How an American couple came to be spies for Cuba
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| Washington
A retired State Department official -- aided by a top security clearance, a shortwave radio, and his wife -- passed on secret information to the Cuban Intelligence Service for nearly three decades.
That鈥檚 the gist of a grand jury indictment unsealed by federal prosecutors on Friday. The State Department is still working on a damage assessment, but federal prosecutor David Kris describes the alleged spy activity as 鈥渋ncredibly serious.鈥
The arrest of Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers, is the latest in a series of high-profile Cuban spying cases. This latest federal indictment, the result of a three-year joint investigation by the FBI and State Department, came just days after Cuba accepted a US offer to renew talks on immigration.
"These talks are part of our effort to forge a new way forward on Cuba, that advances the interests of the United States, the Cuban people and the entire hemisphere," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a press conference in San Salvador on June 1.
Spy case could stymie US-Cuba talks
But the Myers鈥檚 arrest is at the very least a stumbling block to any rapprochement.
On Friday, the State Department reported that Secretary Clinton has ordered a "comprehensive review" of security procedures and practices to protect sensitive and classified information and a "comprehensive damage assessment in coordination with the intelligence community.鈥
Citing Friday鈥檚 arrests, Rep. Mel Martinez (R) of Florida called on the Obama administration to postpone the talks with Cuba.
鈥淭oday鈥檚 arrest of two Americans alleged to have spied for Cuba is reason enough for the administration to halt any further diplomatic outreach to the regime including postponing the migration talks until the U.S. Congress has a full accounting of the damage these individuals have caused to our national security,鈥 he said in a statement.
Myers recruited 30 years ago
Kendall Myers first traveled to Cuba in December 1978. He was 41 years old, a contract instructor at the State Department鈥檚 Foreign Service Institute and, by his own account, a disillusioned man 鈥 driven to spy, not by a desire for money or other personal gain but by a changing attitude about the United States and its communist neighbor.
鈥淚 have become so bitter these past few months. Watching the evening news is a radicalizing experience,鈥 he wrote in a diary entry from the trip released in court documents Friday. 鈥淭he abuses of our system, the lack of decent medical system, the oil companies and their undisguised indifference to public needs, the complacency about the poor, the utter inability of those who are oppressed to recognize their own condition.鈥
By contrast, Cuba was 鈥渟o exciting!鈥 he wrote. 鈥淭he revolution has released enormous potential and liberated the Cuban spirit.鈥
Walking past exhibits in the Museum of the Revolution in Havana 鈥渓eft me with a lump in my throat. They don鈥檛 need to try very hard to make the point that we have been the exploiters,鈥 he wrote.
US academics targeted for spying
The Cuban Intelligence Service has a well-established program aimed at 鈥渟potting and assessing persons within the United States academic community who may be suitable for recruitment,鈥 according to an FBI affidavit. The recruitment of Myers and other recent Cuban agents fit that pattern.
Myers and his wife first visited Cuba on 鈥渦nofficial personal travel for academic purposes鈥 at the invitation of an official with the Cuban Mission to the United States in New York City. Six months later, they were visited by a Cuban agent [鈥渃o-conspirator A鈥漖 in South Dakota and recruited as clandestine agents. Myers was urged to find a job at either the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency.
They returned to Washington. After failing to get a job as an analyst at the CIA, Myers(鈥淎gent 202鈥) resumed employment with the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. Gwendolyn (鈥淎gent 123 and Agent E-634鈥) worked at a branch of the Riggs National Bank. She was never granted a security clearance.
Shortwave radio and Morse code
Together, over nearly 30 years, they communicated with the Cuban Intelligence Service by picking up encrypted radio messages in Morse code on a shortwave radio. In 1985, Kendall Myers received a top secret security clearance, upgraded in 1999, that gave him daily access to classified information through computer databases until his retirement in October 2007.
In January 1995, they traveled to Cuba via Mexico and met with Fidel Castro. They spoke through interpreters, according to court documents. Over the years, they had secret meetings with Cuban 鈥渉andlers and representatives鈥 in Trinidad, Tobago, Jamaica, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina.
A birthday cigar
But the agent who met Kendall Myers outside his office at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on April 15 this year did not work for Cuban Intelligence. Instead. He was working undercover for the FBI, posing as a Cuban agent and assigned to determine the nature and scope of the Myers鈥 clandestine activities. The agent told Kendall Myers that he had 鈥渋nstructions to contact him鈥 to get information, because of the 鈥渃hange that is taking place in Cuba and the new administration.鈥 He congratulated Kendall on his birthday and offered him a cigar.
At a meeting later that day, Kendall told the undercover agent that he opted to leave the State Department a year early because he had felt 鈥渕ore or less threatened鈥 his last months at the State Department.
鈥淲e have been very cautious, careful with our moves -- trying to be alert to any surveillance,鈥 he said. The plan, he said, was to sail to Cuba on their sailboat. In an April 30 meeting, Kendall said that he and Gwendolyn are 鈥渁 little burned out.鈥
鈥淲e lived with the fear and the anxiety for a long time, and still do,鈥 he said.
鈥淸We] would like to be a reserve army -- ready when we鈥檙e needed. But I think, honestly, we don鈥檛 want to go back into the regular stuff,鈥 he said, according to court documents.
Cautious spies
Describing their activities, the Myerses said that the most secure way to transmit information to illegal agents was 鈥渉and to hand.鈥 Kendall said that the best way to take information out from his job was 鈥渋n your head.鈥 He said that he kept notes locked in his office safe.
鈥淚 was always pretty careful. I didn鈥檛 usually take documents out,鈥 he said.
Gwendolyn added her favorite way to pass information was by changing shopping carts in a grocery store, because it was 鈥渆asy enough to do.鈥 But she added that she wouldn鈥檛 do it now, because 鈥渘ow they have cameras.鈥
They told the undercover agent that their last personal contact with a Cuban agent was in Guadalajara in December 2005. Since then, they said they had received 鈥渓ots of e-mails.鈥
In a court appearance on Friday, the couple pleaded not guilty to charges of serving as illegal agents of the Cuban government and wirefraud. If convicted, they face a maximum sentence of 35 years in prison.
Extent of spying damage unknown
Federal prosecutors have not detailed the full scope of the intelligence that they say was passed on to Cuba. In the indictment, the Justice Department alleges that an analysis of Kendall Myers鈥檚 classified State Department work computer hard drive shows that from Aug. 22, 2006 until his retirement in 2007, he viewed more than 200 sensitive or classified intelligence reports concerning Cuba.
But intelligence analysts say this could be just a small portion of the secret information he could have passed on to Cuba.
鈥淲e as a nation grossly underestimated how good Cuban intelligence services were and still are,鈥 says Chris Simmons, a former US counter-intelligence official and founder of the Cuban Intelligence Research Center in Leesburg, Va.
鈥淐uba is an intelligence trafficker. Cuba knows that US secrets are a valuable commodity around the world. Their view is that intelligence is a commodity and it can and should be sold or bartered to anyone who has an appropriate offer, as long as Cuba can not be tied as a source of information,鈥 he says.
Until this case moves forward, the full scope of the damage to national security won鈥檛 be known, he adds. 鈥淥nce we start seeing the documents, we鈥檒l be able to see how bad it was and where their areas of focus were.鈥