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You might say that outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is leaving his successor and the Biden administration foreign-policy team a lengthy and hastily compiled 鈥渢o-undo鈥� list.

In just the past few days, Mr. Pompeo has: returned Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism 鈥� from which President Barack Obama removed the communist island nation in 2015; designated Yemen鈥檚 Houthis a terrorist group; ended decades-old restrictions on U.S. diplomatic contacts with Taiwan; and continued to pile on sanctions targeting the Iranian and Chinese governments.

Most are measures President-elect Joe Biden will likely want to reverse as quickly as possible in order to implement his vision for addressing the issues involved through diplomacy.

But undoing the recent actions adds a layer of unanticipated risk to the work of the new foreign-policy team, placing what experts call 鈥渓and mines鈥� in their path. Reversing the Cuba and Houthi designations, for example, will invite attacks from political opponents that the new administration is soft on communism and terrorism.

Mr. Biden, who takes office at noon Wednesday, was already going to be busy reversing some of President Donald Trump鈥檚 signature foreign-policy actions. He announced over the weekend that among his Day One actions will be rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement 鈥� from which Mr. Trump withdrew the United States on his first day in office 鈥� as well as a cancellation of Mr. Trump鈥檚 controversial Muslim travel ban.

Mr. Biden has also pledged to return the U.S. to the Iran nuclear deal (from which Mr. Trump withdrew the U.S. in 2018) once Iran commits to return to the limits the 2015 agreement placed on its nuclear program.

Unlike most presidential transitions of yore, when the departing administration focused on enabling a smooth transition to the next and significant last-minute foreign-policy actions were rare, Mr. Pompeo has taken a dizzying number of actions many experts say can only be explained as efforts to tie the hands of the incoming team and to make its foreign-policy path more onerous.

鈥淚t鈥檚 like pulling the pin of the grenade and rolling it into the room where the new administration is getting ready to try to deal with all of these issues in the ways they see fit,鈥� says Heather Conley, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. 鈥淵ou鈥檙e setting them up for failure. It鈥檚 just making things worse,鈥� she adds, 鈥渘ot better.鈥�

Last-minute executive order

The last-minute measures demonstrate how foreign policy, once largely above the domestic partisan fray and more consistent than not from one administration to the next, has become as polarized and divisive as domestic policy, some experts say.

President Trump has also taken last-minute steps of his own to, if not tie Mr. Biden鈥檚 hands, then at least complicate his initial days in office. On Monday Mr. Trump signed an executive order lifting coronavirus travel restrictions for a handful of countries as of Jan. 26 鈥� when he will no longer be in office.

Mr. Biden鈥檚 spokeswoman quickly tweeted that, given the gravity of the pandemic and following the advice of the new administration鈥檚 medical team, the restrictions would not be lifted.

One result of this politicization is more sidestepping of Congress and foreign policy by executive order, experts say, which has only encouraged what Ms. Conley calls the 鈥渟winging pendulum鈥� of U.S. foreign policy.

Swinging the pendulum back takes time and energy on the part of the new administration, and complicates its path forward by increasing tensions with the countries involved.

But perhaps the most damaging impact of a zigzag foreign policy, experts say, is that allies and adversaries alike can no longer trust the United States to be a consistent and stable diplomatic interlocutor.

鈥淵ou want your word to be credible, but it becomes hard for our allies and adversaries to commit to working with us or entering into agreements with us if they can鈥檛 believe what we鈥檙e saying or that it鈥檚 going to last,鈥� says Daniel Drezner, a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts.

鈥淚n international relations you have the idea that the parties 鈥榗redibly commit鈥� to something,鈥� he adds, but the recent changeableness of U.S. foreign policy 鈥渞aises questions for many about the U.S. ability to 鈥榗redibly commit鈥� going forward.鈥�

Continuity is the norm

Mr. Drezner says Republican and Democratic administrations have for decades played a kind of ping-pong of enforcing and undoing what is called the Mexico City Policy. Since 1984 the policy has been implemented by Republican administrations to ban U.S. health aid to foreign NGOs providing abortion services or counseling including the abortion option. Incoming Democratic administrations, on the other hand, have quickly lifted what is also known as the 鈥済lobal gag rule.鈥�

But other examples are hard to come by, Mr. Drezner says. He notes that President Bill Clinton negotiated late into his second term a free-trade accord with Jordan that included labor and environmental components that the incoming Bush administration opposed.

But in the end the Bush administration 鈥渟wallowed hard鈥� and went forward with the trade deal, he says.

As other examples, Professor Drezner notes that the Carter administration negotiated for the Iran hostages鈥� release right up to its final hours, and President George H.W. Bush sent troops into Somalia in December 1992 鈥� just weeks before leaving office. But he adds that Mr. Bush kept Mr. Clinton, the president-elect, 鈥渓ooped in鈥� on the Somalia troop deployment, while the hostage negotiations with Iran ended up providing a boost to the incoming Reagan administration.

鈥淭he difference is that these things were not intended as land mines to blow up under the new guys, they were more part of a seamless foreign policy that in many ways carried on from one administration to the next,鈥� he says.

Noting that 鈥渇oreign policy is now in many ways as polarized as domestic politics,鈥� Professor Drezner says it鈥檚 not surprising that Mr. Pompeo would act on issues that 鈥渉ave domestic political resonance,鈥� like Cuba, China, and terrorism.

Pompeo鈥檚 political ambitions

Mr. Pompeo, who leaves office touting as one of his major accomplishments the reversal of the 鈥渁ppeasement policies鈥� of the previous Obama-Biden administration 鈥� toward Iran and China, for example 鈥� is assumed by many political observers to be laying the groundwork for a presidential run in 2024.

Daring Mr. Biden to risk strengthening that 鈥渁ppeasement鈥� image by reversing the terrorist designations of Cuba or the Houthis is widely seen as essentially a political move.

Yemen鈥檚 Iran-allied Houthis may not be a hot-button issue in the U.S., but Yemen鈥檚 devastating humanitarian crisis is a rallying cry for many human rights and aid groups. Recognizing the reality that the rebel Houthis control most of Yemen鈥檚 territory, and thus the distribution of desperately needed food assistance, could prompt the incoming Biden administration to reverse the Houthis鈥� designation as a terrorist group, some regional experts say.

But such action could in turn prompt political opponents to label the new administration soft on terrorism, Professor Drezner says.

Some experts say there are still areas of significant and even growing consensus in foreign policy. China is one, says Ms. Conley of CSIS, noting that 鈥渋f anything, we鈥檙e seeing greater bipartisanship and agreement on getting tough鈥� with Beijing.

Indeed, when Mr. Pompeo announced Tuesday that the U.S. now considers China鈥檚 treatment of the minority Uighurs to be 鈥済enocide,鈥� it was a rare instance of the administration endorsing a position already taken by Mr. Biden 鈥� who announced last year through a spokesman that he considered China鈥檚 Uighur policies to be 鈥済enocide.鈥�

鈥淐hina is a perfect example of our position in the world and our pursuit of national interests only getting worse when we are divided, so I think a lot of people are saying, 鈥楲et鈥檚 try a more bipartisan approach to China, clearly one of our major challenges going forward,鈥欌�� Ms. Conley says. 鈥淭he U.S. will be stronger globally when allies and adversaries alike know we鈥檙e unified, and can have confidence that we鈥檒l have some stick-to-it-iveness in our policies.鈥�