Iran election: Regime鈥檚 crisis of confidence undercuts democracy
| LONDON
Iran鈥檚 presidential election next week comes at an especially challenging time for the Islamic Republic. Economic hardship has prompted lethal street protests; hopelessness about the future is pervasive, and voter apathy widespread; and campaigns to boycott the election have taken root.
Trending on Twitter is the hashtag in Persian: #NoWayIVote.
With the regime鈥檚 popular legitimacy appearing in the balance, the result has been a crisis of confidence among conservative power brokers and an unprecedented lurch away from democratic practices toward more autocratic methods.
Why We Wrote This
Iran鈥檚 conservative power brokers, fearing they could not win a fair election, are tipping the scales like never before, upsetting the balance between 鈥淚slamic鈥� and 鈥淩epublic鈥� aspects of the regime.
Analysts warn these measures are likely only to further alienate voters across Iran鈥檚 political spectrum on election day, June 18.
The first sign that this election would聽be like no other聽came when the聽powerful聽Guardian Council announced the shortlist of vetted candidates.
Ensuring that the candidacy of聽hard-line聽judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi 鈥撀燼 midranking聽and uncharismatic聽cleric who lost the last election聽鈥撀爓ill be virtually uncontested,聽the council rejected well-known centrists,聽reformists, and most other conservatives.
Even some hard-liners were shocked by this brazen attempt to engineer the result, which appeared to upend the tense balance that has prevailed for decades between 鈥淚slamic鈥� theocratic rule and 鈥淩epublic鈥� democratic aspects of the聽state.
The Guardian Council, a 12-member body that oversees elections and can override decisions by parliament, has often been criticized for overzealous vetting, especially of reformist candidates. But this is the first time it has shaped an outcome so clearly.
鈥淚 have never found the Council鈥檚 decisions to be this unjustifiable,鈥� lamented Sadegh Larijani, a veteran member of the council and former judiciary chief.聽Alluding to the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a key tool of hard-line power, he聽complained on Twitter of 鈥済rowing interference by intelligence agencies鈥� and their 鈥渋ntentional manipulation鈥� of the late May decision to anoint Mr. Raisi.
Appalled, he said, 鈥淚n the midst of these strange times, I seek refuge in God.鈥�
The second extraordinary sign is officialdom鈥檚 relative indifference to voter turnout 鈥� a metric portrayed in every vote since the 1979 Islamic Revolution as crucial proof of enduring popular support.
Little is being done to combat the apathy and boycott campaigns, as if that public vote of confidence were no longer聽necessary 鈥� or achievable.
鈥淭he elections are going to drastically erode the regime鈥檚 legitimacy,鈥� says Ervand Abrahamian, a preeminent historian of modern Iran and retired professor at the City University of New York.
鈥淔or the last four decades, the main form of legitimacy has been high participation of the people in elections, with sometimes 80% turnout,鈥� says Professor Abrahamian. 鈥淎nything lower than 50% has been considered a vote of no confidence.鈥�
Recent polls put likely turnout at less than 40% 鈥� possibly less.
Behind the choice of Raisi
Amid a sense of decline and deepening unpopularity, analysts say the choice of Mr. Raisi 鈥撀燼nd the way in which the Islamic Republic鈥檚 so-called deep state has made that choice 鈥� speaks volumes about the rising levels of anxiety among Iran鈥檚 leaders.
The stakes are especially high today with no clear successor to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now 82 years old.
Mr. Raisi may be seen as a trusted pair of hands, and is even tipped by some as a potential next supreme leader, though his religious credentials are weak. Among other senior positions, the current judiciary chief has served as custodian of the Imam Reza shrine apparatus in Mashhad.
Yet Mr. Raisi is bedeviled by his role on a four-man, inquisition-style聽鈥渄eath commission鈥� in Tehran that oversaw the execution of thousands of prisoners in 1988 鈥� a聽鈥渕edieval background鈥� that Professor Abrahamian says聽鈥渨ould further erode the regime鈥檚 legitimacy鈥� were he to be elected president.
Mr. Raisi was handily beaten in 2017 by incumbent President Hassan Rouhani, a centrist whose plans to reach out to the West, improve the economy, and increase social freedoms engendered hope 鈥� and a high turnout 鈥撀爄n the two elections he won.
Iranians鈥� hopes聽surged with聽the聽2015 landmark nuclear deal with world powers, but collapsed in 2018 when the United States withdrew from the deal and imposed 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥� sanctions.
Narrowing the choice to聽Mr. Raisi 鈥渋s so self-destructive,鈥� says Professor聽Abrahamian. 鈥淚f you can no longer give someone like Rouhani to run against the conservatives, then who鈥檚 going to really vote, except for the true believers in Raisi?鈥�
Redefining democracy?
The shift toward a noncompetitive race heralds an effort by some聽hard-liners聽to redefine 鈥渄emocracy鈥� in Iran, since multiple victories for reformists, starting with the 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami, clearly show their popularity.
鈥淲e have a problem that began with the Khatami presidency,鈥� the archconservative strategist Hassan Abbasi told Iranian media. 鈥淲e embraced the Western democratic model for the election process. ... That was a mistake.
鈥淭he United Arab Emirates does not hold any election; aren鈥檛 the people living with less headaches?鈥� he said of that Persian Gulf monarchy. 鈥淭here is no election in Oman. ... None in Turkmenistan. ... All those people are living with less headaches, aren鈥檛 they?鈥�
That argument has been taking hold among pro-regime elements fearful that they will lose power for good if a non-hardliner wins again, says a well-connected Iranian analyst who travels often to Iran聽and requested anonymity.
鈥淚 would use the headline that, 鈥楾his is the deep state鈥檚 attempt to take over,鈥欌�� says the analyst, who defines the deep state as including certain figures in the supreme leader鈥檚 office, key hard-line clerics and lawmakers, parts of the judiciary and state media, and IRGC intelligence.
The lesson of 2017
The turning point for them was the 2017 election, when hard-line and moderate conservative forces 鈥� and all their media 鈥� backed Mr. Raisi, yet he still lost by 8 million votes.
The loss 鈥渨as the ultimate lesson that ... they won鈥檛 win in a truly competitive election,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淪o if they want to turn things in their favor, they will have to tighten the political space up to a degree that brings their own guy out of the ballot box.鈥�
鈥淔or them, Syria-type elections, Russia-type elections, they like that,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淭hey still really think, 鈥榃e need some sort of popular backing,鈥� but to them it鈥檚 enough if there is a clear result in the end,鈥� such as 70% for聽Mr. Raisi 鈥� even if that 70% is just 11 million votes, out of 59 million eligible voters.
Indeed, a low turnout would indicate a desire to 鈥減unish the Islamic Republic,鈥� Iranian journalist Fereshteh Sadeghi in Tehran told a Johns Hopkins University聽webinar Tuesday. 鈥淚t doesn鈥檛 necessarily mean that we want to topple you. ... We just want to say, 鈥極K, you don鈥檛 care about us; we don鈥檛 care about you.鈥欌��
The attempt to shrink the democratic space has also prompted debate among conservative factions weaned on the dual Islamic and Republic aspects introduced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who stressed that people 鈥渁re the lords of the ruling elite.鈥�
Many hard-line camps 鈥渨ere really angry and have continued to be angry at this restricted choice because ... they do believe in the republican nature of the system and that requires votes and elections,鈥� says Narges Bajoghli, an expert at Johns Hopkins University who closely follows conservative discourse in Iran.
鈥淭hey are trying their hardest to keep the reformists from coming to power, but they don鈥檛 want to do that through the process that鈥檚 been coming about these past few weeks, because that takes away all claims of legitimacy,鈥� says Ms. Bajoghli, author of "Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic."
Internal versus external
She notes the irony that Iran鈥檚聽external聽strategies聽are聽succeeding in countering聽American and Israeli influence, through an Iran-led 鈥渁xis of resistance鈥� from Gaza and Syria to Iraq and Yemen.聽Yet at home the forces that orchestrate and support those 鈥渧ictories鈥� struggle to win a free election.
鈥淩egionally they are very strong. Internally, they鈥檙e very unpopular across much of the population,鈥� says Ms. Bajoghli.
That has prompted a potentially dangerous miscalculation, says Professor Abrahamian.
鈥淭he rational thing to do when things go wrong is try to open up, to get more public support. But if you narrow yourself down, it鈥檚 just alienating more people,鈥� he says.
鈥淚 think the most important thing is the question of legitimacy, and if they don鈥檛 have that legitimacy, all they are going to have is a raw power of terror [that] puts the balance of power much more in the hands of the Revolutionary Guard,鈥� he adds.
And in that push away from聽democratic mechanisms, Iran has many examples.
鈥淲e鈥檝e seen, not just across the region, but across the globe, states are willing to completely militarize the streets in an attempt to silence or at least push back protest movements, and Iran is part of that trend,鈥� says Ms. Bajoghli. 鈥淚 think their calculation is, 鈥業t鈥檚 worked in all these places. It鈥檒l work for us.鈥欌��
