海角大神

Judging by the fierce anti-coup rhetoric coming from Turkey, the ouster of Egypt鈥檚 Muslim Brotherhood president by military fiat has shaken Turkey鈥檚 own Islam-rooted leaders.听

Turkey鈥檚 ruling party invested much in Mohamed Morsi鈥檚 year-long rule, offering political support and loans and business deals worth $2 billion聽to Egypt鈥檚 first elected government, which it saw as a kindred ideological spirit and proof of the popular appeal of political Islam.

But as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashes out against Egypt鈥檚 coup as if it had been aimed at his own Justice and Development Party (AKP)聽鈥� whose Islam-leaning predecessors faced multiple military coups 鈥撀爃e is virtually alone. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have pledged $12 billion to aid any post-Morsi regime,聽though Qatar, another rich Persian Gulf monarchy and a strong backer of Morsi, has kept relatively quiet.听

鈥淣o matter where they are鈥�coups are bad,鈥� Mr. Erdogan聽said聽in televised remarks聽this week. 鈥淐oups are clearly enemies of democracy.鈥�

鈥淲e don鈥檛 respect those who do not respect the people鈥檚 will because we paid a big price. We don鈥檛 want our Egyptian brothers to pay the same price,鈥澛燛rdogan聽said subsequently聽in a video message to a rally in Germany聽on Tuesday.

The聽one-sided聽pro-Morsi line has been so strong that Egypt鈥檚 foreign ministry this week called upon 鈥淭urkish dignitaries鈥� to make statements 鈥渨ithout taking sides and in a way that embrace all Egyptians,鈥� according to Turkish news reports.听

鈥淎 lot of Turks now read Egypt in Turkish terms,鈥� says Mustafa Akyol, a political commentator and columnist for Hurriyet Daily News. 鈥淓rdogan and his party identify with Morsi strongly, whereas his opponents are saying, 鈥榊ou see, Morsi made the same mistakes in Egypt you are doing here, and you see what happened.鈥欌�澛�

Critics of Erdogan who have taken to the streets by tens of thousands since late May say that the AKP鈥檚 鈥渕ajoritarian鈥� outlook 鈥撀爀quating victory at the ballot box with a license to ignore smaller parties and groups 鈥� has led to increasing authoritarian rule by Erdogan and chants of 鈥渄ictator.鈥�

Similarly, Morsi 鈥� who won with a razor-thin majority of 51 percent 鈥� promised inclusive government but聽is accused of instead ruling聽for the favor of the Muslim Brotherhood and its own Islamist agenda in Egypt, with little reference聽to the substantial secular camp that played a critical role in toppling聽dictator Hosni Mubarak in February 2011.

Staunch supporters

One sign of the close links between Ankara and Cairo is that the Morsi government chose to bypass Egypt鈥檚 official news media and struck a deal instead with Turkey鈥檚 state-run Anadolu News Agency to release all official statements聽in Egypt.听

And Foreign Minister Ahmet聽Davutoglu聽this week worked the phones, calling more that a dozen of his counterparts from Qatar to Lithuania to聽cobble together聽a joint response聽condemning聽what Turkish officials 鈥撀燼nd the Muslim Brotherhood聽鈥� call the 鈥渕assacre鈥� of 51 pro-Morsi supporters shot dead early聽Monday聽morning by the Egyptian military.听

Since聽Morsi鈥檚 fall, the Turkish news agency has live-streamed only pro-Morsi rallies. AKP officials have organized pro-Morsi rallies in Turkey, and some supporters have used Morsi鈥檚 photo on their Twitter account handles.

鈥淢aybe they invested a bit much,鈥� says Mr. Akyol, author of 鈥淚slam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty,鈥� of the AKP鈥檚 support of Morsi.

鈥淚t is true that they invested in the Muslim Brotherhood, and the AKP government has been seen as a patron of the Muslim Brotherhoods of the region, from Syria to Hamas,鈥� says Akyol. 鈥淪o that chain, if you will, is now maybe being broken in Egypt. I doubt it will go back to the days of Mubarak 鈥� which was really bad for Turkish-Egypt relations 鈥撀燽ut it鈥檚 also possible the new government will be less willing to engage with Turkey because Turkey so strongly comes in support of Morsi.鈥�

Little in common beyond Islam

But in reality, the countries have few parallels. Turkey鈥檚 economy has surged in the past decade under AKP rule, while Egypt鈥檚 has only further disintegrated under Morsi. The AKP is also in little danger of being overthrown by the military, which despite its all-powerful role as a self appointed defender of secularism since the founding of the modern Turkish state in the 1920s, has been systematically pushed out of politics by the AKP in recent years, with hundreds of the top brass now in prison facing conspiracy charges.听

And Erdogan managed to weather a month of unprecedented anti-government protests across the country, while Morsi was toppled only days after millions took to the streets in opposition.听

鈥淭here is no threat whatsoever to the AKP鈥檚 grip on government,鈥� but the Egypt coup has now stymied an AKP goal of creating "a Turkey-Egypt axis in the region," .

鈥淸T]he expectation was that as a consequence of Turkey鈥檚 largesse to Egypt, Morsi and his Brotherhood would decide to emulate the Erdogan AKP of 2002-2011 to prove the theory that Islam and democracy can coexist,鈥� writes Mr. Candar. 鈥淭he opposite, however, occurred, with Erdogan beginning to look more like Morsi, and the AKP beginning to resemble the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically.鈥澛�

Erdogan blames the Turkey unrest 鈥撀燾lashes erupted again聽on Monday聽night between police using tear gas, water cannons and paintball guns against protestors in downtown Istanbul 鈥� on a cabal of Turks with links to 鈥渢errorist鈥� groups, the foreign media, and an ill-defined 鈥渋nterest-rate lobby鈥� that he claims seeks to undermine Turkey鈥檚 substantial economic progress under the AKP.听

Speaking聽by video to the rally in Germany called 鈥淩espect for Democracy,鈥� Erdogan did not explicitly mention the recent protests, but instead spoke of decades-long repression and the history of coups. AKP's less moderate antecedents were subject to four military coups since the 1960s.

鈥淭hey humiliated our values for years. They despised our beliefs, ignored our choices, desires, demands and expectations,鈥� he said. 鈥淩egarding democracy as a privilege for themselves, they wanted to insult us by calling us shepherds, peasants, sheep鈥�This is their sole aim.鈥�

But the AKP has won聽the last three聽elections with increasing support each time, even if polls show that heavy-handed police action and mishandling of the protests has eroded support from the 50 percent聽result聽two years ago.听

鈥淭hey want to subdue us by attacking our mosques, women wearing headscarves, religious people and our values,鈥� Erdogan said. 鈥淒o not worry. Turkey is no longer the country it once was.鈥�

AKP officials,聽who have cast Morsi's toppling as an assault on democracy,聽make little mention of the fact that mammoth street protests against Morsi鈥檚 autocratic rule had been building for months. For Turkish politicians and commentators alike, the obsession聽with Egypt聽has been聽about聽parallels聽to Turkey's domestic protests against Erdogan's us-vs.-them style,聽and聽also聽the 鈥渧olcanic effect鈥澛爋n the AKP聽over the loss of Egypt from聽its聽regional strategy of spreading its own soft power聽as a successful example聽of moderate Islam.听

Egypt 鈥渨as the most important element of a 鈥榥ew order鈥� that聽[Foreign Minister Davutoglu]聽is claiming to spearhead in the Middle East and North Africa,鈥� writes Mohammad Pervez Bilgami in a column in the Hurriyet Daily News. Erdogan and the AKP 鈥渉ave spent much of the last couple of years branding Turkey as a model for Egypt and other Arab Spring countries; the reverse is now taking place.鈥�