海角大神

Georges Doriot, the eminent Harvard Business School professor and widely acknowledged 鈥渇ather of venture capital,鈥� had an annual ritual: He would have his students examine a Boston business directory from 100 years prior and then ask them how many of those businesses were still in operation. Invariably, the response ranged from few to none. It was a sobering introduction to the ephemeral nature of even the most well-known and powerful American companies. In Rich Cohen鈥檚 wonderful The Fish That Ate the Whale, we are introduced to just such a vanishing corporation, United Fruit Company, and its peripatetic and hyper-focused leader, Samuel 鈥淪am the Banana Man鈥� Zemurray.

Cohen, author of the best-selling "Tough Jews" and "Sweet and Low," has exhaustively researched Zemurray, a Russian 茅migr茅 who arrived in New York City in 1891 with hardly a cent to his name and who, through hard work, ambition 鈥� and not a little luck 鈥� rose to become head of United Fruit for approximately 25 years, from the early 1930s through the 1950s. Cohen describes the young Zemurray as "hardened as the men in Walker Evans鈥� photos, a tough operator, a dead-end kid鈥� 鈥� a scrappy worker who demonstrated that one didn鈥檛 need to be a Rockefeller to understand the basics of success: start at the bottom, fight your way to the top.

Zemurray emigrated to Alabama shortly after arriving in America, first to Selma, where he worked in his uncle鈥檚 store, and shortly thereafter to Mobile. He laid eyes on his first banana on the Mobile docks in 1893, and was quick to carve out a niche for himself in the field peddling 鈥渞ipes鈥�: bananas that were days from expiring, which the bigger companies like United Fruit considered worthless. Zemurray was both highly aggressive and observant in plying his trade 鈥� he was fond of quoting 鈥淭here is no problem you can鈥檛 solve if you understand your business from A to Z鈥� 鈥� and by the time he was 21, he was selling nearly 600,000 bananas a year and was essentially a millionaire.

His labors came to the attention of Andrew Preston, the president of United Fruit, who came to Mobile in 1903 and met with Zemurray, caling him "a risk taker ... thinker and a doer.鈥� Preston signed a contract with Zemurray giving the young 鈥渇ruit jobber鈥� the rights to United Fruit鈥檚 ripes. At this point Cohen likens Zemurray to 鈥渁 bike racer riding in the windbreak of a semitruck 鈥� the semitruck being United Fruit鈥� and adds that, 鈥淚f he had stopped there, his would have been a great success story.鈥�

United Fruit鈥檚 march to prominence 鈥� and monopoly 鈥� was due to the efforts of three men: New Englander Lorenzo Baker, who developed banana fields in Central and South America; Boston Fruit鈥檚 Andrew Preston; and Brooklyn-born Minor Keith, who constructed the first cross-Panama railroad and planted the first banana 鈥渞hizomes鈥� in the region. In 1899, Baker, Preston, and Keith sealed a partnership that created United Fruit. Zemurray, as he moved into the business, joined forces with Mobile native Ashbell Hubbard, who had his own contract with United Fruit. Together, with Zemurray鈥檚 $20,000 investment, the two men acquired two smaller companies, Cuyamel Fruit Co., and Thatcher Brothers, the latter of which provided the new enterprise with steamships. This put the young company squarely in United Fruit鈥檚 crosshairs, and, as Cohen makes clear, the emerging colossus dealt with competitors in only two ways: 鈥渁bsorb or crush.鈥� Zemurray was not about to be crushed.

Having moved to New Orleans in 1905, four years before United Fruit would win a Supreme Court case alleging that they had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, Zemurray met Jake 鈥淭he Parrot King鈥� Weinberger, an itinerant merchant who had extensive knowledge of Central America. (Zemurray would later marry Jake鈥檚 daughter Sarah). In 1910, Zemurray traveled to Honduras, where he bought 5,000 acres of land and met 鈥渃haracters鈥� such as fugitive Texas embezzler William Sidney Porter (the author O. Henry). Zemurray found he was easily able to 鈥済rease the skids鈥� of his enterprise by bribing officials of the heavily indebted D谩vila government and by paying for Washington lobbyists to kill a plan by US Secretary of State Philander Knox to place a duty on all imports, bananas included.

Finally Zemurray decided to quietly overthrow the Honduran government. The new leader, General Manuel Bonilla, gave Zemurray essentially a free hand in expanding his business interests in the country.

The inevitable 鈥渂anana war,鈥� as Cohen describes it, pitted Zemurray, the 鈥済ringo鈥� who rode with the roughnecks of the isthmus, against the starch-collared Brahmins of Boston of United Fruit, who seemed to operate from another planet. They sought to cut off Zemurray鈥檚 supply chain but, seeing that Zemurray was unrelenting, they arrived at a deal, brokered by United Fruit board member Bradley Palmer, that offered Zemurray 300,000 shares of United Fruit stock to leave the banana trade. Zemurray accepted but 鈥� still volatile, restless, and driven 鈥� he was nowhere near ready to relax and rest on his laurels. As Cohen sums up his world view: 鈥淪how me a happy man, and I will show you a man who is getting nothing accomplished in the world.鈥�

The board of United Fruit were from Boston鈥檚 business elite. They had little use for this hard-headed and raving Russian. Zemurray, seeing the value of his United Fruit stock dwindle from $30 million initially to $3 million in 1932, spent the months before United Fruit's January, 1933, board meeting secretly gathering voting proxies against the United Fruit board. At that winter鈥檚 meeting, Zemurray made a personal appeal, saying the board had continually ignored his advice. At the end of it, board chairman Daniel Gould Wing sneered at him, saying, 鈥淯nfortunately, Mr. Zemurray, I can鈥檛 understand a word of what you say.鈥� Zemurray then angrily left the room and returned with the large sack of proxies, which he threw on the table, saying 鈥淵ou're fired! Can you understand that, Mr. Chairman?鈥� In the Central American isthmus, the demoralized population viewed Zemurray鈥檚 ascent to the head of United Fruit as a godsend. But Boston鈥檚 anti-Semetic gentry had reserved one last insult. As a Jew, Zemurray was essentially blackballed in the city, and when homeowners wouldn鈥檛 sell to him, he gave up, taking an apartment in the Ritz Carlton instead.

Now a powerful man, Zemurray, concerned about Adolf Hitler鈥檚 atrocities against the Jewish people, used his considerable wealth and other resources to help establish a Jewish foothold in Israel. Cohen makes clear that Zemurray, although not exactly an observant Jew, acted decisively and forthrightly when asked to help. Citing his World War II efforts, Cohen says Zemurray 鈥渋nvolved himself in the war effort as much as possible, volunteered, hosted, contributed... [did] everything but fight, and would have done that, if not for his advancing years.鈥�

After the war, both the political landscape and United Fruit鈥檚 swelling size changed the Central American isthmus. Cohen asserts, 鈥淏y 1942, the company owned 70 percent of all private land in Guatemala, controlled 75 percent of all trade, and owned most of the roads, power stations and phone lines, the only Pacific seaport and every mile of railroad.鈥� Guatemala鈥檚 people had had enough and were inflamed with desire to end the brand of colonialism and racism they associated with United Fruit. In 1951, charismatic revolutionary leader Jacobo Arbenz assumed Guatemala鈥檚 presidency and one year later signed 鈥淒ecree 900,鈥� which gave the government the right to appropriate hundreds of thousands of acres of United Fruit property which was distributed among Guatemalan peasants.

Zemurray was incensed and used every device at his disposal 鈥� the Central Intelligence Agency, the press, and even the 鈥淔ather of Public Relations,鈥� Edward Bernays 鈥� to undermine Guatemalan resistance efforts. The CIA targeted Arbenz with their "Operation Success" and by 1954 Arbenz was gone with nary a struggle.

But the political backlash in America following 鈥淥peration Success鈥� was swift and powerful. It was widely reported that the campaign to overthrow Arbenz was mounted chiefly for economic reasons, and for one company in particular: United Fruit. The Justice Department now had the leverage to descend upon United Fruit鈥檚 monopoly as never before, and in 1958, the company signed a consent decree with the government that effectively sealed its demise. Its profits dried up, and parts of it were sold off to companies such as Dole and Del Monte.

It was an unseemly and devastating defeat for Zemurray. By 1960 this figure of large build, dominating personality, and boundless energy was a broken man who lingered in coffee shops in New Orleans鈥� French Quarter, 鈥渁n old man with his buttermilk and Times-Picayune.鈥� Cohen鈥檚 masterful and elegantly written account of Zemurray and the corporation he built is a cautionary tale for the ages: how hubris can destroy even the greatest and most powerful company. Today, United Fruit exists only as yet another of those expired entries in the Boston Business Directory.

Chris Hartman is a Monitor contributor.