海角大神

How big a military threat is Russia, really?

Some US generals see Putin's moves in Ukraine and Syria as dangerously aggressive. Others see calculated efforts aimed at blunting Western influence but not directly challenging the US.

In a recent talk at one of America鈥檚 premier war colleges, the nation鈥檚 top military officer聽warned incoming students about the dangers of Russian aggression.

Gen. Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed to Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea, its meddling in Ukraine, and its aid聽to the Syrian regime. Even in the face of a severe economic squeeze, "they are modernizing their nuclear enterprise, they are modernizing聽their submarine force," he said.聽Such warnings have become increasingly dire in foreign policy circles.

Is Russia really the dire military threat that it's made out to be?聽

Many longtime Russia analysts concur that there is certainly a role for a robust military posture but that Russia's moves don't merit the level of alarm that they have generated.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it clear that he has 鈥渘o interest in challenging our military聽where we make it clear we don鈥檛 want to be challenged,鈥� says聽Olga聽Oliker, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International聽Studies in Washington. Instead,聽鈥渢he Russians are terrified聽of us. They see themselves as pushing back against US hegemony 鈥� and they really do see聽this, this isn鈥檛 just rhetoric.... We are what they build against.鈥�

For just this reason, the Russians have been beefing up their conventional arsenal, building hypersonic missiles and new submarines.

Russia鈥檚 moves to date 鈥渉ave been select and calibrated,鈥� write retired Gen. David聽Petraeus,聽former head of聽the CIA, and Michael O鈥橦anlon, a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution,聽in this month鈥檚 Foreign Affairs magazine. Crimea, after all, was聽historically Russian and 鈥渋s populated by a majority of Russian speakers, and is home to聽Russia鈥檚 only Black Sea naval base.鈥�

What鈥檚 more, when Mr. Putin moved into Syria last fall, 鈥淗e did so only after having determined聽that the Obama administration was keeping its own involvement limited,鈥� they argue. While these actions 鈥渕ay have been cynical and reprehensible鈥� they 鈥渨ere not completely聽reckless or random, nor were they particularly brutal by the standards of warfare.鈥�

In short, they conclude,聽Russia鈥檚 actions 鈥渄o not likely portend a direct threat to more central NATO interests.鈥�

The debate comes as the West generally and the US in particular decides how to counter Russia's increasingly bold moves 鈥� on a number of threat levels.

The conventional threat

Where conventional forces are concerned,聽the US military is聽quickly becoming the force charged with聽鈥渟erving as a strong deterrent to Russian aggression,鈥� the director of strategy聽for US European Command, Maj. Gen. David Allvin, said last month. 聽

This warning comes, as such military warnings generally do, with a hefty $3.4 billion request in聽the Pentagon鈥檚 latest budget for the so-called European Reassurance Initiative that will,聽among other things, fund the deployment of more US troops and weapons to Europe.聽

Few analysts suggest the US should do nothing. The debate is over how forcefully to react. With US Army troop levels down to 30,000 in Europe, it makes sense to beef up the forces there, General Petraeus and Mr.聽O鈥橦anlon write. But聽鈥渟tationing a major NATO force in the Baltics 鈥� not only is unnecessary聽but also could provoke Putin as easily as deter him, given his temperament and his desire to聽restore Russia鈥檚 status."

鈥淚 think there鈥檚 no reason to make the Russians think we wouldn鈥檛 fight for our allies,鈥� says Ms. Oliker.

There is, too, the threat of nuclear force. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think that Putin will challenge the US through聽nuclear means over areas that are peripheral to his interests,鈥� says聽Kim Kagan, president of the Institute for the聽Study of War in Washington, where Petraeus is a member of the board of directors.聽鈥淏ut the nuclear聽threat is there and our policymakers need to take that seriously.鈥�

Then there is Russia's "gray zone" aggression,聽including interference in domestic politics and election campaigns, Oliker notes.聽鈥淐onventional weapons aren鈥檛 very useful for that, nor are navies, which [the聽Foreign Affairs article] suggests we pour more money into.鈥�

Between war and peace

Yet knowing how to confront gray zones has been tricky for the Pentagon because the US聽government 鈥渟trictly separates phases of peace and war,鈥� Dr. Kagan adds. 鈥淲e鈥檝e created a model聽of conflict suited for the Cold War era and possibly for the early post-Cold War era, but not to聽this era of intense competition.鈥�

Part of what the Pentagon has been trying to do to counter Putin is to engage in propaganda, or聽鈥渋nformation warfare,鈥� as it鈥檚 known in military parlance. In this realm, narratives matter, and聽some analysts express concern that worrying too much about whether a US military move could聽be interpreted as provoking Putin somehow rationalizes the Russian leader鈥檚 behavior, and聽plays into the Russian narrative.

鈥淥n the one hand, I understand what the Foreign Affairs article is saying [about not聽unnecessarily provoking Putin]. On the other hand, I feel if we cast our policy because Putin will聽claim we are the aggressor, then we will find ourselves limited in what we can do and where we聽can do it 聽鈥� because there is no action that we can take that Putin will not characterize as聽provocative,鈥� Kagan says. While a little prudence 鈥渋s a good thing in foreign relations, I do think Putin has been looking for a red line, and he鈥檚 found few.鈥�

The question, however, is what Putin will do with red lines, says Julianne Smith, former acting national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden 鈥� specifically, whether 鈥渓ike a cornered聽cat,鈥� he鈥檒l respond in a dangerous and unwelcome way.聽鈥淲hat worries me most 鈥� and what they miss a bit in the [Foreign Affairs] piece, is the potential for a seemingly small incident to spiral out of control.鈥�

To this end, Ms. Smith, now the director of Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a聽New American Security in Washington,聽has conducted a number of war game exercises that look at scenarios in聽which routine Russian actions spiral out of control.

鈥淧utin frequently conducts military probing聽exercises where he orders Russians jets to come precariously close to either key infrastructure聽sites, commercial jets 鈥� or buzzing our ships in the Black Sea,鈥� she says. 鈥淭hese probing聽incidents are nothing more than bluster and acts of intimidation, but they have the potential to聽go terribly awry.鈥�