Biden and Netanyahu 鈥� and the diminished US standing in Middle East
-
Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
President Joe Biden was asked last week if he thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was deliberately acting in ways to sway the U.S. presidential election.
His strikingly passive response, clearly tinged with disappointment, communicated much more than a simple answer to the question.
鈥淲hether he鈥檚 trying to influence the election, I don鈥檛 know,鈥� said Mr. Biden, before adding that, in any case, Mr. Netanyahu should remember that 鈥渘o administration has done more for Israel than I have. None, none, none.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
For the past year of war in the Middle East, many critics of the Biden administration at home and abroad say its inability to restrain Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has damaged U.S. stature and credibility in the region.
He was the first U.S. president to visit Israel in wartime, having arrived in Tel Aviv just days after the shocking Hamas attacks of Oct. 7 to wrap the Israeli leader (and all Israel, collectively) in an 鈥渦nshakable鈥� embrace of American support.
And yet here was Mr. Biden in the White House briefing room a year later, unsure of the Israeli leader鈥檚 objectives. His uncertainty underscored how for months the United States had repeatedly been left in the dark on Israeli escalatory actions in Gaza, against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now over Israel鈥檚 anticipated retaliation against Iran.
More than anything, Mr. Biden鈥檚 words underscored how little sway the U.S. has over players and events in the region, and just how diminished U.S. standing is.
鈥淲ho knows what鈥檚 next?鈥�
That President Biden couldn鈥檛 reject the possibility that Mr. Netanyahu wants to influence the U.S. election 鈥渟uggests to me that the U.S. is not in the driver鈥檚 seat here,鈥� says Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank that promotes restraint and focus on core interests in U.S. foreign policy.
鈥淣ot only is the U.S. just along for the ride, but it doesn鈥檛 even know where the destination is.鈥�
Noting the number of instances over the past year in which Israel reportedly gave the U.S. no advance notice of potentially escalatory actions 鈥� including last month鈥檚 pager attacks in Lebanon and the bombing in Beirut that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah 鈥� she says this situation 鈥渞eveals just how little leverage the U.S. has鈥� with Israel.
鈥淔rom the U.S. perspective,鈥� she adds, 鈥渨ho knows what鈥檚 next?鈥�
That question is echoing across Washington and other capitals as the world waits to see how Israel will deliver its promised retaliation against Iran for its Oct. 1 missile attacks on Israel.
While global markets are already anticipating that Israel will go after Iran鈥檚 vast oil-production infrastructure 鈥� world oil prices have shot up this week 鈥� U.S. officials are more worried that Israel will try to bomb Iran鈥檚 nuclear facilities.
Most military experts believe Israel could not significantly damage Iran鈥檚 deeply buried nuclear installations without U.S. military assistance.
Mr. Biden has publicly cautioned Israel against attacking Iran鈥檚 nuclear sites 鈥� a move U.S. officials worry could provoke a cataclysmic response from Tehran.
But the world has observed Mr. Netanyahu repeatedly disregarding and disparaging U.S. counsel over the past year, some experts say. They warn that the spectacle has damaged U.S. stature and credibility among friends and adversaries alike.
鈥淣etanyahu has time and again demonstrated to the world that one could not only stiff arm the U.S., but could repeatedly leave it in the dark on its actions and openly lie about what the U.S. was doing [for example, regarding arms deliveries] 鈥� and do so with impunity,鈥� says Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
鈥淭hat鈥檚 not a very useful lesson for the world to learn,鈥� says Mr. Alterman, a former special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.
Declining U.S. stature in Mideast
Indeed, at the recent U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York, one of the buzziest topics of hallway chatter was American impotence and inability to influence its key Middle East ally, officials from several countries report.
The past year demonstrates how profoundly the earthquake of the Oct. 7 attacks has shaken and realigned the trajectory and power balance of the Middle East. Most significant, perhaps, has been the U.S. relegation from unrivaled engine for regional action to almost observer status.
鈥淓ven if it had been possible to reach a cease-fire deal on Gaza, it would have been the result of the U.S. and Egypt and Qatar working together, so even that would have underscored how the world has changed from the days when the U.S. largely made things happen on its own,鈥� says Bruce Jentleson, a professor of public policy and political science at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.
Given that reality, Dr. Jentleson, a former State Department Middle East expert, says the Biden administration erred by repeatedly proclaiming its diplomatic efforts were on the verge of bearing fruit. 鈥淚 never thought it was wise to say you were so, so close to completing a negotiation鈥� for a Gaza cease-fire, he says. 鈥淥verall,鈥� he adds, 鈥渨e haven鈥檛 played our hand very well.鈥�
And one of the biggest mistakes foreign policy experts say President Biden made was to allow his 鈥渦nshakable support鈥� for Israel blind him to the unfriendly actions and overriding political motivations of the Israeli leader.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 know what single action by the U.S. would have changed the course of this conflict,鈥� says Dr. Alterman, 鈥渂ut what I do know is that the Israeli prime minister ambushed the leader of the country that has done more than any other ... to protect Israel and its interests.鈥�
Few regional experts say the differences with Mr. Netanyahu should have prompted the U.S. to cut off military assistance to Israel. 鈥淕iven the nature of Israel鈥檚 adversaries, I have a hard time with the argument the U.S. should have conditioned aid to Israel,鈥� Dr. Alterman says.
But some argue there were ways to set a tougher tone. 鈥淭here is a difference between defending Israel against its enemies, and giving them that same ironclad support for their actions in Gaza and the West Bank that we saw as contrary to our interests,鈥� Dr. Jentleson says.
Noting that Mr. Netanyahu was actively undermining U.S. diplomatic efforts and 鈥渄isparaging the administration鈥� directly with U.S. audiences, Dr. Alterman says the Biden administration should have at least been more upfront about its differences with the Israeli leader.
Drawing an analogy to the 鈥淢arquess of Queensberry rules鈥� that set the standards for fairness in boxing, he says, 鈥淚f they were not going to play by the rules, why are we going to be polite and play by the rules? I don鈥檛 get it.鈥�
An altered legacy
For numerous observers, America鈥檚 sidelining in the course-setting of Middle East affairs 鈥� and in particular Mr. Biden鈥檚 inability despite months of effort to deliver a cease-fire and nip an expanding conflict in the bud 鈥� underscore how profoundly things have changed in a year.
In September 2023, a commanding President Biden announced at a Group of 20 summit a Middle East trade plan that was to be one piece of a grand re-imagining of the region. The vision, seen as contrary to Iran鈥檚 or Hamas鈥� interests, included normalized Israeli-Saudi relations, a Palestinian state, and a U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership.
Mr. Biden dubbed the ambitious plan 鈥渁n inflection point in history,鈥� and it was widely understood that the plan would cement Mr. Biden鈥檚 legacy in the region.
Now that legacy is a shambles, and for much of the region and beyond, Mr. Biden鈥檚 Middle East legacy will be almost the contrary: an unwitting facilitation of a devastating regional conflict as a result of unquestioned support for an ally whose leader has repeatedly disregarded U.S. counsel for restraint and de-escalation.
鈥淭here鈥檚 no question that moral hazard is at work in the U.S.-Israeli relationship,鈥� says Dr. Kelanic of Defense Priorities. 鈥淚ron-clad support for Israel 鈥� can create perverse incentives for Netanyahu to behave more aggressively [and] take greater risks knowing the U.S. has Israel鈥檚 back, perhaps no matter what.鈥�
