Iran nuclear deal may be just what hard-line president-elect needs
| LONDON
For years in Iran, the one constant of hard-line politics has been severe punishment of President Hassan Rouhani over the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with the United States and other world powers.
While negotiating with the American archenemy, hard-liners said, the centrist Mr. Rouhani had presided over a humiliating compromise and traitorous giveaway of Iran鈥檚 nuclear crown jewels, for little in return.
Final proof for the hard-liners 鈥� both of U.S. duplicity and Iranian foolishness 鈥� came when then-President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018 and imposed a new raft of suffocating 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥� sanctions.
Why We Wrote This
Why would Iran鈥檚 president-elect want a compromise with the U.S. to revive the nuclear deal? The answer lies in how hard-liners see their best way to satisfy, and pacify, a disgruntled, apathetic population.
Today hard-line antagonism toward the agreement and Washington has not changed, even as Iran prepares for a seventh round of talks in Vienna to restore the deal, officially titled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
So then why does Ebrahim Raisi, the hard-liner鈥檚 hard-liner, who was elected president a week ago, favor getting back to that same 鈥渇lawed鈥� deal?
Perhaps the main reason, say analysts, is that Mr. Raisi鈥檚 ascent to the presidential seat, with little popular mandate after a record-low voter turnout, means that success for him in office will require sanctions to be lifted.
Hard-liners, too, need sanctions eased as they pursue a new social contract focused on economic fulfillment to replace the once-paramount democratic and Islamic criterion of legitimacy, espoused by Iran鈥檚 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The sooner the better
And lifting sanctions will require a return to the JCPOA, distasteful as a new compromise with the U.S. may be for hard-liners who now control all key levers of power in Iran.
Ideally, for Mr. Raisi, the nuclear deal would be restored even before he assumes office in August 鈥� so Mr. Rouhani could again be blamed for selling out, while the new president reaps the economic benefit.
鈥淩aisi and even some of the hard-line forces behind him ... don鈥檛 necessarily favor a revival of the JCPOA, but they want sanctions to be lifted,鈥� says Bijan Khajehpour, a veteran Iran analyst and managing partner at Eurasian Nexus Partners in Vienna.
鈥淭wo years ago, they wouldn鈥檛 understand that these two actually relate to each other, but now they fully understand that if they really want sanctions to be lifted, then they have to restore the JCPOA,鈥� says Mr. Khajehpour. 鈥淭hey understand this is the only way to get rid of the banking sanctions, the oil and shipping sanctions. So the resolve is there to do it.鈥�
During the election campaign Mr. Raisi indicated he would not oppose a return to the JCPOA, which has the imprimatur of Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But recent reporting that a return to the deal was all but agreed to weeks ago, and that Iran was dragging its feet until after the June 18 election, is overstated, a senior U.S. diplomat said Thursday.
鈥淲e still have serious differences that have not been bridged,鈥� a senior State Department official, speaking without attribution, told journalists. 鈥淚t remains possible ... but we鈥檙e not there yet, and I鈥檓 not going to speculate as to if or when we will get there.鈥�
When asked if Iran will stick to the JCPOA, Mr. Raisi said Monday that 鈥渙ur foreign policy will not begin with the JCPOA and will not be limited to the JCPOA.鈥� Hard-line media in Iran has shifted from聽noisily聽demanding that Mr. Rouhani pull out of the deal, to now claiming that 鈥渁 strong and revolutionary government is able to claim Iran鈥檚 rights鈥� 鈥� and that Mr. Raisi can be trusted not only to remove sanctions, but also to 鈥渘eutralize鈥� them.
Disillusioned voters
Mr. Raisi鈥檚 victory was hardly a landslide, and the result of an unprecedented series of moves by the establishment to pave the way for his victory. A veteran of the judiciary, he is tainted by his role in a four-man 鈥渄eath commission鈥� that oversaw the execution of thousands of prisoners in 1988.
He was defeated by Mr. Rouhani at the polls in 2017, and this time faced a boycott by reformists and widespread apathy and voter disillusionment. Fewer than 50% of eligible voters turned out 鈥� the lowest ever in a presidential race. And while Mr. Raisi won with 62% of the votes cast, that represents just one-third of the electorate.
The number of spoiled ballots, some 12% of the total 鈥� a 鈥減rotest鈥� vote three times larger than in any previous election 鈥� was higher than that received by Mr. Raisi鈥檚 closest challenger.
The result is a bid to create a pragmatic new Iran 鈥渂rand鈥� that accommodates a lack of popular support, and dwindling inspiration drawn from religion, while emphasizing instead satisfying economic needs.
鈥淲hat we may be seeing is simply a new social contract in the making,鈥� says a well-connected Iranian analyst who travels frequently to the country and asked not to be named.
鈥淕iven the trends that I see and sense among young people that I get to meet in Iran, people would say, 鈥楯ust give me Wi-Fi, some sort of economic prosperity or safety, and then leave me alone with your politics. I don鈥檛 need that,鈥欌�� says the analyst. 鈥淎nd in fact, you then have people OK with their livelihoods, who may simply forgo this whole idea of political participation.鈥�
That trade-off marks a transformation from a revolutionary state to one in which popular political support is no longer necessary, says Mr. Khajehpour at Eurasian Nexus Partners.
鈥淲e have to accept that ... democracy is not a top priority. It鈥檚 economic growth, it鈥檚 power projection, it鈥檚 controlling the different regional and internal challenges. It鈥檚 a very different design of a state,鈥� he says.
鈥淓specially for hard-liners in Iran, it is a lot more inspired by the way [President Vladimir] Putin presents Russia: 鈥榃e are strong,鈥欌�� with a strong military and economy, says Mr. Khajehpour.
The new social contract
The planned pivot is ambitious, though some elements have fallen into place. Hard-line and conservative voices in Iran note that the Islamic Republic has survived Mr. Trump鈥檚 maximum-pressure campaign and Israel鈥檚 cyberattacks and assassinations, and has violently crushed widespread protests against corruption, mismanagement, and the struggling economy.
But providing some satisfaction to a disgruntled and increasingly impoverished population is key to such a vision 鈥� which makes sanctions relief therefore necessary.
The 鈥渘ew social contract鈥� involves the government giving more power to local councils to resolve local needs, says Mr. Khajehpour. But it is coupled with a 鈥渘ational government that says, 鈥業 don鈥檛 want anyone to interfere in my defense and foreign and regional policy decisions; it鈥檚 none of your business. I know it鈥檚 not democratic.鈥欌��
鈥淎nd society says, 鈥楢s long as you make sure we have welfare, economic development, and jobs, we are not going to go on the street and protest for political freedoms and human rights,鈥欌�� says Mr. Khajehpour.
The result is a bid to create a 鈥渘ew brand of Iran,鈥� he adds. But it is a gamble, which in critical ways is dependent on a compromise with Washington 鈥� and the actions of your avowed enemy.
鈥淚t is true that Iran鈥檚 conservatives remain inherently hostile to the United States. ... Raisi has made no secret that this is his mantra,鈥� writes Vali Nasr, an Iran and regional expert at Johns Hopkins University鈥檚 School of Advanced International Studies, in an analysis this week in Foreign Policy.
鈥淪till, behind the veneer of ideological obduracy a new realism is setting in, one that comes with total victory,鈥� writes Mr. Nasr. 鈥淚n contrast with earlier times when conservatives torpedoed outreaches to the West to hamstring their moderate opponents, now they must seek stability in their relations with the world if they are to successfully consolidate power.
鈥淔or that, they must first deal with the United States.鈥� 聽
