For Turkey's strongman Erdo臒an, trouble seeing eye to eye with Trump
| ISTANBUL
It was a jubilant moment of victory for Turkey鈥檚 President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an.
In a mid-December telephone call, he appeared to persuade President Trump to upend years of American policy in Syria by stepping away from US-backed Kurdish militias that Turkey calls terrorists and handing the reins to America鈥檚 NATO ally.
鈥淵ou know what? It鈥檚 yours,鈥� Mr. Trump reportedly said of Syria. 鈥淚鈥檓 leaving.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
Behind closed doors (or on the phone), what do world leaders expect to accomplish with each other? In the latest US-Turkish clash over Syria, unmet expectations played a central role.
For Turkey鈥檚 leader, the diplomatic achievement was the culmination of months of maneuvering to improve ties with Washington, which have cycled between bad and worse since the Obama years.
It was also a deal cut in a manner suited to Mr. Erdo臒an and other heads of state in the region: one authoritative leader to another.
鈥淩ight now, Turkey鈥檚 power in foreign policy is an epic being written by destiny. And it is being written with the world鈥檚 giants,鈥� Erdo臒an said days later in a speech.
But the jubilation was short-lived for Erdo臒an and turned to surprise and finally anger. Top US officials repeatedly rolled back Trump鈥檚 promises to Erdo臒an 鈥撀燼nd finally Trump himself tweeted a warning on Jan. 12 that he would 鈥渄evastate Turkey economically if they hit Kurds.鈥�
The tone of the president鈥檚 tweet did not play well on the streets of Istanbul this week. 鈥淭rump sent another aggressive comment,鈥� says a young Turkish entrepreneur, who requested anonymity. 鈥淗is style is very toxic,鈥� he adds, shaking his head in disbelief.
Turkey immediately warned the United States, in turn, not to make a 鈥渇atal mistake鈥� and that it 鈥渨ill not be intimidated by any threats.鈥�
But eyes rolled among Turks tired of years of roller-coaster politics, as the prospect of another bruising economic battle began to loom.
It was US sanctions imposed in August, after all, when Turkey refused to release an American evangelical pastor charged with trying to topple the state, that precipitated a sharp fall in Turkey鈥檚 currency.
鈥淒on鈥檛 make fun of us,鈥� one Istanbul coffee shop owner says half-jokingly when noting how a friend was tightening his belt a notch. The joke was about being hungry, but with far broader connotations about forces beyond Turkish control.
A Syria policy in flux
The diplomatic brawl is the latest case study of the challenge of doing business with a mercurial White House, where every objective appears to be a constantly moving target.
Turkey has watched top US officials move the goalposts on Syria policy from the commander-in-chief鈥檚 apparent promise of an unconditional and speedy withdrawal. Not only has the timeline for the removal of the 2,200 US troops been extended, but conditions have been imposed on any Turkish military move into northern Syria: to not attack the US-allied Syrian Kurdish militia that has been fighting the Islamic State (ISIS).
鈥淚t鈥檚 an uncharted era in foreign policy, because you don鈥檛 know who you have to deal with in Washington in order to advance your own national security objectives,鈥� says Sinan 脺lgen, a former Turkish diplomat and head of the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), a think tank in Istanbul.
鈥淏efore it was clear. The answer may have been yes or no, but at least you got an answer, and 鈥� were pretty confident that it reflected the administration point of view,鈥� says Mr. 脺lgen. 鈥淭hese are really extreme reversals that make it difficult to construct sound policy.鈥�
One result is that Turkey 鈥撀燼nd other nations, by extension 鈥� can鈥檛 be sure that US 鈥渕essaging is credible, if you have a president who within days changes his position, and members of the administration [then] try to undermine the president鈥檚 position,鈥� says 脺lgen.
Diplomatic 鈥榤alpractice鈥�
Another lesson is that doing a deal with the boss may not mean that you鈥檝e actually done a deal,聽even though that is how Turkey鈥檚 president and most regional leaders have long operated.
Trump has expressed personal admiration for Erdo臒an聽in the past and has approved of other authoritarian chiefs from Cairo and Manila to Riyadh and Moscow. Trump likewise has sought to exude a manner from the Oval Office telling would-be deal-makers that his decision is all that matters.
鈥淓rdo臒an made the mistake of thinking he can handle all of the Syria file with Trump personally, and his personal relationship with him,鈥� says Asl谋 Ayd谋nta艧ba艧, a Turkey expert in Istanbul with the European Council on Foreign Relations.
That bet appeared to pay off, until it became clear that Trump had a limited grasp of what he had given away to Erdo臒an, she says. 鈥淵ou have the problem of a leader who wants to be the prime interlocutor 鈥� Trump 鈥� but isn鈥檛 at all clear on the facts that he is negotiating,鈥� says聽Ms. Ayd谋nta艧ba艧. 鈥淚t鈥檚 malpractice on all counts, diplomatically and politically.鈥�
So a conversation that was likely designed to appease Turkey and smooth the relationship led instead to another clash, she says.
鈥淚t is these cyclical crises that are marking the relationship, in part because there are volatile leaders involved,鈥� says Ayd谋nta艧ba艧. 鈥淓rdo臒an himself is a mercurial man; there is no doubt about it. He has a volcanic anger. But Trump is not only mercurial [and] has a volcanic anger, but he is also blowing hot and cold. He makes Erdo臒an look like a steady hand.鈥�
Dispute over Syrian Kurds
A key source of bilateral friction is Turkey鈥檚 opposition to US military support in northern Syria for the People鈥檚 Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian Kurdish militia with organic ties to the Kurdistan Workers鈥� Party (PKK). That Turkish group is on the US terrorist list and has waged a battle against the Turkish state for decades.
Turkey fears that US weapons given to the YPG to fight ISIS will also bolster the PKK and that Turkish forces will be waging war on their southern border against the YPG once the Americans leave and ISIS is contained.
Turkey claims the YPG, PKK, ISIS, and Al Qaeda are all 鈥渢errorists鈥� in equal measure, and analysts here say the capitulation by Trump during the December telephone call was taken by Erdo臒an to mean that Turkish armed forces would be able to take them on or, at the very least, push them back beyond a buffer zone.
After Erdo臒an vowed in a speech that the PKK and ISIS would be 鈥渨iped out鈥� in the coming months, one online reader commented on the Habert眉rk website: 鈥淭his is what MANLINESS looks like, Thank you, CHIEF.鈥澛�
But then Trump鈥檚 national security adviser, John Bolton, said that conditions were attached, that the US needed guarantees that Turkey would not attack the YPG. During a visit to Ankara last week, he was snubbed by Erdo臒an, who said he would never agree to such conditions.
Damage control
In a first step at damage control, Trump and Erdo臒an spoke by phone again Monday and held a 鈥渧ery positive conversation,鈥� Erdo臒an told ruling party lawmakers on Tuesday. But he noted his surprise, too, that striking a deal with Trump was not enough.
鈥淥ur hope increased with the departure of certain names in the [Trump] administration who did not look warmly at the positive trend in US-Turkey relations with regards to Syria,鈥� said Erdo臒an.
He added that there had been 鈥渃racks here and there, but we did not place much importance on it, because we know our real interlocutor was Mr. Trump.鈥�
Erdo臒an鈥檚 aides made the point more sharply, with adviser Yasin Aktay saying the US had been 鈥渁 highly unreliable partner.鈥�
鈥淭he problems and misunderstandings between the US and Turkey are results of the confusion and cacophony between the actors at different levels of the US administration and institutions,鈥� Mr. Aktay told Al Jazeera. 鈥淲ashington fights one terrorist group, Daesh [ISIS], while backing another one, the YPG. Such inconsistencies in US policies decrease the country鈥檚 reputation as a global power.鈥�
That assessment is far from the heady days when Trump was first elected in 2016, when the Turkish leadership hoped Erdo臒an and Trump would find a useful chemistry together, with glue perhaps provided by Trump鈥檚 then-national security adviser Michael Flynn, whose public lobbying benefited the Turkish government.
Of all the clashes since, one low point came in August, when Trump imposed sanctions on Turkey for not releasing the evangelical pastor Andrew Brunson, held for two years and charged with trying to overthrow the Turkish state.
Erdo臒an countered with tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles and other US goods, and Mr. Brunson was finally released in October, prompting a new chumminess between Trump and Erdo臒an.
The Khashoggi affair
Also in October, the brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabia consulate in Istanbul was seen here not just as a way to weaken Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), analysts say, but also to win points with Trump by playing it in such a way that the crown prince and his friendship with Trump would not be irreversibly crippled.
鈥淭he Turkish strategy was certainly to weaken MBS, but even more than that to earn political credits in Washington by insinuating to Trump that Turkey is allowing a freedom of action 鈥撀燼nd not pressuring Trump in a way that would be inimical to his relationship with MBS,鈥� says analyst 脺lgen.
It was a fine line, and therefore 鈥渜uite an achievement on the Turkish side.鈥�
But if Trump had overstepped in his promises to Erdo臒an, the way to fix it 鈥渋s not with this very belligerent Twitter diplomacy, essentially targeting a fellow NATO country with economic devastation,鈥� says 脺lgen. 鈥淭hat is unheard of.鈥�
