US walking a tightrope with its Yemen policy
| Sanaa, Yemen
With a curved dagger in his belt and a beard dyed flame red, Yemen鈥檚 most influential cleric on Monday laid down limits on growing counterterrorism assistance from the United States and said dialogue could solve problems with Al Qaeda militants in Yemen.
Sheikh Abdul-Majid al-Zindani, who has been labeled a 鈥済lobal terrorist鈥� with Al Qaeda links by Washington and was once close to Osama bin Laden while fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, said Yemen would 鈥渁ccept any cooperation in the framework of respect and joint interests,鈥� but would oppose military occupation.
That difference matters in Yemen, where elements of the government have often maintained expedient ties with militants of all stripes鈥攊ncluding Sheikh Zindani, and even Al Qaeda, analysts suggest鈥攚hich complicate efforts to crack down.
Zindani illustrated the dilemma when he criticized a US-backed Yemeni airstrike against a suspected Al Qaeda target in mid-December. 鈥淢any citizens were killed,鈥� he said. 鈥淚s this right? What about a government that calls in any force to strike whoever it wants in this way, without any restrictions?鈥�
Washington is boosting its counterterrorism cash and training for Yemen in the aftermath of Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab鈥檚 alleged attempt to blow up a US airliner on Christmas Day. It sees the main threat as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which claimed responsibility for the plot.
But removing Al Qaeda from Yemen will not be easy. And analysts warn that the threat of Al Qaeda鈥檚 offshoot here is being overplayed in the West, at the expense of more serious problems faced by Yemen鈥檚 weak government such as an uprising in the north that has claimed thousands of lives and a secessionist movement in the south.
Adding a dose of discrete American assistance might help, analysts say, but could also backfire if too weighted toward military action, or seen to be propping up an unpopular government.
鈥淭he American presence in this equation will cause an inevitable spike in Al Qaeda recruitment,鈥� says Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani, a political consultant in the capital, Sanaa. While some militants may have been killed, reports of dozens of civilian casualties were 鈥渦nacceptable鈥� to most Yemenis, he says.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think the Americans need to get involved in any more visible way,鈥� says Mr. al-Iryani. 鈥淭he greatest risk Yemen faces today is greater foreign intervention, not Al Qaeda. It will turn large numbers of Yemenis who are not radical into Al Qaeda.鈥�
US intervention tricky
Calibrating the American role will be tricky, in a country that analysts routinely describe as a 鈥渇ailing state鈥� where government contacts with Islamic militants have been deep since President Ali Abdullah Saleh deployed them in 1994 in Yemen鈥檚 civil war. Some 23 militants鈥� including Jamal al-Badawi, one of the organizers of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole鈥攅scaped from Yemeni jail in 2006, reportedly with the help of sympathetic Yemeni intelligence officials.
About 90 Yemenis remain in detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Though the US had originally planned to release most of them to Yemeni custody, that plan has now been held up on concerns some of them might seek to attack US interests after their release.
An estimated 200 to 300 Al Qaeda militants鈥攆oreign and Yemeni alike鈥攁re believed to operate in the poorest Arab nation that boasts nearly three weapons for every one of its 23 million citizens. Tribal allegiances dominate and religious extremism is prevalent in the rugged terrain at the southern flank of the Arabian Peninsula.
鈥淭here are probably thousands, but even if there are only 300, they can plan and recruit and train鈥攖he environment is there,鈥� says Abdullah al-Faqih, a political scientist at Sanaa University.
鈥淭his [underpants bomber] incident was a good thing鈥攊t brought attention,鈥� says Dr. al-Faqih. 鈥淚f there is instability in Yemen, you can be sure that Al Qaeda can attract all kinds. But stability can limit their reach. The Saudis have a good experience going after Al Qaeda. If you want to control them, you must do door-to-door war, not airstrikes.鈥�
President Saleh on Sunday renewed his commitment to taking on Al Qaeda, which in the past year and a half has begun to hit Yemeni targets for the first time and joined with its Saudi counterpart to form Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
鈥淒ialogue is the best way鈥ven with Al Qaeda, if they set aside their weapons and return to reason,鈥� Mr. Saleh told Abu Dhabi TV. 鈥淲e are ready to reach understanding with anyone who renounces violence and terrorism.鈥�
That view was echoed by Sheikh Zindani, who did not explicitly criticize the government鈥檚 expanding cooperation with the US: 鈥淭he president of the republic called for dialogue. The opposition also called for dialogue. The majority of the people see that dialogue will be the best way.鈥�
Complex terrain
Yet analysts describe layers of interwoven loyalties in Yemen which have coincided with a self-radicalization of militants and a reaction to harsh measures by the government in its myriad conflicts.
鈥淭he American government has tried to have this policy mix between development and security,鈥� says a European analyst with long Yemen experience who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of his work. 鈥淯nfortunately, the stress has been more on security than development. By the US Agency for International Development targeting certain regions, positive things can come out of this.鈥�
鈥淎QAP has shifted its strategy,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淭he [Sept. 2008] attack against the American embassy鈥攕ymbolically, it is something Al Qaeda can brag about鈥攂ut inside of Yemen, everyone says, 鈥極k, we might agree with striking Americans, but who was killed? Only Muslims鈥� This is very bad for them; no one is going to support this.鈥�
鈥淪o AQAP has started to strike people working inside security, specific targets that are not directly civilian,鈥� adds the analyst. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 why we shouldn鈥檛 overrate the threat from Al Qaeda. By overrating it, we are actually strengthening it. Because there is this fertile ground鈥ith strong anti-Americanism, because the government is not delivering, and is increasingly unpopular.鈥�
鈥淭he anti-terror issue in Yemen for the government is a kind of resource,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淏ut the Americans and the West should be cautious not to feed this threat.鈥�
President Barack Obama said he had 鈥渘o intentions of sending US boots on the ground鈥� to Yemen or Somalia, in an interview with People magazine released on Monday. In countries like Yemen and Somalia, Mr. Obama said: 鈥� I think working with international partners is most effective at this point.鈥�
Gen. David Petraeus, who visited Yemen shortly after the alleged attempt to bring down the US airliner on Christmas Day, said on Sunday that Yemen鈥檚 foreigner minister was 鈥渜uite clear that Yemen does not want to have American ground troops there.鈥� The US 鈥渨ould always want a host nation to deal with a problem itself,鈥� Petraeus told CNN. 鈥淲e want to help. We鈥檙e providing assistance.鈥�
鈥淪ome people are cognizant of the pitfalls. But sending Petraeus on a high-profile mission to Yemen, clearly trying to cater to the domestic pressure鈥攚hat is the Obama administration doing about this?鈥攈as a negative impact in Yemen,鈥� says Joost Hiltermann, the deputy director of the Middle East for the International Crisis Group in Washington.
鈥淭hat鈥檚 a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, the American public needs to be reassured that the government is taking the necessary measures,鈥� say s Hiltermann. 鈥淥n the other鈥f you are dealing with countries like Yemen or Pakistan, that are extremely fragile, you鈥檝e got to have an extremely light footprint. Because if you go in more heavy-handed, by sending in military advisors and predator strikes and whatnot, you are going to drive a good number of the population into Al Qaeda鈥檚 arms.鈥�
