海角大神

The savage beating to death this week of four Shiite Muslims by a Sunni mob in Egypt set off a predictable chain reaction in Iran, which has long cast itself as the protector of Shiites around the world.听

Iran condemned the Cairo killings and 鈥渁ny act of extremism and violence which contradicts Islam,鈥� and called upon 鈥渢he sensible and revolutionary Egyptian nation, through its prudent leaders [to] exercise vigilance vis-脿-vis plots to foment discord among various schools of Islam.鈥�

A prominent Shiite cleric in Iran鈥檚 religious center of Qom went further, speaking about an 鈥渁nti-Shia project in Egypt [which has] caused the intensification of sectarian [violence], emergence of crimes and legalization of bloodshed.鈥�

But even though Iran has stepped up the rhetoric, it has done little else 鈥� evidence that the Islamic Republic鈥檚 willingness and ability to intervene on behalf of embattled fellow Shiites depends听more听on strategic听than religious听calculations, analysts say.

The Cairo killings come amid an escalation of sectarian tensions between the two main denominations all over, especially in Syria.听That divide presents a dilemma for Iran, which has always presented its 1979 Islamic revolution as a pan-Islamic model听for Sunnis and Shiites alike.听

For example, although Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is officially referred to as the 鈥淟eader of the World鈥檚 Shia," in a 2008 speech he says, 鈥淓ven those who were not Shia Muslims were attracted to the Islamic revolution. Millions of our Sunni brothers in Arab, African, and Asian countries were attracted to the Islamic revolution, and this [1979 revolution] was a blow to the enemies.鈥�

Playing into Western hands

鈥淚ran鈥檚 response to this massacre in Egypt is quite typical of how it has approached sectarian division,鈥� says Roxane Farmanfarmaian, who teaches politics and international relations at Cambridge University in Britain.

鈥淚ran has consistently stated that Muslims must act and stand together, and that any division or conflict between the Sunni and Shia only plays into Western hands that think of Islam as violent,鈥� says Ms. Farmanfarmaian. 鈥淚t will support Shia when it鈥檚 geopolitically important and useful, but it has to have that extra dimension before it supports Shia听per se.鈥�

Mr. Morsi has condemned the killing of Shiites as a 鈥渉einous crime.鈥� And the country鈥檚 leading Sunni religious establishment, Al-Azhar, said the killings were against Islam and urged the 鈥渉arshest punishment.鈥� But听Morsi 鈥� the Muslim Brotherhood president who will mark one year as Egypt鈥檚 first democratically elected president on听June 30听鈥撎齣s also accused of giving free rein to fundamentalist Sunnis known as Salafists, who consider Shiites heretics.

Spilling over from the Syrian war

Many of the most troublesome sectarian tensions today are spilling over from the Syrian war, afflicting Lebanon and Iraq.听Iran鈥檚 critics accuse it of deepening听those听divisions with its support of the Syrian government, even though fellow Syria听allies Russia and China听have no pro-Shiite agenda.听

Speaking in April, Khamenei sought to听minimize听the split. He said that the Assad regime is not Shiite (although听its Alawite roots are a Shiite sect), nor are its opponents Sunni, even though 鈥淲estern propaganda and dependent regional media鈥� try to depict it that way.

Yet even the fighters themselves have听increasingly听described their听battle as a sectarian fight. As Iran and Hezbollah (with Russia) have enabled Assad鈥檚 forces to make recent military gains, the Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan (with the US and Europe) have bolstered support for the opposition.

New risks

Iranian leaders have long recognized that specific talk听from them听about defending Islam鈥檚 minority Shiites does not go over well with majority Sunnis,听and adds stress to听religious faultlines that date back 14 centuries.听

And in apparent recognition of the new risks of sectarian hatred spiraling out of control, Iran鈥檚 President-elect Hassan Rohani has stated that a top priority after he is sworn in will be mending relations with Saudi Arabia. He took similar conciliatory steps a decade ago as the head of Iran鈥檚 Supreme National Security Council.

The pragmatism in Iran's selective support of fellow Shiites can be found in Bahrain, the听tiny Persian Gulf sheikhdom where Shiites听began听pro-democracy protests in听early 2011. Iran听did nothing to prevent Saudi Arabia from sending military forces to bolster the government as it crushed the protests.

Such signals from Tehran means Iran 鈥渋s not going to go out on a limb for Shia听per se, it鈥檚 going to go out on a limb for unity,鈥� says Farmanfarmaian. 鈥淲hen it comes down to being 鈥楽hia vs. political expediency,鈥� as in the case of Bahrain, [Iran] certainly sees no reason to show up on those beaches and get into a war.鈥�

In March 2011, Khamenei said: 鈥淒o not make [Bahrain ] a Sunni and Shia issue; this would be the biggest favor 鈥� for the enemies of the Islamic nation鈥�. There exists no Sunni-Shia conflict.鈥�

Then last February, Khamenei explained the result: 鈥淭he rulers of Bahrain claimed that Iran is involved in the events of Bahrain. This is a lie. No, we are not involved,鈥� he said. 鈥淚f we had interfered, the conditions would have been different in Bahrain.鈥�