Russian missiles for Turkey? What鈥檚 at stake as collision looms.
| ISTANBUL and LONDON
As the United States and NATO-ally Turkey braced for an inevitable collision over Turkey鈥檚 decision to buy a Russian-made air defense system, a ray of hope appeared to emerge from the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan.
Could the two countries avert a crisis that risks unraveling the NATO alliance, as Turkey turns away from the West and toward Russia for part of its defense needs?
Deliveries of the Russian S-400 missile system are to begin in a week, Turkey says. But U.S. officials have been warning for months that if Turkey goes through with the $2.5 billion purchase, it will result in U.S. sanctions against Turkey鈥檚 already weak economy and jeopardize its role in the Pentagon鈥檚 F-35 stealth fighter program and purchase of 100 of the planes.
Why We Wrote This
For years NATO watchers have looked on with concern as Turkey has courted Russia even as its ties with the U.S. have frayed. Now a Russian missile deal has become a pivotal issue of Turkish identity.
But then President Donald Trump appeared to ease the pressure, after meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an in Japan.
Mr. Trump blamed Barack Obama for forcing Turkey鈥檚 turn to Russia, saying his predecessor blocked sales of the U.S. Patriot missile system 鈥� without mentioning that Turkey had, in fact, rejected the sale three times, because its demands for technology and joint production were not met.
Mr. Erdo臒an had not been 鈥渢reated fairly鈥� and wanted the American missile, Mr. Trump stated. The Turkish leader is 鈥渁 NATO member, and he鈥檚 someone I鈥檝e become friendly with, and you have to treat people fairly. ... You can鈥檛 do business that way. It鈥檚 not good.鈥�
Turkish identity
But can such diplomatic overtures paper over the ever-widening U.S.-Turkey chasm? Analysts say that is not likely because the proposed purchase speaks to fundamental issues about Turkey鈥檚 long-term direction and even its identity. Mr. Erdo臒an is sticking with a crucial decision that could hamper NATO weapons systems integration and prove an intelligence bonanza for Russia. And it is the U.S. Congress, not Mr. Trump, that will impose sanctions.
More broadly, Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 decision is not only technical but also political, and designed to signal Turkey鈥檚 unhappiness with the U.S. and other NATO allies on a host of issues, from criticism of Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 authoritarian rule at home, to his troops鈥� role in Syria.
鈥淚f Turkey proceeds with the S-400 Russian missile system 鈥� and all indications are that it will 鈥� I think it鈥檚 the beginning of the unraveling of Turkey鈥檚 longtime relationship with NATO,鈥� says Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at the Chatham House think tank in London.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not happened previously where one NATO member imposes military and economic sanctions on another,鈥� says Mr. Hakura. 鈥淭he key player in this is not President Trump, it鈥檚 Congress. There is total bipartisan consensus [to penalize] Turkey. This is one of the few issues attracting bipartisan consensus in Washington.鈥�
According to Eliot Engel, the Democratic chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, this is a 鈥渂lack-and-white issue鈥� for Congress.
鈥淓ither Mr. Erdo臒an cancels the Russian deal, or he doesn鈥檛,鈥� Representative Engel of New York said in the House in early June after passage of a resolution condemning the planned purchase. 鈥淭here is no future for Turkey having both Russian weapons and American F-35s. There is no third option. There鈥檚 no path for mitigation that will allow Turkey to have its cake and eat it, too.鈥�
鈥楨xistential question鈥�
Indeed, U.S.-Turkey relations have been marked more by clashes than harmony since 2013, when the Obama White House criticized Mr. Erdo臒an鈥檚 handling of the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and press freedom.
A host of problems have since marred relations, including, crucially in Turkey鈥檚 calculation, devoted U.S. military support for Kurdish militias in northern Syria that battled the Islamic State (ISIS). The Syrian Kurds are聽linked to militants of the Kurdistan Workers鈥� Party in Turkey who are fighting Ankara.
In early June, then-acting U.S. defense chief Patrick Shanahan issued an ultimatum to Turkey鈥檚 defense minister, warning that if the S-400 deal with Moscow was not scrapped by July 31, the U.S. would shut Turkey out of the F-35 project, which is now being rolled out across Europe. Turkish pilots already in training on the F-35 have been withdrawn from classes in the U.S.
Sanctions will follow, the Pentagon warned, in compliance with U.S. legislation designed to hamper the Russian defense industry.
鈥淚t is an existential question. Something like this couldn鈥檛 have happened a decade ago, or even five years ago,鈥� says Asl谋 Ayd谋nta艧ba艧, a Turkey specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
鈥淵es, it does underline Turkey鈥檚 yearning to emerge as a more independent global power, no longer entirely dependent on the United States,鈥� says Ms. Ayd谋nsta艧ba艧.
鈥淭urkey sees that as its ticket to a more independent policy, but in reality it is probably going to make Turkey beholden to Russia far more than it is prepared to be,鈥� she says. 鈥淎nd Turkey鈥檚 exit from the West would be a very painful exercise, both in terms of our military culture, and our economy. So S-400s are not just about S-400s. It鈥檚 about the identity of Turkey and its place in the world.鈥�
American support for Syrian Kurdish militias, whom Turkey considers to be 鈥渢errorists,鈥� has especially grated on Ankara. U.S. and Turkish troops deployed cheek by jowl in Syria, ostensibly fighting with the same anti-ISIS objectives, have at times come close to open conflict.
Unlikely shift toward Russia
But another aim of Turkey in Syria has for years been to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad. And that is directly opposed to the goal of Russia, which has deployed air and ground forces, alongside Iranian troops and proxy forces, to preserve the Assad regime.
Turkey has nevertheless worked with both Russia and Iran, agreeing in 2017 to create and monitor several de-escalation zones in Syria, in a deal that deliberately shut out the U.S.
Yet Turkey鈥檚 shift toward Russia could not be more unlikely, since Ankara 鈥渇eels threatened by its massive neighbor鈥� to the north, say Soner 脟a臒aptay, a Turkey expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Andy Taylor, a former congressional staffer, in a recent analysis in The Hill.
鈥淏etween the 17th and 20th centuries the Ottoman and Russian empires were deadly rivals,鈥� they note. 鈥淯ntil the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Turks and Russians fought 17 major wars, which the Turks overall lost.鈥�
Turkey鈥檚 decision to join NATO 鈥渨as driven by its fear of Russia,鈥� they say, adding that Stalin鈥檚 demand for some of Turkey鈥檚 land in 1946 prompted Ankara to join the Western alliance in 1952.
鈥淥f course, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is happy to sell weapons to a NATO member to drive a wedge in the alliance,鈥� the analysts note. 鈥淢oscow can use the S-400 system to conduct invaluable intelligence-gathering efforts against the F-35,鈥� a project Turkey has been a partner with from the start.
Turkey-Russia relations took a bitter turn in November 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet fighter that had crossed from Syria into its airspace for 17 seconds. Mr. Putin called it 鈥渁 stab in the back by the accomplices of terrorists鈥� and imposed sanctions on Turkey.
Decline of a 鈥榯rustable ally鈥�
While that relationship has clearly been patched up 鈥撀燼nd several million Russian citizens have been allowed again to each year enjoy their vacations on Turkey鈥檚 Mediterranean coast 鈥� the S-400 deal marks a concrete repudiation by Turkey of the U.S.
鈥淚t is certainly going to be quite a historic alienation between the two, if indeed Turkey does go through with the purchase,鈥� says Sinan 脺lgen, a former Turkish diplomat and head of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, a think tank in Istanbul.
鈥淭he technical aspect is it has taken the U.S. far too long a time to come up with a package that could satisfy Turkey鈥檚 needs,鈥� says Mr. 脺lgen. 鈥淏ut this has come on top of a political atmosphere which has been quite poisonous, in the sense that there has been a very clear and widespread erosion of trust in the U.S. commitment to Turkey, and Turkey鈥檚 security.鈥�
The result is that the U.S., instead of being viewed as a 鈥渢rustable ally,鈥� is seen in Ankara as disregarding Turkey鈥檚 core national security interests 鈥渂y aligning itself with and weaponizing鈥� Kurdish militias in Syria, says Mr. 脺lgen. 鈥淚t鈥檚 the trust void that鈥檚 been left by the U.S., which has allowed Russia to become so aligned with Turkey over this time, and that鈥檚 quite remarkable.鈥�
