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Iran could have enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel one nuclear bomb with a 15-kiloton yield by the end of August, about the time the US presidential race will kick into high gear, according to a new report.

And if anything is likely to replace 鈥渏obs, jobs, jobs鈥� at the top of the list of campaign issues, it鈥檚 the arrival of a nuclear-capable Iran.

The report, the result of research by the Critical Threats Project at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, is careful to underscore that its findings assess 鈥渢echnical feasibility鈥� only and do not delve into the question of Iran鈥檚 motivations behind its advancing nuclear program.

The report 鈥渄oes not assess Iran鈥檚 intentions to weaponize or to pursue break-out scenarios,鈥� says Maseh Zarif, the Critical Threat Project鈥檚 Iran team leader. 鈥淚t is intended solely to inform the policy community and the American public about the nature and progress of the Iranian nuclear program.鈥�

Iran insists that its uranium enrichment program is aimed at producing fuel and materials for civilian power and medical research purposes. But the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western powers, including the United States, suspect that Iran鈥檚 recent acceleration of uranium enrichment to about 20 percent purity suggests Tehran could be planning to 鈥渂reak out鈥� as a nuclear weapons power.

In his report, Mr. Zarif says Iran would need 85 kilograms of about 20-percent low-enriched uranium to deliver the 15 kilograms of 90-percent high-enriched, or weapons-grade, uranium to build a bomb.

Using information gleaned from IAEA reports and other technical sources, Zarif says Iran could have the needed amount of 20-percent low-enriched uranium, which it is producing at two known facilities, Natanz and Fordow, by June. To convert that into the 15 kg of weapons-grade uranium needed for a bomb, would then take about another 10 weeks.

That is, if Iran decided to take such a 鈥渂reak-out鈥� step. So far it is only known to be producing the 20-percent enriched uranium.

The Zarif report differs from the conclusions of other nuclear experts, some of whom have estimated Iran to be at least a year away from amassing enough fuel to provide the basis for an eventual nuclear weapon. Others have put a 鈥渂reak-out鈥� date even farther off, based on Iran鈥檚 known and repeated technical difficulties 鈥� not to mention the certain and virulent international reaction that any signs of a shift to producing high-enriched uranium would trigger.

But some researchers estimate that Iran could be even closer to the nuclear threshold than Zarif concludes.

Gregory Jones, in a December report for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said that an 鈥渁ll-out effort鈥� by Iran could result in a bomb within two to six months.

Shifting from a technical appraisal to an analysis of 鈥渋ntentions,鈥� Mr. Jones predicted that Iran would avoid that kind of reaction-causing 鈥渁ll-out effort鈥� but would instead 鈥渃ontinue on its current course, producing an ever growing stockpile of enriched uranium and carrying out additional research to produce non-nuclear weapons components.鈥�

Jones also concluded that the debate over Iran鈥檚 intentions may be moot. 鈥淭hough it could be many years before Iran becomes an overt nuclear weapon state,鈥� he said, 鈥渋t is already close enough to obtaining a nuclear weapon to be considered a de facto nuclear country.鈥�

Zarif doesn鈥檛 make that kind of judgment in his report. But he does offer one conclusion that could resonate as US policymakers wrestle with the Iran issue over the coming months.

He says that all the measures taken by known and unknown actors against Iran since 2009 鈥� economic sanctions, targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers, and computer viruses that have sent Iran鈥檚 uranium-enriching centrifuges spinning out of control 鈥� 鈥渉ave not significantly derailed the Iranian enrichment program.鈥�