海角大神

When a catastrophic tsunami struck Indonesia鈥檚 Aceh Province in 2004, killing more than 200,000 people and uprooting hundreds of thousands more, the United States marshaled the forces of partners Japan, Australia, and India to launch one of the largest and most comprehensive disaster aid efforts ever undertaken.

The initiative saved lives and rebuilt communities across the affected Indian Ocean region. It demonstrated that alliances of nations could be as much about meeting human needs as about lofty hard-power defense strategies and big-power competition.

More broadly, it underscored that democracies working together from the basis of shared values offered a more comprehensive and equitable assistance and redevelopment model than the one proffered by an autocratic China.

In that sense, the U.S.-led assistance effort was an early stab at countering the regional ambitions of a rising China.

Now, as President Joe Biden launches his first major foreign policy initiative 鈥� focused on Asia鈥檚 Indo-Pacific region and aimed at countering an increasingly aggressive China 鈥� the Aceh relief effort is one of the administration鈥檚 guides, senior administration officials say.

By dispatching Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin together to Tokyo and Seoul this week, Mr. Biden aims to demonstrate that America鈥檚 alliances and cooperation with key democratic partners are back, aides say.

The trips also are recognition, some regional analysts say, that the U.S. has some catching up to do in what is perhaps the 21st century鈥檚 most critical region.

鈥淭here was a clear recognition in the administration that the United States had lost ground in Asia 鈥� and they needed to quickly build up a united front to deal with China on a range of issues,鈥� says Michael Green, former National Security Council senior director for Asia under President George W. Bush and now senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

On Thursday, Mr. Blinken will carry with him the message from his meetings with democratic partners in the region when he meets in Anchorage, Alaska, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Moreover, the two top national security officials鈥� Asia trip follows a first-of-its-kind summit last Friday of the leaders of the four countries of the Aceh effort 鈥� now more formally organized as the Quad. Mr. Biden initiated the summit as a way to demonstrate a foreign policy of values that is focused on 鈥渁ddressing people鈥檚 needs at a very basic level,鈥� as one senior administration official says.

The 90-minute, four-leader forum resulted in an ambitious coronavirus vaccination distribution plan marshaling each country鈥檚 strengths to deliver 1 billion vaccines to Southeast Asia by the end of 2022. Other areas pegged for stepped-up cooperative action include climate-change mitigation, infrastructure development, and access to rare-earth metals.

鈥淲e are united by our democratic values and our commitment to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific,鈥� Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his counterparts at the opening of the virtual summit. 鈥淥ur agenda today 鈥� covering areas like vaccines, climate change, and emerging technologies 鈥� make the Quad a force for global good.鈥�

Yet if Mr. Biden chose the Indo-Pacific region for the inaugural run of his 鈥渧alues-based鈥� foreign policy, it was to underscore how offering an alternative to China鈥檚 vision for the region has only grown in importance in the nearly two decades since the Indian Ocean tsunami.

鈥淰accine diplomacy鈥�

Underscoring the stakes of the Biden administration鈥檚 foray into what China increasingly considers its backyard are the divergent approaches to 鈥渧accine diplomacy鈥� being pursued by the U.S.-led Quad countries on the one hand and by China on the other.

The differences between the two approaches could hardly be more stark.

China is well ahead in terms of regional COVID-19 vaccine distribution, but its approach has invited criticism over what many see as an aggressive and nationalist diplomacy that puts Chinese interests first. As one example, the Chinese government this week announced that it would begin admitting vaccinated foreigners at airports and other ports of entry 鈥� but only those foreigners carrying proof of having been administered a Chinese-produced vaccine.

On the other hand, the Quad countries鈥� vaccine initiative calls for tapping into each country鈥檚 strengths: harnessing India鈥檚 production capabilities in conjunction with U.S. biotech expertise, Japanese funding, and Australia鈥檚 logistics prowess.

In many ways, Mr. Biden鈥檚 Quad summit and the Blinken-Austin visits to Tokyo and Seoul are stage-setters for Secretary Blinken鈥檚 meetings with Foreign Minister Wang 鈥� chief diplomat of the country the secretary of state has in recent weeks described as America鈥檚 and indeed the 鈥渇ree鈥� and liberal world鈥檚 chief rival and adversary. (After Seoul, Secretary Austin heads to New Delhi for discussions on enhancing military-to-military cooperation between the U.S. and India.)

Mr. Blinken鈥檚 expected message to Mr. Wang: This past week demonstrates not just that we are back in Asia, but that we intend to build a secure, prosperous, and free Indo-Pacific through our alliances and partnerships with democracies in the region.

Calling China in a speech last week the one country able 鈥渢o seriously challenge the stable and open international system,鈥� the chief U.S. diplomat said managing the U.S.-China relationship was likely to be the 鈥渂iggest geopolitical test of the 21st century.鈥�

Agenda of concerns

Senior administration officials said Tuesday that Mr. Blinken 鈥� who will be joined in the Anchorage meetings by President Biden鈥檚 national security adviser, Jake Sullivan 鈥� does not expect to make any major announcements after meeting Chinese officials. Instead, the talks aim to set the tone and lay out the agenda of concerns 鈥� from China鈥檚 economic coercion of U.S. allies and partners to provocative military activities and human rights 鈥� for a 鈥渂roader strategic conversation鈥� going forward.

鈥淲e think it鈥檚 really important that each side understands where the other side stands,鈥� says one senior administration official.

For regional analysts, the Biden administration鈥檚 Indo-Pacific week also is demonstrating that the U.S. intends to compete with China by building with regional partners a model that is better than China鈥檚 at meeting people鈥檚 aspirations for freedom and prosperity.

Mr. Green at CSIS says wrapping up the administration鈥檚 Asia week with meetings with senior Chinese officials 鈥渋s a very smart play.鈥� America鈥檚 Indo-Pacific partners and the Quad countries in particular 鈥渄o not want the containment of China; they don鈥檛 want complete decoupling,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey want the U.S. to compete but be able to cooperate with China where it鈥檚 in our interests.鈥�

Mr. Blinken is expected to sprinkle a tough stance in Anchorage with hopes for cooperating with Beijing on issues of mutual interest, including climate change, Afghanistan, and, Mr. Green adds, perhaps even Myanmar.

Shift to hard power?

The question now for some regional analysts is whether the U.S. sticks to a comprehensive, values-driven diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, or if a sense of the growing urgency to confront China prompts a shift to more hard-power initiatives like stepped-up joint military exercises and inter-military cooperation.

鈥淭he rhetoric from the Quad summit was reassuring and the emphasis on promoting the public good, with the vaccine initiative and climate change and infrastructure investment, was a very positive development,鈥� says Sarang Shidore, a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks in Washington.

鈥淏ut China is the deeper reason the Quad was even born,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd what I find worrying is that despite the recent attention to the values of the group, which include peace and inclusion, the military aspect has not really been pulled back.鈥�

Pointing to Secretary Austin鈥檚 stop in New Delhi, Mr. Shidore says he sees the risk of a regional policy based on values and mutual interests shifting increasingly to an emphasis on China鈥檚 鈥渃ompellence and containment,鈥� something he says America鈥檚 regional partners don鈥檛 want.聽聽

And he says it is the U.S., as the Indo-Pacific regional powers鈥� 鈥渕ost powerful and consequential鈥� partner, that will determine which course the region follows.