海角大神

Turkey's 'holy war' in Syria puts a more religious nationalism on display

Rebranding Turkish nationalism with Islamic themes has helped President Erdo臒an mobilize support for the Afrin military operation and his style of leadership. The rhetoric also has deepened anti-Western sentiment.

Turkish forces and Free Syrian Army fighters were deployed in Afrin, Syria, March 18.

Khalil Ashawi/Reuters

March 23, 2018

When Turkey鈥檚 armed forces finally seized control last Sunday of the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northern Syria, after a two-month campaign, it was presented as a victory by 鈥淚slam鈥檚 last army鈥 in a holy war, or 鈥渏ihad.鈥

Turkey has mounted frequent cross-border operations into Iraq over the years to target militants of the Kurdistan Workers鈥 Party (PKK). And 鈥淥peration Olive Branch鈥 鈥 as Turkey named the Afrin offensive 鈥 is the second major operation into Syria since 2016, aimed at preventing Syrian Kurds affiliated with the PKK from building their own mini-state on Turkey鈥檚 southern border.

But never before has an operation by Turkey鈥檚 military 鈥 the second-largest army in the NATO alliance, with a fiercely secular tradition 鈥撀燽een wrapped in such overtly religious language.

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That portrayal signifies how far President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have progressed in rebranding Turkish nationalism in their own, Islam-rooted image. The results, analysts say, have been an extension of the AKP鈥檚 conservative and religious agenda; less room for opposition; and a deepening of anti-Western sentiment that has portrayed Turkey as the front line in a clash of civilizations.

鈥淵ou do have a combination 鈥 a nexus of Islamism and Turkish nationalism 鈥 that has not existed before,鈥 says Asl谋 Ayd谋nta艧ba艧, a Turkey expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations who is based in Istanbul.

鈥淚t resonates. And the moment you define it as a religious war, you have no sympathy for the people on the other side. They鈥檙e the enemy. They are terrorists. They are not innocent,鈥 says Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧.

鈥淥nce you call something a holy war, citizens are very constrained in their ability to say anything about it,鈥 she says. 鈥淲e鈥檝e had lots of people who are detained or under investigation for their tweets, or criticizing the war, so social media has really been silenced about it.鈥

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an, center, attends the inauguration of his ruling Justice and Development Party's Politics Academy, in Ankara, Turkey, Friday, Mar. 9.
Kayhan Ozer/AP

President Erdo臒an vowed this week that Turkey would advance much further east in northern Syria, using its soldiers and the Syrian militia it supports to seize control over all the border territory, most of it now in the hands of US-backed Syrian Kurds. Much of that ground is now held by Kurdish militias, whom Turkey considers to be terrorists, that were backed by the US to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) 鈥 with American units seeded among them.

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Taking Afrin was but a 鈥渃omma鈥 in the Turkish advance, and it will continue 鈥渦ntil we entirely eliminate this [Kurdish-controlled] corridor,鈥 said Erdo臒an.

The price has been high. Some 50 Turkish soldiers have been killed, with reports of several hundred civilians dead. Turkey claims to have killed or captured more than 3,700 Syrian Kurdish fighters, though other estimates suggest 1,500 of them were killed. Tarnishing the result, Turkey鈥檚 own Syrian proxy force has been photographed engaging in wholesale looting of Afrin, as well as destroying a statue of a mythical figure in Kurdish history who represented resistance and freedom.

Surge in religiously infused nationalism

The blending of nationalism and religiosity, which has been a growing feature of AKP rule since it came to power in 2002, surged in the aftermath of a failed July 2016 coup attempt. Nightly 鈥渦nity鈥 rallies, organized in cities across the country by the AKP for a month, were steeped in mixed religious and political imagery.

Mustafa Akyol, the Turkish author of 鈥淭he Islamic Jesus鈥 and 鈥淚slam Without Extremes,鈥 says Erdo臒an is using a religiously infused nationalist narrative to support his status as a strong leader. While 鈥渢he dominant and official ideology in Turkey has always been nationalism,鈥 he says, the religious component has become more visible in the past couple of years.

鈥淣ow we are seeing Turkish nationalism again as the dominant ideology, but this time with a lot of Islamic references, so the nation is defined mainly through its Islamic heritage and the Ottoman Empire. Islamic themes are more visible,鈥 Mr. Akyol says, noting that it helped mobilize support for the Afrin operation.

鈥淭he narrative of President Erdo臒an in the past 5 or 6 years has been defined by these grave threats to Turkey,鈥 says Akyol, who is also a fellow at the Freedom Project at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. 鈥淪ome of these are real threats. The PKK is a real threat to Turkey. And the coup was a real threat to Turkey,鈥 he says.

鈥淏ut then these threats are taken to advance a highly ideological narrative, which basically says Turkey is now threatened by endless conspiratorial powers, the Western allies, the PKK movement, G眉len, and all of them are connected somehow. And against such grave enemies, we need a strong leader, a strong national psyche 鈥 with a lot of holy references.鈥

From the start, the Afrin operation has been cast in Islamic terms.

鈥淭here will be no progress unless there is jihad,鈥 Parliament Speaker 陌smail Kahraman said as the offensive began. 鈥淭he great state will stand up, we have martyrs, may Allah grant them mercy.鈥

Funerals for fallen Turkish soldiers have also been saturated with religious terminology. Speaking at one last week, Erdo臒an said, 鈥減aradise is near,鈥 and that, 鈥淥ur martyrs have undertaken a great struggle 鈥 for our religion.鈥

Erdo臒an has a history of using Islamist rhetoric, and was jailed for four months for breaking secular laws in 1997 when he was mayor of Istanbul, by reciting these lines in a speech: 鈥淭he mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers.鈥

Last week he聽compared the spirit and faith of Turkish soldiers at Afrin to those Ottoman troops whose legendary faith helped them prevail in the World War I battle of 脟anakkale on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915.

Marking that anniversary, Erdo臒an quoted lines from the poet Yahya Kemal, which spoke of the Turkish Army then as 鈥渢he army which has died for you; you raise them high in the call to prayer; victory is claimed, because this is the last army of Islam.鈥

Nationalist concept of 鈥榡ihad鈥

Even Turkey鈥檚 official Directorate of Religious Affairs issued a sermon in mid-February, proclaiming upon the Afrin offensive.

鈥淚t is the highest level of jihad to enter armed struggle for the faith, existence, the homeland, and freedom,鈥 the sermon said. 鈥淥ur heroic army fighting for independence and our future, for unity and togetherness, is victorious!鈥

While words like 鈥渕artyr鈥 have always been used by the Turkish military, and Allah invoked by soldiers, the open use of words like 鈥渏ihad鈥 have surprised secular Turks, especially. One columnist asked pithily, after the 鈥渓ast army of Islam鈥 and 鈥淕od鈥檚 army鈥 lines of poetry were posted, whether the Twitter account of the Turkish Armed Forces had been hacked by ISIS.

Author Akyol says he鈥檚 sometimes uncomfortable with the use of religious terminology, but sees it in more political terms.

鈥淭his is a very nationalist concept of the word jihad, and holy struggle, as defending our homeland against the enemies 鈥 but I would not see this language as akin to that used by jihadist terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS,鈥 he says.

Islam is more present in Turkey鈥檚 official education, with even TV series and state TV making increasing references to the nation's Islamic values and past. But there are limits, too. Erdo臒an lashed out this month at ultraconservative clerics 鈥撀爋ne of whom had recently condoned wife beating 鈥 saying, 鈥淚slam must be updated.鈥

鈥淎KP鈥檚 social agenda can be rightly called conservatization, more than anything else,鈥 says Akyol. 鈥淒oes this include 鈥業slamization鈥? Yes, obviously Islam is more dominant in the official narrative, [but] it is not an Islamization that will make Turkey look like, say, Saudi Arabia or Iran in 10 years.鈥

Squelching opposition

Still, describing the Afrin offensive as a 鈥渉oly war鈥 has made opposition more challenging, especially under a state of emergency that has continued since mid-2016. Just over two weeks into the offensive, the Interior Ministry announced that 449 people had been arrested for social media use about Afrin, and accused of making 鈥減ropaganda and terrorism.鈥

Another element is anti-Western sentiment, which characterizes Turkey鈥檚 role as a front line in a broader civilizational clash, says analyst Ayd谋nta艧ba艧. She notes that on Turkish television this week 鈥 even the CNN affiliate CNN T眉rk 鈥 there have been discussions about 鈥淎merica鈥檚 Chaos Plan,鈥 in which panelists speak seriously of US support for ISIS and its aim to bring chaos to the Middle East.

鈥淵ou see this a lot,鈥 says Ayd谋nta艧ba艧. 鈥 鈥業slam鈥檚 last army鈥 isn鈥檛 just fighting Kurds, it鈥檚 fighting Kurds who are being used by the West and 海角大神 world, in the old set-up that they are describing.

鈥淭urkish leaders want it both ways,鈥 she adds, noting Turkey鈥檚 EU membership bid and NATO role. 鈥淭hey want to cooperate with the West, but have the right to do West-bashing, Euro-bashing, and US-bashing in the public sphere.鈥