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Can Joe Biden build back the crumbling US-Saudi alliance?

The signs that America is no longer the sole outside player in Saudi Arabia are clear and many.

Chinese-made cars zip along Jeddah鈥檚 tony waterfront.

Dozens of Chinese businesses that have set up shop in Riyadh eye contracts for Saudi megaprojects.

Since last Fall, all schools in the kingdom, from primary to graduate, offer Chinese as an optional 鈥渢hird language鈥� after Arabic and English; a few private universities teach Mandarin as the second language after Arabic.

And the majority of Saudi crude oil loaded onto tankers is heading for the South China Sea.

Even as President Joe Biden visits Saudi Arabia this week to shore up an 80-year alliance with a country he once termed a 鈥減ariah,鈥� Beijing and others have been moving in to help influence the kingdom鈥檚 post-oil future.

With the president seeking to strengthen America globally against both Russia and China, U.S. and Saudi officials face the challenging task of reviving a relationship in which both partners have different needs 鈥� and different views on what makes a good ally.

The only question looming larger than how far Saudi Arabia can truly enter Beijing鈥檚 orbit, is whether the long-time allies can provide what the other needs.

The answer, some say, may lie with honestly articulating what those needs are.

What is U.S. policy now?

Mr. Biden鈥檚 visit to Jeddah on Friday, scheduled to include bilateral meetings with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as well as a summit with other Arab leaders, follows his two-day visit to Israel to reassure another key regional ally.

It comes at what American and Saudi officials describe as 鈥渁 low point鈥� for their long partnership.

There is the well-documented friction between the leaders over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

There is rising anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress over the kingdom鈥檚 human rights record, and frustration among Saudis over American unwillingness to support their economic transformation.

And U.S. officials were 鈥渄eeply disappointed鈥� with Saudi Arabia鈥檚 refusal to boost oil output following Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine in February, though doing so would have ripped up a hard-won production agreement between OPEC nations and Russia that ended a punishing price war.

American officials described the Saudis鈥� February push-back as a 鈥渨ake-up call鈥� in Washington.

But all agree Mr. Biden鈥檚 greatest task is confronting the fact that the strained U.S.-Saudi ties predate the Ukraine war, Mr. Khashoggi鈥檚 murder, or the crown prince鈥檚 rise.

It is the core question that every Arab official, and politically attuned citizen, asks: What, now, is America鈥檚 foreign policy in the Middle East?

鈥淭he strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. is important because it supports a certain peace in the region,鈥� says Saudi analyst Mohammed Alyahya, a fellow at Harvard鈥檚 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 鈥淏ut there is confusion as to what exactly America is guaranteeing when it says it is pivoting away from the region.鈥�

In a relationship built on energy security in return for regional military security, the Saudi leadership sees a United States not as fully committed as it once was. 听

Saudi officials say Washington has been changing its priorities for more than a decade and acts now as if it does not know what it wants from its Gulf alliance 鈥� or if it wants it at all.

They point to apparent support for Arab Spring democratic uprisings; reneging on its chemical-weapons red line in Syria; repeated declarations that America is 鈥減ivoting鈥� to Asia; and the perceived overlooking of Iran鈥檚 destabilizing activities in a race to secure a nuclear deal.听

鈥淧eople in the Gulf don鈥檛 know what to take seriously in U.S. policy statements,鈥� says Mr. Alyahya, who describes Gulf states as undergoing a political and economic 鈥渄iversification鈥� of partners in the past decade. 听

The presence of Russian and Chinese firms and flurry of government delegations to Riyadh underscores a belief here that it is the U.S. that deserted Saudi Arabia, forcing it to rely more on Beijing and Moscow.

鈥淔rom our standpoint, the Americans are the ones that allowed Russia to come to our door-step and set up bases in the heart of the Arab world,鈥� says a Saudi official not authorized to speak to the press. 鈥淭hey pivoted away from us. Now they expect us to turn things around in a second?鈥�

Generation China?

More than a realpolitik realignment, the Saudi drift closer to China鈥檚 orbit is also being driven by young Saudis who perceive greater opportunities with a China on the rise.

Increasingly, young Saudis are pursuing higher education in China to make inroads in the country before embarking on their own businesses. And this after the kingdom sent 250,000 young Saudis听to study at U.S. universities on scholarships over the past decade.

鈥淔or technology and business, China is leading the future,鈥� says Mohamed,听an IT engineer听who only gave his first name. He听graduated with a computer science degree from Zhejiang University and now works for a health-tech start-up in Riyadh. 鈥淐hina is a good place to study and improve oneself for the global market,"听he says.

Some Saudis make little distinction between American criticism of Crown Prince Mohammed and a general anti-Saudi sentiment, with attempts to 鈥渃ancel鈥� Western companies and even performers who come to Saudi Arabia.

Young Saudis told The Monitor that despite being personally drawn to America, they are more willing to align themselves economically and politically with China, which, despite its mass incarceration of Muslim Uyghurs, appears more welcoming.

鈥淩egardless of who is responsible, it is unfortunate that the U.S. is losing the source of soft power it has in Saudi Arabia,鈥� says Mr. Alyahya.

鈥淏y boycotting an entire country, or making its citizens feel that they don鈥檛 deserve鈥� to see performances by Western musicians or professional golfers, 鈥渋t unnecessarily bullies people and inspires these fantastical and unrealistic views听that China is the answer.鈥�

But observers say there are limits to how far the kingdom can gravitate toward Beijing.

Saudi officials and businesspeople describe an 鈥渆ase of business鈥� and cultural understanding with Americans that they struggle to find with Chinese firms and officials.

鈥淭here is a clash of business cultures between the Chinese and the Saudis while there is a sense of familiarity with Americans,鈥� says Chris Johnson, ex-officio of the American Chamber of Commerce, Saudi Arabia, who has represented both Western and Chinese firms in the kingdom.

鈥淭here is a certain warmth and friendship that is important for Saudis that just isn鈥檛 the way the Chinese do business.鈥�

With Saudi Arabia鈥檚 effort to transition to a post-oil economy, thousands of young Saudis are eager to emulate Silicon Valley, not Shanghai.

From leafy suburbs sprouting up around Riyadh and Mecca to coworking spaces with bean bag chairs and foosball, Saudi Arabian culture is turning decidedly more American, not less, under the crown prince.

Acknowledging the relationship

The first step to mending ties, Saudi observers say, is for Washington to publicly admit it needs and values their partnership.

鈥淏iden should focus on American interests and world stability, not play to the pressures of the radical left agenda,鈥� says Mohammed Alhamed, president of Saudi Elite Group, a youth empowerment organization, and an analyst of Saudi-U.S. relations. 鈥淭here needs to be an acknowledgement of the importance of this relationship, and that Saudi Arabia has become an important player in the world stage.鈥�

Mr. Biden started this 鈥渁cknowledgement鈥� in an op-ed last weekend in the Washington Post 鈥� the late Mr. Khashoggi鈥檚 employer and a publication that has rankled Saudi officials.

鈥淲e have to counter Russia鈥檚 aggression, put ourselves in the best possible position to outcompete China, and work for greater stability in a consequential region of the world,鈥� the president wrote.

鈥淭o do these things, we have to engage directly with countries that can impact those outcomes. Saudi Arabia is one of them,鈥� he stated, pledging to 鈥渞eorient 鈥� but not rupture 鈥� relations with a country that鈥檚 been a strategic partner for 80 years.鈥�

Officials and observers say Saudi Arabia is looking for a 鈥渃oncrete commitment鈥� to regional security. But as Iran nears a nuclear weapon, what can America offer its allies?

Mr. Biden provided one answer in Jerusalem Thursday in a joint declaration he signed with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid: 鈥淭he United States stresses 鈥� the commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure the outcome.鈥�

The declaration notably included the strongest U.S. language yet against Iran鈥檚 proxy activities in the region, a top concern for Saudi Arabia, vowing 鈥渢o confront Iran鈥檚 aggression and destabilizing activities.鈥�

No firm steps were announced to implement this pledge.

David Rundell, a former U.S. diplomat and author on Saudi Arabia, acknowledges a domestic U.S. political discomfort with 鈥渁 greater U.S. commitment to a country whose leader is depicted as a despot.鈥�

But he says, bluntly: 鈥淚f you want to avoid a nuclear disaster in the region, the U.S. needs to promote a more open and concrete security alliance with Saudi Arabia.鈥�

Many say even a modest boost in Saudi oil production and an agreement on shared challenges could mark the Biden visit to the kingdom as a success.

鈥淭he visit itself is a recognition of the importance of the relationship and is a step in the right direction,鈥� says Mr. Rundell. 鈥淭hat is significant and should not be underestimated.鈥�