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The fiscal policy debate in the 2016 presidential election (yes, Virginia, there is a policy debate, even if you can鈥檛 hear it through the noise) has come down to a familiar question: Do deficits matter?

Donald Trump and his policy proposals argue strongly that they do not while Hillary Clinton appears to believe that they do鈥攕ort of.

Let鈥檚 start with Clinton. While she has聽proposed a long list of new tax subsidies聽and spending programs for everything from child care and education to caring for aging parents, she has carefully offset her new programs with tax increases on high-income households. The result: A modestly ambitious domestic agenda that largely pays for itself. However, it does nothing to reduce the existing $14 trillion public debt or shrink the ratio of debt to Gross Domestic Product,聽according to estimates聽by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB).

Thus Clinton appears to acknowledge that deficits do matter, at least to the extent she is careful to not make them worse. As she said repeatedly in last night鈥檚 debate, her fiscal plan鈥渨ill not add a penny to the debt.鈥�

Trump鈥檚 tax plan, by contrast, would make deficits worse. Much worse. He鈥檚 proposing a tax cut of historic proportions without putting forward spending reductions to offset those lower revenues. CRFB, using its own estimates of his spending plans and聽TPC鈥檚 projections聽of the size of his tax cuts,聽figures聽Trump would add $5.3 trillion to the debt over the next decade and increase the ratio of debt to GDP in 2026 from 86 percent to 105 percent.

Trump justifies his plan with three somewhat contradictory arguments:

The supply-side case: Once you consider the positive effects of a tax cut, a stronger economy will generate more income and, in turn, more tax revenue. As he said last night, 鈥淲e will create a tremendous economic machine鈥� that, he said, could generate 鈥�5 or 6 percent鈥� economic growth.

But even Trump campaign aides appear to concede that his tax plan 聽won鈥檛 pay for itself鈥攅ven when taking into account its effect on the overall economy. That鈥檚 supported by recent analyses by the Tax Policy Center, the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), and the Tax Foundation.聽TPC and Wharton found that Trump鈥檚 tax plan聽would add about $7 trillion to the debt over the next 10 years (including macroeconomic effects and added interest costs), and the聽Tax Foundation estimated聽it would add between $2.6 trillion and $3.9 trillion over the next 10 years (including macro effects but excluding added interest). These scores included taxes but 聽not spending or other economic proposals.

Trade and regulatory relief: Even if the tax plan won鈥檛 generate enough growth to finance on its own, Trump says other elements of his economic agenda would. These include his plans to slash regulation and encourage production of carbon-based fuels. But the real key, the campaign insists, is Trump鈥檚 aggressive trade policy aimed at limiting foreign imports into the US. While Trump insists this strategy would boost the economy and help pay for tax cuts, the argument runs counter to both experience and decades of mainstream economic theory, as my TPC colleague Eric Toder explains聽here. Another TPC colleague, Len Burman,聽explains聽why Trump鈥檚 budget deficits are likely to increase trade deficits, regardless of his trade policies.

Foreign investment: Even if both theories turn out to be false, Trump鈥檚 advisers insist that enough foreign money would flow into the US to finance both private investment and a large government deficit without any increase in interest rates. The argument that large deficits crowd out private investment is 鈥渟illy,鈥� Trump adviser Peter Navarro said at the聽Tax Policy Center discussion on the candidate tax plans聽last week. 聽聽聽

Navarro鈥檚 argument might apply to a small open economy. For instance, New Zealand might be able to finance both large budget deficits and private investment. But the US, with the largest economy in the world, has enormous capital requirements. This year,聽gross private investment聽is approaching $3 trillion, with net borrowing of about $540 billion. And the federal government will borrow $544 billion. 聽

Currently,聽debt held by the public聽is about $14 trillion, with $6.2 trillion held by foreign investors. Next year alone, TPC and Wharton estimate that Trump鈥檚 tax plan would聽increase the deficit聽by another $300 billion, even after accounting for the short-term economic growth it might generate. That鈥檚 a lot of borrowing and it is hard to imagine it could continue over a long period of time without driving up interest rates.

But just look at recent history, Trump aides say. Over the past decade, the federal government ran huge deficits with no concurrent rise in interest rates. But that was during a period of recession and low growth when private demand for capital slowed markedly. In 2009, for example,聽private investment in the US聽(adjusted for inflation) fell to levels not seen since 1997. It has since recovered, but only to pre-recession 2006 levels. 聽聽

Trump seems not entirely unaware of the risks of big deficits. After all, he did scale back by about one-third his 2015 tax cut plan. And he pledges to not only finance his tax cuts, but balance the budget鈥攚hich means offsetting the additional deficits already built into current law.

Yet, while Clinton seems worried enough about deficits to carefully calibrate her tax and spending plans to avoid adding to the debt, Trump appears comfortable with a fiscal plan that would, according to standard economic analysis, sharply increase the debt. 聽聽

This story originally appeared on TaxVox.