Renaming Al Qaeda to Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Umma?
Inside his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Osama bin Laden mulled renaming Al Qaeda amid worries that the terrorist group had become a tarnished brand.聽
That's one of the details tucked in thousands of pages of documents that were seized in last year's Navy SEAL 谤补颈诲.听West Point鈥檚 Center for Combating Terrorism (CTC) released a study of 17 declassified documents today, offering a window into Mr. bin Laden鈥檚 views.
The report notes that one of 鈥渢he most compelling鈥� stories to come out of the declassified documents is bin Laden鈥檚 struggle to rein in Al Qaeda affiliates, and keep his intended message and branding on track.
鈥淚 plan to release a statement [announcing] that we are starting a new phase to correct [the mistakes] we made; in so doing, we shall reclaim, God willing, the trust of a large segment of those who lost their trust in the Jihadis,鈥� bin Laden wrote in 2010.
The CTC report notes that though bin Laden publicly condemned the West, focusing on the repression and injustices exacted on Muslims by countries like the US, his private correspondence reveals that he was particularly pained by domestic jihadi attacks on Muslims.
His frustration may have even led bin Laden to consider rebranding his Al Qaeda movement as a whole. One letter by an unknown author suggests a 聽(see English translated document聽# 0000009).聽Some of the proposed options are aimed at making followers of Islam feel more included in the organization.
But pithy they are not:
*聽Tanthim al-Jihadi li-tawhid al-Umma wa-inkathiha, which means Jihad Organization for Unification and Rescue of the Nation,
* Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Umma, or Jihad Organization to Liberate Al-Aqsa and Unify the Nation,
* Hizb tawhid al-Umma al-Islamiya, Islamic Nation Unification Party.
Damage control was an apparent concern for the organization that has little oversight on an operational level with affiliates and those simply inspired by Al Qaeda's work. In response to a letter from Al Shabab leadership in Somalia expressing interest in identifying themselves as an Al Qaeda affiliate, , "If asked, it would be better to say there is a relationship with al-Qaida, which is simply a brotherly Islamic connection, and nothing more," according to the United Press International.
"Rather than a source of strength, [bin Laden] was burdened by what he viewed the incompetence of the 'affiliates,' including their lack of political acumen to win public support ... and their poorly planned operations which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslims," reads the CTC report. Bin Laden was apparently disappointed by affiliate group ISI/AQI's arbitrary attacks on Shi鈥檌te civilians, and warned other affiliates not to commit the same mistakes.
Bin Laden feared the frequency of civilian deaths that often occurred as 鈥渃ollateral damage鈥� in regional attacks were causing the Muslim populace to lose sympathy with the movement 鈥撀爌articularly when these deaths were 鈥渆xploited by the enemy,鈥� bin Laden wrote, presumably referring to Western media and governments. He also indicated a desire to create an Al Qaeda Central, a term pulled, ironically, from Western media, to maintain greater oversight of affiliate groups.
Documents also reveal that in light of the Arab Spring 鈥� something bin Laden viewed positively 鈥� he wanted to focus more attention on media and outreach. In part, he hoped to rouse those who hadn鈥檛 yet rebelled against their rulers to do so, but he also acknowledged the important role media plays, as 鈥渁 [principle] element of the battle.鈥� He expressed an interest in creating an Al Qaeda media outlet that could inform more mainstream Muslims about jihad, and perhaps spark their interest in the movement.
