海角大神

After聽historic聽electoral victories less than two years ago, the political demise of Egypt鈥檚 Muslim Brotherhood and increasing troubles of Tunisia鈥檚 Islamists raises the question: Was their first shot at governance doomed to fail by immense challenges and vindictive opponents, or did their own missteps聽help聽precipitate their downfall?

In the streets of Cairo and Tunis, citizens riven by a tumultuous transition cast blame in nearly every direction. They are probably all at least partly right.

Islamist聽parties聽swept into power聽at a moment of tremendous social, economic, and political upheaval.聽They had no experience in聽governance,聽let alone聽amid that much聽turmoil. While they聽received a plurality of votes,聽they faced formidable political opposition.

鈥淚slamists were always going to have difficulty governing, but not because they鈥檙e Islamist,鈥澛爏ays Henry Smith, a North Africa analyst from the British risk assessment firm Control Risks.聽鈥淎ny political party would have faced the same structural and institutional problems.鈥�

Yet even accounting for the magnitude of the challenges before them, their inexperience, and the opposition they faced, many say that both the Muslim Brotherhood鈥檚 Freedom and Justice Party and Ennahda in Tunisia made key strategic mistakes that weakened their hand 鈥� and, in the case of Egypt, led to their聽fall from power.

Now, as the Brotherhood seeks to reinstate President Mohammed Morsi after the military ousted him on聽July 3, how Egypt responds is likely to have implications not only for its fledgling democracy but also abroad 鈥� especially in Tunisia, where Ennahda is facing聽a re-energized聽opposition.

鈥淭he fall of the Brotherhood can be a turning point on the trajectory of political Islam in the region,鈥� says Khalil al-Anani, a Durham University scholar of Islamist movements who has been in Cairo this summer. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a very uncertain future, and this will depend on one thing: the willingness of the new regime in Egypt to include them and to build real democracy in Egypt. If this does not happen 鈥� the consequences will be hard for Egypt, the region, and for the world itself.鈥�

Islamists' rise to power

After decades of persecution and marginalization,聽Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia finally ascended to power聽via聽the ballot box in the wake of the Arab聽uprisings.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood鈥檚 Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Ennahda won the most votes in their respective elections in 2011. A coalition dominated by the FJP took 47 percent of Egypt鈥檚 parliamentary election, while Ennahda聽scored聽42 percent in constituent assembly elections.

The Brotherhood gradually shed its coalition allies and Mohammed Morsi narrowly won the Egyptian presidency in June 2012.

The massive street protests on the anniversary of his election, which spurred the military鈥檚 deposing of Morsi, were driven in part by perceptions that the Brotherhood was trying to concentrate power in its own hands,聽breaking聽previous promises to limit its parliamentary representation and sit out the presidential race.

Ennahda has taken a more collaborative approach. Today it heads a governing coalition with two secularist parties that dominates the constituent assembly, an interim legislature whose main task is writing a new constitution.

Ennahda has also been willing to compromise in political battles. Notably, it refrained from trying to mention sharia in the new constitution and abandoned its quest for a purely parliamentary system.

Yet the party鈥檚聽popularity has sunk amid economic malaise and security concerns. Unemployment hovers around 17 percent. Opposition parties accuse Ennahda of having failed to discipline the hardline Salafi movement, some of whose members are becoming increasingly violent.聽

Emboldened by the Brotherhood鈥檚 ouster in Egypt, Tunisia鈥檚聽broadly secularist opposition parties are trying聽to drive Ennahda from power with persistent street demonstrations and political maneuvering. The dispute has stayed peaceful so far, but could set back Tunisia鈥檚 democratic transition.

Circumstances and inexperience

In part, the Brotherhood and Ennahda were dealt a weak hand, say analysts. The protests that toppled Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and聽Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia also frightened off tourists and foreign investors,聽which were critical to both economies. And despite the unity of the popular uprisings,聽both populations quickly became polarized聽as they set about establishing new democracies.

In that context, no matter how stellar a president or his vision for the country may be, it is hard to move things forward if the state apparatus聽does not support that vision, says Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Gehad El-Haddad. 鈥淵ou put a Formula 1 driver into a car with four flat tires, with no engine, no tank, and no steering wheel, it鈥檚 still not going to聽drive.鈥�

Yet both governments have also made avoidable mistakes, analysts say.

Due to聽a combination of timidity and inexperience, Tunisia鈥檚 new leaders missed opportunities to make聽badly needed economic reforms, says Jacob Kolster, North Africa director at the African Development Bank.

One example has been failure to rewrite the Ben Ali-era investment law, which would have brought in more foreign cash, he says.聽聽Instead,聽the government has offered unsustainable quick-fix measures such as massive public-sector hiring and wage increases. And it has made impossible promises of development to impoverished rural areas, fueling resentment.

鈥淚t鈥檚 normal that a government of inexperienced people needs time to find its way and develop ideas,鈥澛爏ays Mr. Kolster. 鈥淏ut Tunisia needs to speed up that process. Unfortunately, things haven鈥檛 moved.鈥�

Opposition parties also complain that Ennahda and the FJP packed appointed positions with party stalwarts who lacked skills to govern 鈥� in some cases due in part to having been jailed for years by regimes who saw them as a threat.

鈥淚slamist-led governments have put people in power whose main preparation has been an extended stint in prison, and who have no real experience in public policy and government,鈥澛爏ays Mr. Smith.

Dominant and undermined

In Egypt, the Brotherhood sought to bolster its lack of experience by sending delegations on more than 200 international visits in the first year. But as a movement that had long operated in secret, it聽was predisposed to another trait that became a significant聽handicap: a lack of transparency that had been crucial in the movement鈥檚 underground days but proved hugely detrimental for a ruling party.聽

According to a recent Gallup poll, public support for the Brotherhood鈥檚 FJP fell from a high of 67 percent shortly after parliamentary elections to 19 percent just before Morsi鈥檚 ouster.

鈥淭hey couldn鈥檛 overcome this ideology of having to keep everything secret and work underground,鈥� says Ahmed Hosny of Gemaa Islamiyya,聽a former Islamist militant movement that renounced violence years ago in order to join politics.聽鈥淭his was a big barrier, it created a big gap between them and the people.鈥澛�

A prime example of this was when Morsi unilaterally amended the constitutional declaration that was supposed to govern the transitional period and put himself 鈥� albeit temporarily 鈥� above judicial review. Morsi鈥檚 supporters described it as a necessary step to keep the revolution, including the writing of a new constitution, moving forward, but his opponents painted it as an unjustified power grab.

鈥淚f this [new] constitutional declaration had been displayed as a revolutionary act by the president 鈥� he wouldn鈥檛 have appeared as a dictator to the people,鈥� says Mr. Hosny. 鈥淏ut this wasn鈥檛 the case, he just surprised the people.鈥�

Dr. Anani of Durham University acknowledges that the Brotherhood lacked the skills to deal with a very complicated country in transition. 鈥淏ut on the other hand, there was a lot of resistance coming from the deep state, from state institutions that obstructed the Brotherhood from governing effectively,鈥� he says, referring to the entrenched elements left over from Mubarak鈥檚 regime, also referred to as聽felool. 鈥淚n the beginning they [the Brotherhood] tried to contain and accommodate the deep state.鈥�

This was their biggest mistake, says Emad Shahin of the American University of Cairo, who connects the Brotherhood's approach to political reform with their religious attitudes. 鈥淟et鈥檚 make peace with them, let鈥檚 bring them to our side 鈥� this is the training of religious people 鈥� proselytization.鈥澛�

The media, some of which is state-run, also undermined the Brotherhood.

鈥淸Morsi] left many of these counterrevolutionary,听蹿别濒辞辞濒聽elements loose 鈥� in the media, in the state apparatus, and in society,鈥� adds Dr. Shahin. 鈥淚f he repressed 10 percent of what [military chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah] Sisi is doing now, he would still be in power.鈥�

The fact that the military retained key ministers from Morsi鈥檚 cabinet, including the minister of Interior, after ousting the president, may signal that they were aligned with the deep state all along and undermining Morsi unbeknownst to him.

鈥淭o put it simply, instead of reforming the state, which is a very corrupt state, [the Brotherhood] tried to ride it,鈥� says Anani. 鈥淚t seemed to me that they were riding a tiger and they couldn鈥檛 control it and it seems to me that this tiger turned and ate them at the end.鈥�

But not everyone sees it that way. Nadr Bakkar, spokesman of the Salafi Al Nour party, which has increasingly diverged from the Brotherhood, says the movement missed an opportunity to embrace some of those who supported Morsi over his opponent Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak鈥檚 last prime minister.

鈥淵ou should realize that you are not in front of enemies,鈥� says Mr. Bakkar. 鈥淵ou have a chance to contain deep state by using other liberal and revolutionary powers who actually voted for you against Shafiq.鈥�

Ennahda facing emboldened opposition

Critics have coined the term 鈥渂allotocracy鈥� to describe the Brotherhood鈥檚 perceived style of democracy,聽by聽which even the slimmest majority of votes bestows聽the right to聽impose ideology聽on others without making any concessions, says Mustafa Ellabbad, director of Al Sharq Center of Regional and Strategic Studies in Cairo.

Tunisian secularists often level similar criticism at Ennahda. Now,聽the Brotherhood鈥檚 downfall has inspired聽Ennahda鈥檚 opponents聽to renew聽their demands that the party relinquish power. The July 25 murder of an opposition leader, the second this year, pushed anger to boiling point.

Opposition parties and the powerful General Union of Tunisian Workers, the country鈥檚 largest trade union, want the government dissolved. Some parties have said they want the聽constituent聽assembly dismantled, too. Meanwhile, 59 members of the 217-seat assembly are boycotting it to support opposition demands,聽according to Al Bawsala, an NGO that monitors the assembly.

Ennahda has called the antigovernment campaign an assault on democratic legitimacy. The party says it鈥檚 open to negotiating a national-unity cabinet but insists the assembly remain in place to finish the constitution.

On Tuesday聽night, hours after assembly president Mustafa Ben Jaafar suspended the body pending talks to end the dispute, tens of thousands of protestors flooded the square outside the assembly building in the largest antigovernment rally yet. Some objected to Ennahda鈥檚 religious leanings. But the underlying message was one of exhaustion.

鈥淲e鈥檝e heard the government tell us 鈥榃e will improve things鈥� 鈥� and then nothing,鈥� says a protestor named Wajdi Chebbi, a young woodworker trying to provide for his ailing father and four younger siblings.

鈥淟eaving religion aside, I just want a government that satisfies the people鈥檚 demands,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hat was the revolution for? For work, for dignity, for rights.鈥�