海角大神

Episode transcript

Jessica Mendoza: Welcome to 鈥淩ethinking the News鈥� by 海角大神. Here, we create space for constructive conversations across a range of issues and perspectives, to give you the information you need to come to your own conclusions. I鈥檓 Jessica Mendoza.

Samantha Laine Perfas: And I鈥檓 Samantha Laine Perfas.

[Music]

Jess: The 2020 election has been certified. Officials across the political spectrum have come out in force to support the integrity of the results. 

Sam: They鈥檝e refuted President Donald Trump鈥檚 false claims of election rigging. 

Jess: And on Tuesday, January 20th, former vice president Joe Biden will be inaugurated as the 46th president of the United States. 

Sam: But many Americans still have doubts. Ahead of November 3rd, Gallup found that public confidence in the accuracy of election results of the past 15 years.

Jess: Another poll, by Morning Consult, found that say they trust U.S. elections. That鈥檚 down from 72% in September. 

Sam: We saw a lot of that distrust play out during the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol last week. Even though election officials nationwide are insisting that the 2020 presidential election was free, fair, and secure 鈥� conspiracy theories about our election continue to thrive.

Jess: So today we鈥檙e kicking off a two-part series to explore this tension. First, what does it mean to have secure elections? And second, why does the idea of election fraud continue to be so compelling to so many?

Sam: In this episode, we鈥檒l be focusing on the question of election security. We have two guests: The first is . He鈥檚 the interim co-director of the nonpartisan organization Verified Voting, which promotes the responsible use of technology in elections. 

Jess: We also have , director of the Election Reform Program at NYU鈥檚 Brennan Center for Justice. 

Sam: Let鈥檚 begin. 

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Jess: Thank you again for joining us, Mark. Could you start by giving us the definition of a free, fair and secure election?  

Mark Lindeman: Well, you didn鈥檛 start easy, did you? I mean, all these terms are qualitative. They鈥檙e not absolute. And election security in particular, it鈥檚 always a work in progress. It鈥檚 been called a race without a finish line. But I think free, fair, and secure means in the end that the candidates have had a fair chance to compete. That voters who are eligible to vote had a fair opportunity to do so, and that everyone can have justifiable confidence that the winners of the election, the reported winners, actually won, you know, really had more support among voters.  

Sam: Hey, Mark, this is Sam here. So I鈥檓 curious then, in order to achieve that, what factors do you guys take into account when you think of what makes up such a system?  

Mark: So Verified Voting is focused on the security aspect of this. We鈥檙e concerned about it being technically sound and also that voters have a basis for confidence that it鈥檚 technically secure. Because it鈥檚 not good enough for election security to be something that election officials know or that experts know. There needs to be a way to reassure the public as well. 

Jess: Could you talk a little bit more about that, in terms of how we effectively communicate to Americans that the process is trustworthy, in a way that overcomes partisan biases or suspicions?  

Mark: So by providing ways to verify and to document really the chain of evidence that leads to election outcomes, that also provides a way for election officials and media to tell the story of how American elections operate and what the bases for trust are. As far as voting systems themselves, the single most important thing is that voters be able to verify their votes, recorded on actual paper ballots. 

People don鈥檛 often think of paper as a technology, but of course, historically it absolutely is. And it鈥檚 probably the best technology we have even now for indelibly recording voter intent. So it may well be that the 2020 election was the best documented election in a century or more. That鈥檚 phenomenal. It鈥檚 perhaps the opposite of the narrative in some people鈥檚 minds. 

Sam: When Jess and I were talking about this with our editors, one thing that we kept thinking about was the difference between saying something like, 鈥渢here鈥檚 no voter fraud鈥� versus 鈥渢here鈥檚 no widespread voter fraud.鈥�

Mark: Yes.  

Sam: Because we know that the system鈥檚 not perfect. So I guess, you know, it might seem like semantics, but do you think that failing to distinguish between those types of statements can have consequences or contribute to distrust or the spread of misinformation?  

Mark: Well, I think that if people say unbelievable things, they will not be believed. So I would not identify it as a primary cause. But I think that, unfortunately, sometimes public officials fall into the trap of overclaiming and thereby being discounted. I never want to say without qualification that American elections are secure. But at the same time, I don鈥檛 want my hemming and hawing to be interpreted as signaling that everything is broken. And in ordinary life, we simply characterize many things as safe, knowing that they鈥檙e not perfectly safe, but also knowing that it鈥檚 rational and appropriate not to live in existential dread about them. So I think a lot of the need is to communicate to voters and the public at large more of the story about all the legitimate bases for confidence in elections, without in any way glossing over the work that remains undone. Which we鈥檙e passionately committed to.  

Sam: So in this election, I鈥檓 curious, from your perspective, if there were legitimate concerns that were raised, especially around regulation changes in response to the pandemic, you know, increasing mail in voting. Were some of those more legitimate? And how did Verified Voting navigate those concerns?

Mark: I think that any massive change in election procedures is going to create potential security flaws. And 2020, for many jurisdictions, was a time of multiple massive changes. Pennsylvania and Georgia, for the first time statewide, was using paper-based voting systems. So that provided a basis for voters to verify their ballots and know that their votes had been recorded correctly. The difficult news is that election officials honestly were creating almost on the fly all their procedures for handling, storing, preserving those ballots. I don鈥檛 think that鈥檚 occasion for terror, but there are always going to be security issues in that case. Now, simultaneously, as you said, many jurisdictions were vastly expanding the use of vote by mail, and that raised all kinds of very real challenges in balancing access to ballots with authentication and security. 

So at a high level, it would be crazy not to be somewhat concerned about, well, are election officials able to do all the things they need to do at this time. Part of our problem in this country is we take elections very seriously when we perceive them going badly or something going wrong. So here, the crown jewel of American democracy, we don鈥檛 treat it that way at all. And we certainly don鈥檛 treat our election officials like the heroes that in 2020 they really were.  

Jess: Could you talk about what the takeaway, or takeaways, might be from everything that鈥檚 happened in the past year? What have we learned and what can we bring with us as we move forward? 

Mark: Well, I think one thing we鈥檝e learned is that a lot of rapid progress is possible. And if you had told me at the beginning of 2017 just how many people in the 2020 presidential election would be voting on paper and how much progress election officials would have made towards really shoring up the voting system, I would have been, you know, delighted and astonished by just how much progress was made. And I think we really saw that success in all the problems that did not occur on Election Day. In many ways, it was the most trouble-free Election Day in many, many years, which, of course, is partly because many people voted before Election Day more than ever.  

Jess: What do you mean by that? What usually, what kind of issues do election officials usually face, poll workers usually face, during big election days like this?  

Mark: Long lines, which often have to do with trouble getting equipment to work in the first place. Equipment failures, reports of votes apparently being flipped. You know, all kinds of things that either prevent voters from voting or raise howling grave doubts that their votes are being recorded and counted accurately. So by no means was 2020 the miraculous, perfect election. But in terms of the trouble reports that we monitored and that election protection hotlines monitored, it was, frankly, a shockingly clean election. 

I think the other takeaway, it鈥檚 maybe not news, but it鈥檚 clearer now than ever, is that doing better objectively and technically does not automatically translate to protecting American elections. Because the biggest threat to American elections, in my view, is really in the American mind. Voters need to have some fundamental belief that election results are trustworthy and we can鈥檛 congratulate ourselves to the extent that we鈥檙e failing to provide that.  

Sam: Mark, as we move forward, how important is it that this process remain nonpartisan? How important is that to the narrative, to the civic culture, and just to us moving forward?  

Mark: Well, it鈥檚 everything. It鈥檚 everything. I really wish I could convey to voters my experience of working with election officials around the country and often not knowing whether I鈥檓 talking with Republicans, Democrats, independents, what have you. Honestly, election officials in the trenches generally don鈥檛 have time to think about it. They don鈥檛 have time to worry about it. They鈥檙e just trying to get people鈥檚 votes counted. They鈥檙e just trying to get the system working for their voters. I think we need to find every possible opportunity to communicate that. 

And I think we鈥檝e seen that manifest, right? We鈥檝e seen a very sharp political division in the aftermath of the election. But among election officials, we have not. There is no stark divide between Democratic and Republican secretaries of state, among election officials on lower levels. And that鈥檚 because, by and large, they鈥檙e deeply committed to their work. They take pride in it. And they don鈥檛 habitually accuse each other of felonies with no evidence or basis whatsoever. And that actually is a very strong culture that we all would benefit from seeing and learning from.  

Sam: Thank you so much, Mark, for joining us and giving us your perspective, it鈥檚 really helpful.  

Mark: It was a pleasure. Boy, this election is a lot to think about, huh? 

Jess: That鈥檚 for sure.  

Sam: An understatement.  

Mark: Yeah. Yeah. So thanks for your thoughtful questions. I enjoyed the conversation.  

[Music]

Clay Collins: Hi everyone. I鈥檓 Clay Collins, Director of Editorial Innovation for the Monitor. Because of listeners like you, our reporters are able to bring fresh perspectives and new voices to the stories of the day. If you鈥檙e enjoying 鈥淩ethinking the News,鈥� consider subscribing to 海角大神. Go to csmonitor.com/subscribe to learn more. That鈥檚 csmonitor.com/subscribe. We really appreciate your support. 

[Music]

Sam: Welcome back. We just finished speaking with Mark Lindeman, the interim co-director of Verified Voting. 

Jess: Now joining us is Larry Norden, director of the Election Reform Program at NYU鈥檚 Brennan Center for Justice. 

[Music]

Sam: Larry, thank you for joining us. You鈥檝e been researching and working in the election space for years now. I鈥檓 curious if the concerns and the conspiracies we鈥檙e hearing about election rigging or fraud are those new? 

Larry Norden: I would say in one sense it鈥檚 not new. What is new is having candidates after the election arguing that the result was not legitimate. We saw that a bit in 2016, but this is the first time that I鈥檓 aware of that we鈥檝e had anything close to such a high-profile figure argue after the election that the results couldn鈥檛 be trusted and really have that argument repeated by so many high-profile figures. 

Jess: To what degree is that different than what happened in 2000? I mean, Al Gore bringing up the vote count in Florida, was that not questioning legitimacy?  

Larry: Yeah, well, the difference is that the election hadn鈥檛 been settled. So there were questions about what the final vote total would be. But as soon as the Supreme Court ruled on Bush v. Gore and the election was certified, Al Gore conceded. So that鈥檚 the difference, is there was a concession from the candidate, and there wasn鈥檛 a concerted effort on the part of major leaders of the party to continue to try to contest the election results.  

Jess: You also mentioned 2016. I think after that election, we did hear a lot about how our election systems were vulnerable, particularly to foreign interference from both sort of a technological and an administrative perspective. And then in 2020, we鈥檙e able to say, you know, our election was the most secure in American history. I think it鈥檚 sort of understandable that folks might be confused as to how that progressed.

Larry: Yeah.

Jess: In what ways did we beef up our election systems in that time? 

Larry: Yeah. So first of all, I think it鈥檚 important to remember what happened in 2016. Hackers associated with Russia conducted research and reconnaissance against election networks in every state, and they breached at least one state voter registration database. They attacked a local election board. They apparently infected the computers at a voting technology company. So this was a huge wake up call for the federal government, for state and local governments, and for election officials. So in response, Jeh Johnson, he was the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, made election infrastructure critical infrastructure. That meant that a whole bunch of federal resources were available to election officials to beef up the security of their systems. 

And then state and local governments took a lot of actions. Prior to 2016, it was a rare thing to see election security covered as a topic in a convening of election officials. After 2016, whenever I went to any convening of election officials, it was always a topic. There was a lot of training of election officials around election security. 

And there was a move away from paperless machines. One of the biggest vulnerabilities we have in the United States is machines that had no paper record of the vote so that if there was a hack into those systems, a failure of those systems, or even just suspicion of problems with those systems, there鈥檇 be no way to go back to some independent record like paper and confirm the results. We saw how important that was for Georgia, right? For the first time in a presidential election in decades, they had a paper record of every vote and they actually counted those votes twice afterwards to confirm that the results were accurate.  

Sam: It鈥檚 interesting to think that, you know, talking about election security, the way that we are talking about it today is a relatively new issue that鈥檚 come up. How is the conversation around our election security having to change to adapt to the digital age? And what are some of the factors that you guys are looking at in terms of how to keep elections secure? 

Larry: So there鈥檚 no question that computerization of our elections has meant that we have to think about security in a new way. There are a lot of benefits. It鈥檚 easier for people to register. The whole registration process is less expensive. It鈥檚 faster to count votes. Right? People were complaining about how long it took to count the votes. But if we didn鈥檛 have computers to help us count those votes, we would still be counting. The 2000 election gave us a pretty clear example of what happens when you鈥檙e using outdated equipment. We had all these hanging chads. It was difficult to determine voter intent, and that was a big source of the dispute in the 2000 election. Modernizing our elections meant that we really reduce those kinds of problems. But it does mean that we have to worry more about cybersecurity and making sure that we have backup systems, whether it鈥檚 because there鈥檚 been a hack or just because sometimes technology fails. We can ensure that people can continue to register, can continue to vote, and that we can audit and ensure that our election results were 鈥� were accurate.  

Jess: Would it be fair to say that technology has provided a lot of advantages to both securing our elections and giving people access to elections, but at the same time, we need to learn to balance that with other ways, not relying so much on technology? 

Larry: So, yes, I think technology has improved elections in many, many ways, but you never want to be solely reliant on any one thing. And so, you know, it just means rethinking what security is. Election officials have always spent time thinking about backup plans. And you have to think differently when you鈥檙e using computers than when you鈥檙e using, for instance, a lever machine.

Sam: In thinking about, like, where we were in 2016 and all the investments and work that went into making our elections not just more secure, but also more available to voters and just more modern, that鈥檚 a lot. That鈥檚 a lot of change that has happened. It鈥檚 a lot of 鈥� I guess I鈥檓 just thinking from the perspective of the voter, do you think that might be contributing to some of the concerns that we鈥檙e seeing right now, just the speed at which change happened that made voters more uncomfortable in a way we maybe didn鈥檛 predict? 

Larry: I don鈥檛 think most people spend a lot of time thinking about election security. They get their information from people that they trust and that starts with maybe their president or their member of Congress. And if those people are providing misleading information about how trustworthy the system is, then you鈥檙e going to get a lot of people who believe them. So, you know, look, there鈥檚 no question, COVID made big changes for everybody. But I think most of the changes, had there not been this kind of commentary, would be reassuring to people, right? As I said, many more people were voting on a paper ballot than we鈥檝e seen in decades in the United States. You can鈥檛 hack a paper ballot. Additional days were provided for people to vote. I think most people would generally say, especially during a pandemic, that鈥檚 a good thing, to give people more options.  

Jess: Is there anything we could do 鈥� we, as well as our political leaders 鈥� is there anything that we can do so that Americans, regardless of party, feel that they can trust the process again?  

Larry: The first thing starts with telling the truth. That comes from us, people who are working in this space. It certainly comes from our political leaders, as well, to talk about what we are doing to ensure that the system is secure, to be as transparent as possible about that 鈥� to invest in elections and election security and to talk about that when we鈥檙e doing it. You know, there are things 鈥� I mentioned that all of the battleground states in this election had a paper record for every vote. They also audited that afterwards. There鈥檚 also like a whole canvassing process that happens, but I think a lot of people don鈥檛 know about it. So when you hear claims like 鈥渢here were more votes than people that came in,鈥� no, that couldn鈥檛 happen. There鈥檚 a canvassing process that happens where we鈥檙e looking at the total number of people who signed in in a polling place. We鈥檙e comparing the total number of votes. We鈥檙e then comparing the paper record to the electronic totals. All of that is public, but we could probably do a better job of making sure that the public is aware that those things are happening, that they can see them. 

At the end of the day, though, I think, there鈥檚 a reckoning that needs to happen. There are some political leaders who have been using false claims of fraud for political advantage. People who have done that have seen only one side of the equation there. And they haven鈥檛 thought about the bigger cost, which is when you start telling people untruths about the integrity of the system, they start to doubt the system entirely. And you can鈥檛 have a democracy that works if people don鈥檛 trust that it鈥檚 going to give you accurate results. You can鈥檛 have a democracy that works if the losing side doesn鈥檛 believe that they鈥檝e lost.  

Sam: Larry, I鈥檝e got just one more question. What gives you hope that we can get back to a place of having integrity, having trust, and protecting our democracy? 

Larry: Election officials give me hope. It鈥檚 kind of remarkable. For all of the controversy that we鈥檝e had around the 2020 election, that we were able to pull it off. We had these cybersecurity concerns. We had concerns about a nation-state attacking our elections. We ran a massive election during a pandemic, and we did it successfully. We had the highest turnout in over a century in the United States, during a pandemic. So it really was a remarkable accomplishment. And that work was bipartisan. And I am hopeful that when partisan tempers cool, that we鈥檙e going to see Republicans and Democrats come together to work and say, 鈥淟ook, now it鈥檚 time to invest in our elections and to invest in trust in our elections.鈥� And if we can follow the example of election officials of both parties who did that over the past year, that gives me a lot of hope.  

Sam: Larry, thanks so much for joining us and just sharing all your insight today. 

Larry: My pleasure. 

[Music]

Sam: Thanks for joining us. In our next episode, we鈥檒l hear about conspiracy theories. 

Jess: Why do people find them so compelling 鈥� 

Sam: 鈥� and how do they affect our elections, and those who work to secure them? 

Jess: If you liked this episode, please consider subscribing to the Monitor. This work is made possible by your support. Visit . 

Sam: Again, that鈥檚 . 

Jess: This episode was hosted, reported, and produced by me, Jessica Mendoza, and Samantha Laine Perfas. Liz Marlantes, Mark Trumbull, and Yvonne Zipp were the editors. Sound design by Morgan Anderson and Noel Flatt. Produced by 海角大神, copyright 2021.

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