Afghanistan: Can Biden dodge failure and forge his own peace?
| LONDON
When American forces ousted the Taliban from power nearly 20 years ago in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, then-President George W. Bush vowed to break the curse of the so-called graveyard of empires.
The history of military conflicts in Afghanistan, Mr. Bush noted, was 鈥渙ne of initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure.鈥�
鈥淲e鈥檙e not going to repeat that mistake,鈥� he said.
Why We Wrote This
Perhaps, in Afghanistan, success is the absence of failure. Ahead of a fast-approaching deadline, President Joe Biden is making a list-ditch effort to preserve both U.S. interests and Afghan progress.
Yet today, just weeks away from an inherited May 1 deadline to withdraw U.S. troops, President Joe Biden is scrambling to avoid precisely that verdict, with plans to convene multilateral peace talks in Turkey meant to jump-start last-ditch diplomacy.
The president is torn between the desires to quickly end America鈥檚 longest-ever war, and also 鈥� in light of Taliban battlefield advances, and a recent Taliban-driven assassination campaign 鈥� to leave Afghanistan 鈥渞esponsibly,鈥� preserving both U.S. strategic interests and Afghanistan鈥檚 hard-won civil society and democratic gains.
Yet pointedly, after a more than $2 trillion investment in the war and nation building that has cost thousands of American and tens of thousands of Afghan lives, the question remains: What, if anything, can Mr. Biden do now to avert catastrophe? Can this White House make its own peace with the Taliban?
The Taliban have been loudly declaring victory over a superpower, ever since agreeing to a deal with President Donald Trump in February 2020. That deal spelled out hard U.S. and NATO pullout deadlines, but imposed few restraints on Taliban attacks against other Afghans, which have continued unabated, or required few concrete moves toward peace.
The Taliban have promised a violent 鈥渞eaction鈥� if the 3,500 remaining American and roughly 8,000 NATO troops do not leave by May 1, a deadline that President Biden said would be 鈥渢ough鈥� to meet. At the same time, U.S. intelligence agencies also warn of a Taliban takeover and collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Kabul, if foreign forces leave precipitously.
Chances of a diplomatic success are so small that even U.S. officials liken to a 鈥渕oonshot鈥� their bid to jump-start intra-Afghan peace talks 鈥� starting with the conference in Turkey slated for later this month 鈥� that would lead to an interim 鈥減eace government鈥� as laid out in an eight-page plan leaked last month.
鈥淭he administration has a moonshot idea, but it is also matching that moonshot idea with some major effort,鈥� says Asfandyar Mir, an expert in political violence at Stanford University鈥檚 Center for International Security and Cooperation. 鈥淭his plan is ambitious. Getting this intra-Afghan agreement is going to be very, very tough. But the good news is that they are literally throwing everything they can at the problem.鈥�
鈥淓verything has to work out鈥�
As the United States plans to convene the Turkey meeting under United Nations auspices, it has called on the Russians, Iranians, and other regional stakeholders like India, and has 鈥渆nergized鈥� communication with the Pakistanis, whose ISI intelligence service has significant influence over the Taliban, notes Mr. Mir.
鈥淭here are a lot of moving parts. For this to work out, everything has to work out,鈥� he says. That means convincing the Taliban to agree to a temporary, monthslong extension of the foreign troop presence 鈥� a critical step the Islamist movement has so far rejected.
An initial power-sharing arrangement may also be possible, but the price of Taliban buy-in may be that the 鈥渇inal settlement will be extremely favorable to the Taliban,鈥� says Mr. Mir.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not perfect. I鈥檓 not saying that this is fixable,鈥� he adds. 鈥淲e鈥檙e trying to window-dress a failed mission at this point. ... It should really go without saying that the main objective here is to ensure a U.S. withdrawal which is not embarrassing. Any grand goal of major peace, or victory for one side or the other, is just not realistic.鈥�
Still, the White House is attempting to recalibrate a deal that in many ways left the Taliban in the driver鈥檚 seat.
In recent days, U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad presented both sides with a new set of nine principles reportedly meant to guide the upcoming Turkey conference. They include a permanent cease-fire 鈥� long an upfront demand of the government, but rejected by the Taliban 鈥� and commitments to equality, human rights, and free elections. The Americans also hope for a 90-day reduction in violence, aiming to prevent a Taliban spring offensive.
Hard lines
The Taliban, meanwhile, have not yet agreed to go to Turkey, much less accept measures that go far beyond their deal with Mr. Trump, who analysts say rushed to end America鈥檚 so-called forever war with little apparent regard for consequences.
And Afghan media report that the Taliban, in exchange for permitting U.S. forces to stay 45 to 90 days beyond May 1, are demanding the release of 7,000 more prisoners 鈥� on top of some 5,500 reluctantly set free by the government last year 鈥� and the removal of leaders鈥� names from a U.N. sanctions blacklist.
The Kabul government is also hewing to a hard line. Afghanistan鈥檚 first vice president, Amrullah Saleh, said Sunday that the Turkey agenda affirms civil society 鈥渁chievements鈥� since the Taliban were ousted in 2001, emphasizing that the Taliban 鈥渕ust accept that Afghanistan will not become Taliban.鈥�
Are 鈥渢he Taliban seeking to come and lash people and we will stay silent? Never,鈥� he said.
But getting the Taliban to make any new compromises won鈥檛 be easy, after they gave up so little in negotiations with Mr. Trump, says Rahmatullah Amiri, an independent analyst based in Kabul.
鈥淚t鈥檚 wishful thinking that this Turkey conference will produce something,鈥� says Mr. Amiri. 鈥淭he Taliban will be there, if they are wanted. They will sit there, but it won鈥檛 produce anything. The Taliban want nothing less or more than complete power.
鈥淭hey know that the golden era of Trump is never coming back. It is like, at this crucial moment, God revealed this gift [Mr. Trump] to them, and the guy gave them literally every key to the padlock,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hat can Biden do? It鈥檚 too late, because now the Taliban already tasted victory.鈥�
The result is a series of bad choices for the Biden administration, as it tries to weigh the risks and benefits of delaying the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The draft U.S. peace agreement points to American aspirations of preserving gains in women鈥檚 rights, free speech, and elections to choose leaders, all to be enshrined in a new constitution.
But it also ambitiously calls for creation of a new 鈥渢ransitional Peace Government鈥� at the start of the process, jointly formed by the Taliban and the U.S.-backed government of President Ashraf Ghani, who would have to step down.
In addition to the cease-fire, it calls for the Taliban moving 鈥渕ilitary structures鈥� from neighboring countries, such as Pakistan 鈥� also unacceptable to the Taliban so far.
After the U.S. leaves, then what?
Yet analysts note that, even if agreement is reached, it might not last beyond a U.S. departure.
鈥淚t鈥檚 highly unlikely that a peace process will survive an American military withdrawal,鈥� Laurel Miller, a former top State Department official in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan diplomacy, who is now director of the Asia program at the International Crisis Group, said in a recent webinar. 鈥淭herefore, to protect American interests, you would have to consider what it is you want to leave behind when you pull out.鈥�
Creating a joint transitional government first puts both Afghanistan and the U.S. 鈥渋n a much worse position,鈥� she said, 鈥渂ecause that weak, fragile, power-sharing artifact would perish with the peace process and you鈥檇 be left with nothing.鈥�
Mr. Biden must be 鈥渧ery careful鈥� further thinning the low current level of U.S. and NATO troops, says Mr. Mir at Stanford, noting that the 鈥渂est case鈥� for the Taliban is a 鈥減olitical meltdown, a total fragmentation of the Afghan security forces and Afghan government.鈥�
Western forces are 鈥渘ot putting any meaningful pressure on the Taliban, [but] once you pull these troops out, then you are likely to see things like defections, wholesale splintering, a total collapse of command and control, and that鈥檚 the situation you want to avoid,鈥� he says.
鈥淕iven that the American empire has survived, we gloss over the fact that the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been a failure,鈥� he says. 鈥淔or now, the U.S. strategy has to be to make sure the Afghan government stays in the fight.鈥�
