arms and to maintain the capacity to protect the island. In essence, it doesn鈥檛 have to defend Taiwan, but it can.

鈥淭he assumption is that China will continue to assume that the United States will come to Taiwan鈥檚 defense and it will plan accordingly. Given that variable, China will continue to decide that force is not its best bet,鈥 says Mr. Sacks. 聽

At the same time, the ambiguity deterred Taiwan from declaring independence, which would have angered China, and risked a war without U.S. support.

Why do some in Congress want it to end?

Strategic ambiguity has kept the peace so far, but a smattering of voices on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill, including Republican Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, think that a clearer U.S. commitment to Taiwan would work better in the future. 鈥淚 think that removing the ambiguity would be good,鈥 Senator Tillis said recently at Politico鈥檚 Defense Forum.聽

He and some of his colleagues believe U.S. policy should be a more active deterrent, given that an increasingly powerful China is running more and more military exercises in Taiwan鈥檚 airspace and has grown more aggressive in its rhetoric.聽

鈥淚n the past, Chinese leaders have said that they would engage in strategic patience, and they didn鈥檛 have a timeline for reuniting Taiwan with the mainland,鈥 says Peter Mansoor, chair in military history at The Ohio State University.

But not Xi Jinping. The Chinese leader has said he wants reunification while he is in office, and China鈥檚 growing military prowess raises the chances he might try to achieve that.聽

The U.S. has three options, says Professor Mansoor. The least likely is that it could leave Taiwan on its own. Or Washington could officially commit to defending Taiwan, and risk involvement in a war. Or it could continue with strategic ambiguity.

Professors Mansoor and Hickey support the third path, increasing arms sales, cooperating with local allies, and training Taiwan鈥檚 military. The Taiwan Strait may be especially tense now, says Professor Hickey, but it鈥檚 been worse before. Relations there are fragile, he points out, and require careful management.聽

鈥淵ou鈥檙e taking a policy that has worked well, and deterred both sides from making trouble for decades, and you鈥檙e going to change that,鈥 says Professor Hickey. 鈥淚 think that鈥檚 pretty risky.鈥

Editor's note: This article has been updated Dennis V. Hickey's current status at聽Missouri State University. He is a professor emeritus.