海角大神

The young Turkish artists clustered on a dark edge of Istanbul鈥檚 Taksim Square are prepared for war. They ready workshop goggles and respirators to fend off tear gas, and tape small plastic bottles to either side of their hard hats, hoping to protect ears from flying gas canisters and stones.

They are ready. But for what? Of that, they are not quite sure, beyond battling police to protest Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan鈥檚 鈥渇ascist鈥� ways of imposing Islamic strictures.

This fight has exposed the depth of Turkey鈥檚 social and religious fault lines and competing visions for its future. The increasingly Islamic hue of Turkey鈥檚 democracy 鈥� along with the 鈥渦s versus them鈥� divisiveness of Mr. Erdogan鈥檚 own rhetoric 鈥� is under unprecedented scrutiny.

Erdogan鈥檚 ruling party has increasingly stepped into Turkey鈥檚 virulent social debates, sparking criticism for everything from new alcohol restrictions to launching skyline-changing construction projects with little outside input.

鈥淲e just want freedom,鈥� says filmmaker Yigit, holding his makeshift helmet during a long midnight stint in the square. 鈥淭hey are imposing on us all their view of this religion. We are religious 鈥� we are all Muslim, we believe in God 鈥� but we can drink alcohol, too.聽

鈥淭hey are separating people ... and you can so easily separate people with religion,鈥� he says.

How Yigit鈥檚 鈥渇reedom鈥� can be achieved is what those protesting on the streets hope to define. Their prime minister, who dismissed them as 鈥渨ild extremists鈥� acting on behalf of foreign agents, hopelessly outnumbered by his own supporters, seems unwilling to compromise.聽

鈥淭his is a new social movement,聽concerned about its liberties,鈥� says Ihsan Dagi, a columnist with Today鈥檚 Zaman newspaper. He notes that the crowds include some Islamic groups and those there are not all simply against Erdogan鈥檚 Islam-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has ruled for a decade and won three elections so far, most recently with 50 percent of the vote.

Erdogan has proved to be a charismatic politician who has guided Turkey鈥檚 transformation from economic basket case to growth engine and provided a period of unprecedented stability. Turkey often portrays itself as the model for successfully blending democracy and Islam in a modern state.

In the process, Erdogan鈥檚 government has also trampled civil rights by imprisoning scores of journalists, opposition writers, and others while systematically weakening the military 鈥� once the all-powerful protector of an elite secularism that freed Turks from religious strictures but prevented others from outward expressions of piety like wearing head scarves in government offices.聽

鈥淧eople do not want an excessive state, a state that is interfering in their daily lives and imposing moral codes on the rest of society,鈥� says Mr. Dagi, also a professor at the Middle East Technical University. 鈥淭hey want to make clear that there are some limits to the power of the majority; they just want to be left alone.鈥澛�

Analysts speak of Erdogan believing in a 鈥渕ajoritarian democracy,鈥� in which the party with the most votes behaves as it likes, and the opposition affects change only at the ballot box 鈥� if it can.聽

Erdogan warned the protesters that if they brought 100,000 people to Taksim Square, he could find 1 million of his own supporters to counter them. Few doubt he has the numbers.聽

But that self-assessment carried little weight with protesters who covered Taksim Square and nearby storefronts and walls with graffiti labeling Erdogan a 鈥渇ascist鈥� and 鈥渕urderer.鈥澛�

The eruption was sparked by a heavy-handed police raid on a small sit-in to prevent the razing of Gezi Park, adjacent to Taksim Square, to make way for a shopping arcade. Protests quickly spread to 200 locations in 67 cities.

鈥淗is critics find him intolerant of opposing views,鈥� says Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at the Chatham House think tank in London. 鈥淗e definitely is pushing Turkey toward social conservatism, a euphemism for increasing restrictions on lifestyle choices such as alcohol, access to abortion rights, and how women and men act in the public space.鈥�

Erdogan has been 鈥渇ar more assertive鈥� with that agenda in the past three years, says Mr. Hakura, noting that the trend coincides with Turkey鈥檚 2011 economic growth rate of 8.8 percent slowing to a 鈥渜uite stagnant鈥� 3 percent for 2013.

鈥淭his [protest] is a unique event, and it鈥檚 been very difficult for [Erdogan] to adjust to it,鈥� says Hugh Pope, the Turkey analyst for the International Crisis Group. 鈥淟et鈥檚 see if he can be a bit more empathetic. The majoritarian style is clearly not going to carry Istanbul in the future. There are a whole series of elections coming up. Erdogan has enjoyed liberal support in the past. He鈥檚 going to need it in the future, too.鈥�

While Erdogan remained defiant,聽President Abdullah Gul sought to ease the anger, saying that 鈥渢he message [the protesters want to convey] has been received.鈥� After five days of protest, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc apologized for the excessive force, but only against the initial peaceful protesters, not the 鈥渕arauders鈥� 鈥� Erdogan鈥檚 word 鈥� who later clashed with authorities and vandalized the streets.

It was a costly and uncommon miscalculation, noted Mr. Pope in a blog post: 鈥淗ow did a polls-obsessed government misjudge the mood so much?鈥�

When the AKP pushed through alcohol restrictions recently, Erdogan called anyone who drank an alcoholic. Last month officials admonished subway riders in Ankara after a couple were caught kissing by security cameras, telling them to 鈥渁ct in accordance with moral rules.鈥�

鈥淭ayyip Erdogan [believes he] represents morals in Turkey,鈥� says Dagi. 鈥淗e thinks that the people should have a set of moral codes, generated from religion and Islamic culture, so those people who are not part of this moral code are seen by him as immoral, as inferior ... and not really proper citizens, not a proper part of the nation that he imagines.鈥�

The situation is the opposite of the Kemalist era of the last century. For decades after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the staunchly secular republic in 1923, religious people 鈥渨ere regarded as second-class,鈥� Dagi says.聽

Turkey鈥檚 social divide has not disappeared, and some who back Erdogan do not subscribe to the divisive talk that has exacerbated the chasm. They remember how the prime minister promised after his 2011 election victory to be more 鈥渉umble鈥� toward the other half of the electorate who did not vote for him.

鈥淭he people who vote for AKP do not necessarily share this [us versus them] vision [with] Erdogan,鈥� adds Dagi.

Still, there is plenty of support聽for Erdogan among AKP officials and on the streets.

鈥淚t鈥檚 natural to criticize the prime minister, but the [protesters鈥橾 position right now is not just criticism, it鈥檚 partly insulting, and then even beyond insulting, it turned into violence, [which] is not acceptable in any democratic society,鈥� says Giyasettin Gergin, head of the AKP Istanbul youth branch. He estimates $12 million in damage caused by the protests.

鈥淎 lot of our [AKP] friends asked, 鈥榃hy are they being so unjust against us?鈥欌�� and wanted to fight back,鈥� Mr. Gergin says. 鈥淏ut we told our friends, our business is keeping calm, behaving fairly, and not to be fooled.鈥�

The AKP didn鈥檛 not order a counteroffensive, but anger was palpable in some quarters.

鈥淚t鈥檚 a natural right for the people to demonstrate, but they鈥檙e not distancing themselves from the protesters, who are wrecking everything. The people who are leading this protest need to stress that this is not a civil war,鈥� says Saliha Eren, a head-scarved media manager in a neighborhood far from the protests.聽

鈥淭he Western media just wants and loves pictures of people clashing with the police,鈥� she says. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e trying to show the world that there is a civil war.鈥�

Erdogan is up for a vote again in 2014, this time for the presidency. In a bid to extend his rule beyond his tenure as premier, the AKP has proposed expanding the presidential role in the Constitution that is being written to replace one voted into law under a military junta in 1982.

The AKP proposal 鈥済rants enormous powers to the president, to dismiss the government, appoint ministers ... without the checks and balances鈥� typical of some other presidential systems, says Hakura of Chatham House. Erdogan wants to become president 鈥渨ith the ability to control the agenda,鈥� Hakura says.

That is an influence the protesters aim to limit.聽

鈥淧eople do not expect a [Erdogan-toppling] revolution,鈥� says student Arda, who gave only her first name. 鈥淏ut it鈥檚 very important for people to know they can do something, that in the future it is easy to come out and be heard.鈥�

The protests reflect the 鈥渄eep ideological polarization that exists in Turkey,鈥� Hakura says, noting that, put off by Erdogan鈥檚 tough talk, even some groups that once voted AKP are backing the protests.

鈥淚 think the prime minister is incapable, or unwilling, to reconcile the ideological rift that exists in Turkey,鈥� Hakura adds. 鈥淏ut ironically, his open defiance and uncompromising stance seems ... to bring the different groups together, because he is seen as pushing this way too far, even for his own supporters.