Why Western sanctions on Zimbabwe may not matter anymore
Since 2003, the United States and the European Union have maintained 鈥渢argeted sanctions鈥� against individual members of the government of Zimbabwe, including President Robert Mugabe and many of his closest advisers and cabinet members.
Now, the EU is talking about lifting some of those sanctions 鈥� including travel bans and arms embargoes 鈥� if Zimbabwe holds a referendum on a new constitution by the end of this year.
Behind the usual chatter about whether it is time to lift sanctions or not is a more fundamental question: How much impact do 鈥渢argeted鈥� sanctions really have?
In a country like Zimbabwe, where the state and the ruling party maintain tight controls on who can buy and sell land, and on who can profit from the exploration of natural resources, the answer is more straight-forward than it might seem. If most of the country鈥檚 assets are indeed owned by the leadership under sanction, then it would make sense the country would suffer. If targeted sanctions were imposed on Bill Gates, for monopolistic tendencies perhaps, it鈥檚 likely that the company he founded, Microsoft, and the town of Redmond, Wash., would feel the effects of those personal sanctions.
After the EU announced yesterday that it might lift sanctions, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai 鈥� a longtime rival of President Mugabe and now a member of a coalition government with Mugabe 鈥� was .
"Linking the suspension to the successful implementation of the constitution referendum is evidence that the EU is willing to respond to progress in reform of the democratic process in聽," Mr. Tsvangira said yesterday.
In truth, by imposing sanctions for so long, the EU and the US may be losing their leverage. Today, Zimbabwe鈥檚 largest trading partner is South Africa, and China is its largest export destination, receiving 5.6 percent of all the goods and products that Zimbabwe produces.
These sanctions, though, have effects far beyond their 鈥渢argets.鈥� When Mugabe鈥檚 government launched a brutal 鈥渓and invasion鈥� campaign, urging militias to use force to push white commercial farmers off their lands starting in 2000, the agricultural economy began to collapse, and Zimbabwe began to run into arrears on its foreign loans. Both the and the 鈥� which rely heavily on US budgetary support 鈥� cut off Zimbabwe from any further aid until 2009, after President Mugabe had formed the coalition government with Mr. Tsvangirai鈥檚 party.
Zimbabwe鈥檚 coalition government of today is a far cry from the Mugabe government that on back in 2003.
Back then, Mugabe鈥檚 land redistribution policies helped turn southern Africa鈥檚 leading food exporter into its leading food-aid recipient. All the same ugly elements of repression by the Mugabe regime remain today: During the Arab Spring months, Zimbabwe police arrested a professor in Harare for watching a video about the Tahrir Square protesters, and charged him, along with 45 others attending his seminar that day, with treason. But the government has also begun a series of reforms that have helped turn Zimbabwe鈥檚 economy around.
In theory, the after flawed elections in March 2008 shouldn鈥檛 function at all, and in truth, it doesn鈥檛 function all that well. But the coalition government has given breathing room for both of the major parties, and welcome relief for Zimbabwe鈥檚 citizens, who once struggled to survive with 1 million percent inflation rates and virtually empty store shelves.
As for those violent 鈥渓and invasions鈥� that were the cause of all these sanctions, there are signs that they, oddly, may have had some positive effects.
On a recent trip to Harare, and photographer Lynsey Addario found a silver lining in Zimbabwe鈥檚 economic storm clouds. In the old days, Ms. Polgreen writes, the faces of the people selling tobacco and other produce to Zimbabwe鈥檚 export houses used to be white. Today, the farmers鈥� faces at export houses are largely black, and despite all the talk about land being given to Mugabe鈥檚 鈥渃ronies,鈥� most of the new landowners are not members of the political elite.
Polgreen's article 鈥� which created a 鈥� puts a different face on a policy that has been roundly, and rightly criticized. While the land invasion policies of 2000 were brutal, and certainly extra-legal, they may have given a broader number of farmers among Zimbabwe鈥檚 black majority access to land that they couldn鈥檛 have had a decade ago.
This creates a political challenge: If a growing number of people have benefited because of Mugabe鈥檚 land invasion, and more people have a vested stake in the new status quo, it becomes much more difficult to imagine returning Zimbabwe to the way it was before sanctions.
Have sanctions lost their target? If so, should they simply be stopped?
