US lies low on Egypt, acting behind the scenes. Is that approach wise?
Obama and administration officials have remained relatively quiet, at least in public, as turmoil revived in Egypt and a new president was elected. Tougher communication is likely going on behind the scenes, some analysts say.
Obama and administration officials have remained relatively quiet, at least in public, as turmoil revived in Egypt and a new president was elected. Tougher communication is likely going on behind the scenes, some analysts say.
Egypt鈥檚 election of an Islamist from the Muslim Brotherhood in its first free presidential elections is further evidence of the challenges that dramatic change in a crucial country like Egypt present to the United States.
The election of Mohamed Morsi, a US-educated engineer, makes the hard place the Obama administration was already in as a result of Egypt鈥檚 revolution that much tighter. The stark dilemmas the US faces may explain why President Obama 鈥 he of Cairo speech, 2009, fame 鈥 and other administration officials have remained relatively quiet on Egypt during recent weeks.
Here are just two examples of the dilemmas the US faces. One, Mr. Morsi鈥檚 past offers some worrisome tendencies, including support for antireligious-minority and antiwomen policies, but how can the US express its concerns without sounding critical of Egyptians鈥 democratically expressed preference? Two, how far ought the US go in criticizing the Egyptian military鈥檚 power grab prior to the announcement of Morsi鈥檚 triumph, when the military there may be the best last guarantor of critical US interests, including preservation of the Egypt-Israel peace accords?
The realities that such vexing dilemmas won't be resolved any time soon, and that any overly emphatic public expression of official US opinion on Egyptian events could easily backfire, explain the administration鈥檚 reticence on Egypt, some regional analysts say.
鈥淲hat the US is engaged in is a complex private effort to protect regional security interests and maintain relations with the military and the intelligence apparatus 鈥 even as the message is delivered and reinforced as events unfold of uncompromising support for democratic change,鈥 says Brian Katulis, a Middle East specialist at the Center for American Progress in Washington. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a complicated dance,鈥 he adds, 鈥渢hat will go on for the rest of the year and beyond that.鈥
Mr. Obama called Morsi Sunday night to congratulate him and express US support for "Egypt's transition to democracy." According to a White House statement on the phone call, Morsi welcomed US support.
An effort to avoid the appearance of heavy-handed interference in Egypt鈥檚 internal affairs helps explain the careful, measured 鈥 and noticeably infrequent 鈥 public commentary from American officials. 鈥淭hey [in the administration] have proceeded as they have at least in part out of a desire to make sure that no one thinks that we think this is about us,鈥 says Mr. Katulis.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton responded to the military鈥檚 steps earlier this month to amass for itself a long list of powers by warning that "there can be no going back on the democratic transition called for by the Egyptian people."聽
Then last week she said it was 鈥渋mperative鈥 that the military turn over power to 鈥渢he legitimate winner鈥 of the presidential election, and she described as 鈥渃learly worrying鈥 military actions that threaten to 鈥渟ubvert constitutional authority.鈥
But those comments, which never went beyond an expression of concern to a threat of potential punitive actions, suggest to some analysts that the tougher communication is going on behind the scenes.
鈥淚鈥檇 say we can assume that these implicit warnings are being taken to another level in private, as the administration conveys its message to a wide variety of actors in the Egyptian political arena,鈥 says Wayne White, a former State Department policy planning official who is now an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute in Washington.聽
Among the conversations that Mr. White, who has long experience working in Egypt, can imagine, is one advising the military 鈥渘ot to provoke a destabilizing uprising over the actions they鈥檝e announced,鈥 he says, and another reminding Morsi and the Brotherhood 鈥渢hat they will be held to their promises鈥 to respect Egypt鈥檚 democratic order and govern for all Egyptians.
鈥淭he most emphatic message to every segment of Egypt鈥檚 new power structure,鈥 White adds, 鈥渋s probably this: that Egypt be returned to some measure of normalcy as soon as possible, both politically and economically.鈥
Katulis of the Center for American Progress says he believes the administration has been 鈥渏udicious鈥 in its meting out of public statements on Egypt, especially given the fast-changing conditions and rapid succession of momentous events. Noting that to a large degree any threats to US interests have yet to be carried out, Katulis says US officials are 鈥渒eeping their powder dry until somebody does something that warrants some targeted action.鈥
An example White gives of something that would move the US beyond cautious words to action would be 鈥渢he military announcing there will be no parliamentary elections for two years鈥 to replace the parliament recently dismissed by Egypt鈥檚 top court. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 the time when [the US] would lower the boom on the SCAF [Supreme Council of the Armed Forces],鈥 White says.
But some experts say such a scenario, in which the US reacts to actions Egyptian authorities have already taken, underscores why the administration should have been more forceful with Egypt in recent months, essentially being 鈥減rescriptive鈥 in ways that State Department officials said the US was determined not to be.
鈥淭he administration should have been much more proactive, making a clear statement of what it expects of Egypt and laying out how the election and different actions by the country鈥檚 powers would affect US-Egypt relations,鈥 says Eric Trager, an Egypt expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Mr. Trager, who was interviewed by phone from Egypt, says most Egyptians see the US behind everything that happens (and things that don鈥檛 happen, for that matter) in their country anyway, so it wouldn鈥檛 have made much difference for the administration to state publicly what it expected of Egypt鈥檚 new leaders.
Instead of 鈥渂romides鈥 about 鈥渄emocratic rule and fair elections,鈥 he says, the US should have gone public with its expectations. 鈥淭hat way when relations between the US and Morsi sour, there鈥檚 something to fall back on,鈥 Trager says, 鈥渟omething to point to and explain why that鈥檚 happening.鈥