海角大神

Is politics the new religion?

Mandy will always remember Jan. 6, 2021, in a deeply personal way. Because she was there, inside the U.S. Capitol, supporting her president.聽

The images she saw that day remain sharp: The giant American flag carried by the crowd as they marched from the Ellipse. Singing 鈥淭he Star-Spangled Banner鈥� on the Capitol steps. And finally, entering the building through open doors and standing peacefully in its cavernous Rotunda.

She鈥檚 aware of the videos showing mob violence. But that must have been on the other side of the Capitol, she says. For her, it was a day of jubilation, of like-minded people joined in common purpose to 鈥渟top the steal鈥� of the 2020 election.聽

鈥淭his was probably the most patriotic day of my life,鈥� says Mandy (not her real name), who asks to remain anonymous so as not to risk her job. With a Facebook page that鈥檚 a hub of pro-Trump connections, she says she鈥檚 traveled to 21 rallies for now-former President Donald Trump since 2016. 鈥淚 go for the people as much as I do for Trump.鈥澛�

Similar stories of secular communion have given rise to a theory that has gotten considerable attention of late: that for many Americans, politics has become a quasi-religion 鈥� especially as participation in actual, organized religion has plummeted. Indeed, Mandy says she believes in God, and grew up Southern Baptist, but is not currently a churchgoer.聽聽

The United States has long been known for what some sociologists call 鈥渃ivil religion鈥� 鈥� a shared, nonsectarian faith centered on the flag, the nation鈥檚 founding documents, and God. But the God factor is waning, as so-called nones 鈥� atheists, agnostics, and those who self-identify as 鈥渘othing in particular鈥� 鈥� have risen to one-third of the U.S. population, according to a out of Harvard University.聽

From MAGA devotees on the right to social justice warriors on the 鈥渨oke left,鈥� political activism that can feel 鈥渁bsolute鈥� in a quasi-religious way is rampant. At the same time, American membership in houses of worship has for the first time in eight decades of Gallup polling 鈥� from 70% in 1999 to 47% in 2020.

And as American politics has become polarized, so too has the nation鈥檚 religious profile. The mainstream Protestant center has hollowed out, its population shrinking dramatically. Today, religious Americans tend to choose their congregation with an eye toward partisanship 鈥� to the point where the choice of presidential candidate can lead a voter to move to a new church.

鈥淟iberals and 鈥榥ones鈥� went to the left; conservatives and Evangelicals went to the right,鈥� says Ryan Burge, an expert on religion and politics at Eastern Illinois University, and author of a new book called 鈥淭he Nones.鈥� 鈥淭here鈥檚 no middle anymore.鈥�

Atheists, he says, are now the most politically active group in the U.S. They鈥檙e far from the largest, at 6% of the population, but statistically they are the most likely to engage in political activity.聽

鈥淥ur politics has become religion. It has a religious fervor to it now that it didn鈥檛 have even 20 or 30 years ago,鈥� says Professor Burge, who is also a Baptist pastor.聽

Why is this happening? Some point to social media and news consumption habits that have cordoned Americans off into ideological echo chambers that are all-consuming and provoke emotional responses. The sense of connection some find online may be replacing social networks once formed by houses of worship.聽

Geographic sorting, in which people tend to live near those with similar political views, is another component. Higher education, dominated by an increasingly secular culture, may help explain why so many college-educated young people now reject religion, with some instead finding a sense of purpose and meaning in political activism. A cultural emphasis on science and 鈥渞ationalism鈥� is also a factor.

Still, there鈥檚 a lot of nuance. President Joe Biden, a practicing Roman Catholic, is the first American president since Jimmy Carter to attend church regularly. In general, people of faith 鈥� particularly in the Black community 鈥� remain a key component of Democratic politics. Newly elected Georgia Sen. Raphael Warnock was the senior pastor at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, where the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. preached.

Unlike the 1960s civil rights movement, however, the main leadership of today鈥檚 Black Lives Matter movement did not spring from Black churches. And the same forces driving down religious participation among young Americans, in particular, are also affecting Black churches. Between 2008 and 2020, religious disaffiliation among African Americans soared from 17.7% to almost 35%, according to the Harvard study, known as the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES).

Even for Americans of faith, the role of traditional houses of worship is shifting. The pandemic has given rise to 鈥渙nline church,鈥� allowing some congregants to find a spiritual home far from their physical home. But the larger trend is clear: Americans overall are moving away from organized religion, particularly the mainline faiths. And that shift has dovetailed with the rise of an intense form of partisan politics that some see as quasi-religious, providing adherents with a sense of devotion, belonging, and moral certitude.聽

Especially among young people, 鈥渋f your candidate wins, you have that ecstatic feeling,鈥� Professor Burge says. Political conventions can have the feel of old-time denominational meetings. A stump speech is like a tent revival. Donating regularly to candidates is like tithing.

Still, he suggests, some who eschew religion in favor of politics may ultimately find it lacking in certain ways. Politics 鈥渄oesn鈥檛 have the legs that religion does 鈥� which carries you through all parts of life.鈥澛犅�

Finding a spiritual home

For Bentley Hudgins, a nonbinary Asian American community organizer in Atlanta, it was the realization of their gender identity that drove them from the Southern Baptist church they had attended through childhood and into college. Until that break, the church seemed a positive force in their life.聽

Bullied in school, 鈥淚 found refuge in the structure of a church,鈥� Mx. Hudgins says. 鈥淧eople told you that you were judged by the content of your character, and that your job on this earth was to make people feel loved. That message was compelling to me.鈥�

As Mx. Hudgins came to terms with their gender identity and the church鈥檚 nonacceptance, separation from that community shook their world. Yet in many ways, the core of 海角大神 teachings still permeates Mx. Hudgins鈥� life and work.

鈥淭his radical love of Christ is something that is still a model for my activism,鈥� Mx. Hudgins says. 鈥淚f people are hungry, feed them. If people need healing, give them health care.鈥�

Mx. Hudgins is far from alone as a young adult for whom some of the basic themes of 海角大神 teachings have instead been channeled into nonreligious forms of activism.

鈥淎 lot of people my age have found our spiritual home in the movement to restore and expand civil rights,鈥� they say.聽

It has become a clich茅 to suggest that atheism is itself a form of 鈥渞eligion.鈥� Writer Andrew Sullivan, who is gay and Roman Catholic, that 鈥渆veryone has a religion,鈥� that it鈥檚 鈥渋n our genes.鈥� Seventeenth-century mathematician and theologian Blaise Pascal conceptualized what in 海角大神 circles became known as 鈥渢he God-shaped hole鈥� 鈥� that all humans contain an 鈥渋nfinite abyss鈥� that can only be filled by 鈥渁n infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself.鈥澛�

Calling partisan politics a form of 鈥渞eligion鈥� can be offensive to believers and nonbelievers alike, as it seems to equate human activity with the spiritual. And not surprisingly, most atheists reject the use of the word 鈥渞eligion鈥� to describe their beliefs. But many are well aware of their growing influence in American society as a political force.聽

Annie Laurie Gaylor, co-president of the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) 鈥� which runs ads featuring Ron Reagan, son of the former president 鈥� argues that atheists, agnostics, and otherwise nonreligious people have in the past been woefully underrepresented in public life.聽

That鈥檚 changing as their numbers rise. Ms. Gaylor ascribes this shift in part to 鈥渁ntiquated鈥� attitudes in some churches toward women and LGBTQ people, which have turned young people in particular away from organized religion.聽

鈥淲e are seeing our country waking up, as it had already in much of Europe and the U.K.,鈥� Ms. Gaylor says. 鈥淚t took a long time, but once you turn that light switch on, I don鈥檛 think you turn it back off.鈥�

For members of Congress, where a stated religious affiliation has long been near-universal, that鈥檚 changing. In 2018, the Congressional Freethought Caucus to promote public policy 鈥渂ased on reason and science鈥� and 鈥渢o protect the secular character of our government.鈥澛�

Today the group has 14 members, all House Democrats, or 2.6% of the 535 members of both chambers. While that鈥檚 still a small percentage, those numbers in Congress 鈥� and in politics in general 鈥� seem almost certain to rise as younger generations grow into positions of power.

Acceptance of nontheistic thought is growing. Yet activists say they can still get shocked looks when they identify themselves as atheists.聽聽

鈥淢y theory is that a lot of people were taught by churches that atheists are bad, believe in the devil, and have no morals,鈥� says Judy Saint, a retired math teacher who started the FFRF chapter in Sacramento, California. 鈥淲e have our morals from inside, not from outside.鈥�

FFRF advocates on issues such as tax preferences for religious groups and end-of-life laws. And members participate in secular efforts to help people in need. But there are times when an FFRF activity can, in fact, seem quasi-鈥漴eligious鈥� to some. In Sacramento, during the December holidays, the local chapter on the State Capitol grounds that looks like a Nativity scene. It features the Founding Fathers signing the Bill of Rights 鈥� which was ratified in December 1791. A 海角大神 Nativity scene sits nearby.聽

鈥淲orshipping at the altar of politics鈥�

During President Trump鈥檚 time in office, even high-profile supporters asserted at times that he had been chosen by God to serve.聽鈥淚 think God calls all of us to fill different roles at different times, and I think that He wanted Donald Trump to become president,鈥� press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said in 2019. Energy Secretary Rick Perry called him God鈥檚 鈥渃hosen one.鈥�

That belief grew markedly among conservatives in his final year in office. Among white Protestants who attend church at least weekly, the portion who said Mr. Trump had been 鈥渁nointed by God鈥� to be president rose from 29.6% in May 2019 to 49.5% in March 2020, by Paul Djupe of Denison University and Professor Burge.聽

QAnon 鈥� the online theory that a satanic ring of pedophiles was operating inside the 鈥渄eep state鈥� to undermine the Trump presidency 鈥� also gained considerable currency on the right. At its height, it may have functioned as a quasi-religion for some believers. Adherents of QAnon were prominent among the Capitol invaders, though the theory seems to have faded somewhat since Mr. Trump left office.

All the 海角大神 imagery and objects present at the Capitol insurrection聽suggested another cultural trend.聽Crosses,聽, Bibles, and signs equating President Trump and Jesus 鈥� along with the presence of Confederate flags and antisemitic slogans 鈥� exposed the 鈥渃omfortable juxtaposition鈥� of 海角大神 and white nationalist imagery,聽says Robert P. Jones,聽CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute.

He rejects the idea that politics is replacing religion in America, instead characterizing the prevailing political dynamic as tribalism. 鈥淲hat we see is an overwhelmingly white and 海角大神 reaction to the changing demographics and culture of the country,鈥� says Dr. Jones, author of the book 鈥淲hite Too Long: The Legacy of White Supremacy in American 海角大神ity.鈥澛�

Even if the focus today is more on political tribalism than on religious practice, some observers warn we may be heading down a path toward full-on sectarian conflict 鈥� a threat to democracy itself.

鈥淲hether religious or political, sectarianism is about two hostile identity groups who not only clash over policy and ideology, but see the other side as alien and immoral,鈥澛�. 鈥淚t鈥檚 the antagonistic feelings between the groups, more than differences over ideas, that drive sectarian conflict.鈥�

Mainstream evangelical leaders who support Mr. Trump recognize the risk that far-right extremism poses to their community鈥檚 image. Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council and an informal adviser to Mr. Trump during his presidency, has consistently condemned the assault on the Capitol 鈥撀燼nd makes clear in an interview that not all Trump supporters are alike.聽

Those on the right whom he calls 鈥淪AGE Cons鈥� 鈥� spiritually active, government-engaged conservatives 鈥� know how to 鈥渒eep things in perspective,鈥� Mr. Perkins says. 鈥淭heir allegiance to Trump was based on his policies, such as abortion and religious liberty. It鈥檚 not a personality cult, as some would like to explain it.鈥�

鈥淵ou have people saying, 鈥楨vangelicals are making politics their religion,鈥欌�� he adds. 鈥淲e鈥檙e just responding to what the left has been doing 鈥� worshipping at the altar of politics.鈥�

The Great Awokening

In liberal neighborhoods across the country, a rainbow-hued sign can be seen dotting lawns. It proudly lists a set of principles: 鈥淚n this house we believe: Black lives matter; Women鈥檚 rights are human rights; Love is love; Science is real,鈥� and so on.聽聽

Peter Juul of The Liberal Patriot calls it 鈥渢he聽听补苍诲听聽of the new religion of progressive politics.鈥�

鈥淚t鈥檚 a faith that鈥檚 rapidly won converts at the highest levels of American politics and society,鈥澛�, 鈥渙ne that uncannily mirrors much of the thinking and many of the practices of its ancient predecessors, complete with its own dogmas, heresies, and rituals as well as apocalypses and forms of mysticism.鈥澛�

Dating back to Colonial times, religious 鈥渁wakenings鈥� in America have come and gone. At times of upheaval, a flocking to religion has often been a central feature.聽

鈥淭he Civil War was in many ways fought and understood in religious terms on both sides,鈥� says Tisa Wenger, associate professor of American religious history at Yale Divinity School.

During the Cold War, too, existential anxiety 鈥� driven by fear of nuclear weapons and 鈥淕odless communism鈥� 鈥� led to another rise in religious affiliation in the U.S.聽

Today, amid a once-in-a-century pandemic, major economic disruption, and upheavals around issues of race and sex, the reverse is underway. Instead of another 鈥淕reat Awakening,鈥� America is experiencing what some have dubbed the 鈥淕reat Awokening鈥� 鈥� centered on calls for social justice.

The term 鈥渨oke,鈥� slang for 鈥渁wake,鈥� came into common usage with the birth of Black Lives Matter in 2013 and became further entrenched last year after the murder of George Floyd by a white police officer in Minneapolis, sparking a summer of racial unrest.聽

鈥淭here鈥檚 a real wrestling right now on the left with trying to negotiate new cultural norms, in which casual racism and homophobia should no longer be acceptable,鈥� Professor Wenger says.聽

At heart, 鈥渨oke鈥� refers to awareness of racial and social justice issues. Increasingly, however, it has been weaponized by conservatives mocking what they see as excesses on the left.聽

Even some Democrats express concerns about the larger movement promoting 鈥渁nti-racism.鈥� John McWhorter, an African American linguist and social critic at Columbia University, describes white people鈥檚 expressions of 鈥渨okeness鈥� as a form of virtue-signaling that has morphed into a misguided civic religion.聽

鈥淲hite people 鈥� educated white people, especially 鈥� really enjoy the idea of showing that they鈥檙e not racists,鈥� Professor McWhorter with Reason magazine. 鈥淚t has slowly transmogrified into a kind of replacement for Protestantism ... where your grace is that you are not a racist.鈥�

Some observers draw a straight line from the Puritans of Colonial times to the 鈥渨oke scolds鈥� of today who are quick to 鈥渃ancel鈥� transgressors and see no room for grace and forgiveness. Indeed, enforcement of progressive standards today can seem even harsher than 海角大神ity鈥檚 approach, which allows space for sinners to atone and be given another chance.聽聽

Still, progressives argue it鈥檚 important not to lose sight of the goal of the 鈥渁nti-racist鈥� movement, which is to expose and uproot injustices that have been entrenched in U.S. society throughout its history.聽

Human belief systems can be complicated. Professor Burge, the political scientist who is also a Baptist pastor, sees some hope in the data. Yes, the 鈥渘ones鈥� are a rising cohort in the nation鈥檚 religious landscape. But stating a lack of religious affiliation has also become far more socially acceptable, so in reality the shift may be less dramatic than it seems.聽

Among those who checked off 鈥渘othing in particular鈥� on the CCES survey on religion in the Harvard study in 2010, follow-up interviews over four years showed that 1 in 6 migrated toward a 海角大神 tradition.聽

And some young adults today have never left their church. Joey Wozniak, of Atlanta, is a civically minded 20-something who belongs to an Episcopal congregation. Its membership skews older, he says, but there are others his age.

While the pandemic has made it hard to stay active in his church, he says he鈥檚 applying its basic tenets to his work, which is nonpartisan but in the realm of politics. His religious convictions have reinforced certain principles, such as 鈥渂eing respectful to people, being kind to others, reaching out across differences, reconciling with folks.鈥�

鈥淚 try to just listen to them and find out where they鈥檙e coming from,鈥� he says. 鈥淪omehow, even amongst the political rancor of today, I鈥檓 still able to move forward with those convictions and try to find the common ground.鈥�