Why coronavirus clampdown is proving risky for Arab regimes
| AMMAN, Jordan, and LONDON
Abu Mohammed聽has played life by the聽rules.
The 45-year-old merchant聽has worked聽hard, paid his taxes, stayed out of politics and protests,聽and been聽a loyal supporter of a government聽that promises security and stability.
Yet amid a COVID-19 lockdown, he was forced聽on March 19聽to close his East Amman spice shop,聽which generated $900 a month to support his family of seven. He is now a month behind on rent and has reduced his weekly groceries聽by聽half.
Why We Wrote This
How politically destabilizing is this pandemic? The economic downturn poses a risk to any government. But across the Arab world, the segment of society most vulnerable is a pillar of regime support.
鈥淲e cannot get bread, we cannot see a doctor, we cannot get medicine. We reach a point where we ask: What is the point of this security?鈥� he聽says聽via telephone.
Editor鈥檚 note: As a public service,聽all our coronavirus coverage聽is free. No paywall.
Such sentiments are bad news for leaders across the Arab world, where people just like Abu Mohammed comprise a core of popular support for regimes that are less than democratic.
A misreading of the COVID-19 pandemic as a 鈥渇oreign problem鈥� allowed聽the virus to spread undetected for weeks in many Arab countries. Their delayed response has exposed mismanagement, deteriorating health services, and widening inequality.
As Arab regimes roll out their armies to tackle the crisis, the virus鈥檚 toll is threatening their claim to聽legitimacy.聽Many of the root problems that聽sparked聽street protests over the past decade, analysts agree,聽are likely to become more acute. Citizens聽say聽it is 鈥渋nevitable.鈥�
Mismanagement
Just a few weeks ago, Arab regimes聽appeared to be聽in a strong position. Egypt had silenced all opposition and聽had聽a near-complete control of the media; monarchies were secured; terrorist insurgencies seemingly defeated.
Even where recent waves of protests聽had聽threatened to upend nondemocratic political systems 鈥� the so-called Arab Spring 2.0 鈥� the status quo was prevailing.
Elites in Algeria formed a government despite elections marred by a boycott. In Lebanon, the protest movement was fizzling.聽Iraqi protesters聽who had braved gunfire for months were overshadowed by a brewing conflict in Iraq between the聽United States聽and Iran.
Yet the regimes鈥� COVID-19 responses have been marked by confusion聽and desperation, undermining stability.聽
In Egypt,聽where 95% of the population lives on 5% of the land, Cairo spent much of its initial weeks suppressing reports about the pandemic rather than tackling it head on.
Since then, Cairo has quarantined a dozen villages, closed several hospitals due to transmission among medical staff, and transformed schools into makeshift hospitals as confirmed cases rose past 1,000.
In Iraq, where rival political and sectarian factions have struggled to form a new government, the Health Ministry spent weeks attempting聽to receive聽a mere聽$5 million from the Treasury.
Health care systems
Algeria, home to the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in North Africa, with more than 1,600 as of Thursday, has the highest virus mortality rate in the entire Arab world at 13%.
The crisis has revealed hollowed out public health care across the region.
Italy, whose health sector was overwhelmed by聽the virus, has 30 hospital beds per 10,000 residents. In comparison, Egypt has 15.6 beds per 10,000, Jordan 14, Iraq 13.8, and Morocco 11, according to World Health Organization figures. Algeria鈥檚 hospitals host only 400 ICU units for 40 million people, experts say.
Arab regimes have recently resorted to launching public fundraisers to聽finance聽their responses: Morocco has raised $3 billion from businesses, royalty, and wealthy citizens; Tunisia $3 million; and Jordan and Egypt have gathered tens of millions in pledges.
Yet even these pledge drives have ignited frustrations.
鈥淏illions in our tax dollars and natural resources have been stolen by the elites, and they think by giving a few thousand dollars back while we die at home they become patriots,鈥� says Mohammed Mustafa, an Egyptian shop owner, via a messaging app.
Middle-class squeeze
Since March 20, Arab states have imposed a range of restrictions, from night curfews in Egypt to full lockdowns in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. All have restricted movement among towns, villages, and provinces.
Yet these lockdowns have placed the burden of the crisis on the middle class and working class 鈥� traditional pillars of support for autocratic regimes.
And聽most Arab states do not have unemployment benefits. As of 2019, only 5% of the unemployed across the Arab world qualify for some form of benefit,聽the聽International Labour Organization estimates.
Small-business owners, small farmers, day laborers, and vendors 鈥� the so-called informal sector 鈥撀燿o not receive a set salary, have no protections, and rely on daily and weekly commercial transactions for their survival.
In Egypt, 50% of all workers are in this informal sector. In Morocco it鈥檚 75%,聽Algeria 57%.
With their travel curtailed and unable to work, this large segment of society is seeing their savings dwindle as they enter their third or fourth week under curfew, analysts and officials say.
鈥淭his vulnerable segment is losing out completely: They are not poor enough to qualify for state assistance and not rich enough to escape the consequences of this crisis,鈥� says Tarik Yousef, director at the Brookings Doha Center and an expert in development economics.
鈥淭he COVID crisis exposes these inequalities, which not only become glaringly clear, but will influence how fast people will recover.鈥�
Already there are signs that communities are chafing at the curfews and restrictions. Protests have erupted in villages under quarantine in Egypt and in impoverished neighborhoods in Tunis. Scattered rallies were reportedly held in Morocco.
In Lebanon, a taxi driver set his car afire and fruit vendors threw their goods in the streets in protest.
鈥淕overnments around the world decide on social distancing,鈥� says Carmen Geha, a Lebanese activist and assistant professor at the American University of Beirut. 鈥淏ut here social distancing means 鈥� you鈥檙e not going to sell your crops for the day. You are not going to feed your kids. That鈥檚 it.鈥�
Morocco has gotten out in front by designating part of its COVID fund to support workers in the informal sector with $80 to $100 stipends. Jordan has enacted an emergency law preventing layoffs and obliging most employers to continue salaries for March and April.
Yet Western diplomats voice concerns for social unrest in the region should COVID-19 restrictions stretch for months. And Jordan and Gulf security sources say they fear a prolonged shutdown, saying, 鈥淲e cannot let the virus spread or despair spread.鈥�
Oil, tourism woes
The collapse in oil prices has deepened the聽crisis.
Iraq鈥檚 oil revenues聽dropped聽from $5.5 billion in February to $2.99 billion in March. Government officials聽say聽they need oil revenues to stay at $5 billion a month to cover costs and pay salaries.
鈥淔or now, the government is just trying to stave off multiple crises and prevent total collapse,鈥� says Sajad Ziyad, a political analyst in Baghdad.
鈥淚t needs to pay citizens. It needs to make sure coronavirus doesn鈥檛 spread. It needs to stop a war going on between Iran and the U.S. in its territory. It needs to try to find some agreement to form the next government.鈥�
Meanwhile, the loss of travel and tourism has dealt a blow to several聽states. Tourism聽accounts for聽19% of Morocco鈥檚 GDP, 15% in Tunisia,聽and聽12% in聽Egypt and聽Jordan, employing hundreds of thousands.
Despite deploying armies to the streets and imposing curfews, Arab strongmen are suddenly appearing powerless in the face of the virus, with their image as guarantors of stability shattered.
鈥淲hen the government is seen as incompetent and unable to manage a crisis, that changes the political equation,鈥� says Algerian analyst Zine Labidine Ghebouli.聽
鈥淵ou now have not only the people in the streets, but people who supported the system beginning to see it as illegitimate. It is a legitimacy crisis.鈥�
Compounding the聽regimes鈥� fragility: world and regional powers, from the Gulf Arabs to Iran, cannot bail them out.
鈥淚n the short term this crisis snuffs out a lot of activism,鈥� says Julien Barnes-Dacey, Mideast expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.聽
鈥淏ut once the health situation becomes manageable, this potentially unleashes a wave of challenges for incumbent elites.鈥�
Editor鈥檚 note: As a public service,聽all our coronavirus coverage聽is free. No paywall.
