海角大神

When Egyptian military leader Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a televised address last July to announce the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, he was flanked by a coterie of the country鈥檚 most powerful religious figures.

To his right sat the Pope of the Coptic Church and the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar, Sunni Islam鈥檚 highest seat of learning. Neither was a surprise to Egyptians. Less expected was the third religious leader: Galal el-Morra, a prominent member of Egypt鈥檚 Salafist movement, which espouses a puritanical vision of Islam.

Just months earlier, the ultra-orthodox Salafists had been a crucial ally of Mr. Morsi鈥檚 Muslim Brotherhood. Now they were shoulder-to-shoulder with the Army against fellow Islamists.听

This appearance may have been the high tide mark for the Salafists, who have been fractured and dislocated by the post-Morsi political shakeout that has undone much of the 2011 revolution's achievements. The weakening of this听Islamic political movement听could have significant implications for the future strength of religious conservatives in Egyptian politics.

Ultra-conservatives in parliament

Although Salafists have traditionally taken a quietist approach to politics, after 2011 they changed tack and created al-Nour, an ultra-conservative political party that aimed to protect Egypt鈥檚 Islamic identity. It surprised many by winning a quarter of the seats in Egypt鈥檚 parliamentary elections in 2012. Then, when Egypt wrote a new constitution, it managed to insert an article that emphasized the importance of sharia, or听Islamic law, to secularists' dismay.

But since Morsi鈥檚 ouster, the Nour party has become one of the coup鈥檚 biggest political casualties. And, say some Egyptians, it only has itself to blame for its own cynicism in siding with the military when it moved against Mr. Morsi.

Not all Salafists took this route: splinter party al-Watan and a number of other Salafist factions have condemned the coup and what many see as the naked political maneuverings of Nour and its leading preacher, Yasser el Borhamy.听

These critics say the party's decision to go it alone, without backing from other Islamist political groups, was based on a strategic view that it could gain ground from a military crackdown on Mr. Morsi鈥檚 Muslim Brotherhood.

But the deal always looked sweeter for the government. Nour's support has offered political cover for a systematic crackdown on most Islamists, not just the Brotherhood, while allowing听the authorities to deny any anti-Islamic political agenda.

鈥淭he Nour Party is playing a risky game that might backfire and affect its political gains,鈥� says Khalil al-Anani, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University and an expert on political Islam.

He warns that Nour has jeopardized its credibility among the wider Islamist movement, and will struggle听to fill the political void left behind by the Brotherhood, which has been banned and classified as a terrorist group.

It also remains vulnerable to the possibility that the next government, expected to be led by Mr. Sisi, will turn against it.

Rank-and-file frustrated

Among the Nour party鈥檚 grassroots supporters, there is anger听at a leadership they say has sold out the movement.

Two years ago, Mohamed, a young Salafist, voted for Nour in the parliamentary elections. 鈥淏ack then, I was proud to give them my vote. We always said that the party was above political maneuvers, and that it really worked for its people,鈥� he says. 鈥淭he situation is very different now.鈥�

Despite Nour鈥檚 official support for Egypt鈥檚 military-backed authorities, an aggressive state-led crackdown on dissent has netted many of its rank-and-file members. State media has issued calls听for citizens to report neighbors whom they suspect of belonging to the Brotherhood.

For Salafists, who wear their beards in a distinctive manner for theological reasons, this adds to the sense of unease and confusion.

鈥淚t鈥檚 hard for me to walk in the streets these days,鈥� sighs Mohamed. 鈥淧eople see my clothes and know I鈥檓 an Islamist 鈥� I have to be on my guard.鈥�

Loyalty test

In the past two months, three of his friends 鈥� all Salafists 鈥� have been arrested. His brother was killed in August, when security forces forcibly dispersed a camp of tens of thousands of Morsi supporters in Cairo.

After nine months of upheaval, the loyalty of Nour鈥檚 members was put to the test in January, when the party threw its weight behind a new constitution. The document was put to a popular vote that was widely regarded as an endorsement for the military-backed authorities, rather than the document itself.

Salafists did not turn out in large numbers, a sign of how disillusioned many have become since the coup.

According to Shadi Hamid, a fellow at the Brookings Institution鈥檚 Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Nour鈥檚 decision to back Sisi鈥檚 power grab has been a 鈥渕ajor miscalculation鈥�.

鈥淭hey鈥檙e hemorrhaging support, there have been numerous defections, they can鈥檛 mobilize their own supporters 鈥� the list goes on,鈥� he says.

Balancing act听

The Nour party is not the only loser in the Salafist camp. Salafist party El-Watan, which split from Nour over personal and political differences in January 2013, has also been forced to tread the thin line between opposing the coup and siding with the Brotherhood, a perilous position in post-Morsi Egypt.

This balancing act is reflected in the careful rhetoric of the party鈥檚 leadership. In an interview with 海角大神, leader Emad Abdel Ghaffour condemned the government鈥檚 crackdown, saying 鈥渢here has never been a time more violent in Egypt鈥檚 modern history鈥�.

鈥淲e criticize the situation, but our words have a blunt edge,鈥� he said. 鈥淚'm not going to say Sisi is a murderer, but I'm not going to say he is the prophet.鈥�

Although he shied away from criticizing Nour, a party he once led, he described Sisi鈥檚 advisors as 鈥渇ools鈥�, suggesting that the former strongman defense minister should be counseled to take steps towards reconciliation, not repression.

According to Hamid, the key problem facing both Islamist and liberal parties lies in the illiberal nature of Egypt鈥檚 post-coup politics.

鈥淵ou have political parties pretending to play normal politics when everyone knows this is not a normal political situation,鈥� he says.

鈥淭he regime needed al-Nour after the coup in order to present a picture of unity and consensus, but the military also wanted to fracture the Islamist scene and undermine the legitimacy of al-Nour in the eyes of many of its supporters.鈥�