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To get an idea of the rough reception President Obama can expect when he meets with Saudi Arabia鈥檚 King Abdullah in Riyadh Friday, consider the disappointment and only lightly veiled disdain behind a recent comment from an influential member of the Saudi royal family.

鈥淲e鈥檝e seen several red lines put forward by the president, which went along and became pinkish as time grew, and eventually ended up completely white,鈥� Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence head and ambassador to the United States, told an international conference in Monaco last December.

Prince Turki鈥檚 comments were clearly referring to Mr. Obama鈥檚 decision last year not to strike Syria鈥檚 Bashar al-Assad even after the president鈥檚 鈥渞ed line鈥� on chemical weapons use was crossed. Also hinting that his concerns extend to Obama鈥檚 dealings with Iran, the prince added, 鈥淲hen that kind of assurance comes from a leader of a country like the United States, we expect him to stand by it. There is an issue of confidence.鈥�

Obama will confront Saudi Arabia鈥檚 shaken confidence in the US when he sits down with the king. The list of Saudi concerns is long, regional analysts say, extending beyond Syria and Iran to the US commitment to fighting Al Qaeda. There are even qualms that America鈥檚 increasing energy independence will trigger a weakening of the US commitment to assuring the security of the Persian Gulf.

Behind each of these concerns, some say, is a growing worry about America鈥檚 commitment to the Middle East. At the core of every 鈥渢hreat鈥� Saudi Arabia perceives is 鈥渁 Saudi concern that the United States has not really backed stability, that it has failed in Egypt and in Syria, that it has failed in Iraq, that it may be leaving the region or giving it less priority,鈥� says Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

A key Saudi concern is Iran 鈥� and a perception that the US is so focused on reaching a deal with Tehran on its nuclear program that it is overlooking what Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries see as Shiite Iran鈥檚 hegemonic ambitions. These countries view Iran as trying to encircle its adversary Sunni Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia 鈥渟ees Iran as directly involved in covert action and in trying to encourage unrest in the region using its Al Quds Force,鈥� a secretive unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, 鈥渁nd its intelligence鈥� to destabilize 鈥渁n important list of countries鈥� from the Gulf to the Red Sea, Mr. Cordesman says.

A 鈥渃onspiracy鈥� sweeping the region, he notes, is that the US will 鈥渁bandon the Arab Gulf and shift to Iran and the Shiites.鈥� Such thinking may be 鈥渧ery hard for us to understand,鈥� but it is indicative of the ambience Obama will enter as he visits Riyadh, Cordesman says.

Iran, Syria, and Egypt are all major concerns, but other regional analysts agree that worries about them are heightened by doubts about the role the US intends to play post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan in the Middle East.

鈥淭he underlying anxiety and the demand for Washington鈥檚 attention from the Gulf come from something bigger than any one policy issue,鈥� says Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Brookings Institution鈥檚 Saban Center for Middle East Policy. 鈥淚t comes from the fact that we are at a bit of a turning point in terms of America鈥檚 role in the region.鈥�

That turning point is not just the result of the drawdown from Afghanistan and the 鈥渞elative diminution of American military presence鈥� that entails, she says. It is also the 鈥渆nergy revolution鈥� that will leave the US less dependent on Mideast oil and the still-rumbling 鈥減olitical earthquake鈥� in the region known as the Arab Awakening.

Some regional analysts have summed up Obama鈥檚 task in Riyadh as offering 鈥渞eassurance,鈥� but Ms. Cofman Wittes says the president鈥檚 job will be something beyond that 鈥� more like explaining his 鈥渧ision鈥� of a continued but evolving American commitment to the region.

On Syria, for example, Obama must be able to offer 鈥渟ome clear alternative strategy [to US military involvement] to deal with the consequences of the Syrian war for American interests and for the security of America鈥檚 allies,鈥� she says.

On Iran, she says, Obama must explain to dubious ears 鈥渢he strategy in the nuclear talks鈥� while 鈥渞eminding鈥� the Saudis that the US agrees 鈥渢here are a whole host of other aspects of Iranian behavior in the region that the US finds obstreperous and destabilizing and problematic 鈥� and that the US is still committed to confronting Iran on these鈥� other issues.

鈥淚t鈥檚 a question of alliance management,鈥� she says, 鈥渂ut it鈥檚 alliance management in the face of tremendous upheaval.鈥�

A key indication of the success of Obama鈥檚 Riyadh visit will be not so much a sense that the president was able to offer a set of American remedies to address the region鈥檚 turmoil, says Cordesman of CSIS, but that the longtime partners can overcome doubts and differences to work together on common interests.

鈥淭he problem on both sides is not that the Saudis have expectations that the US can do something decisive鈥� about the region鈥檚 many challenges, Cordesman says. 鈥淚t is whether you can move towards some form of cooperation, and particularly patient cooperation over time,鈥� he adds, 鈥渂ecause neither the US nor Saudi Arabia has any quick meaningful answers to any of the major problems in this region.鈥�