With Russia grinding closer, Ukrainians weigh the cost of land for peace
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| Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine
Viacheslav Zgurskyi and Tetiana Nestor went unscathed when a Russian glide bomb struck close to their home in January. But the near miss shattered what little sense of safety the couple had left in the city of Zaporizhzhia.
The shrapnel from the bomb punched jagged holes in the roof and walls, and gouged the family car. Their neighbor鈥檚 house lies in ruins.
The family returns only briefly, like now, to feed the dog. The functioning gas stove makes that relatively easier 鈥 a small mercy in a country where power cuts have plunged homes into cold and darkness.
Why We Wrote This
Ukraine and Russia may be at the negotiating table, but for the Ukrainian public, the idea of giving up territory for peace is still anathema. What would make Ukrainians consider such concessions? Guarantees of security against future Russian aggression.
The couple鈥檚 daughter, Veronika, shuffles about the home in a puffy winter jacket. She is skipping kindergarten these days because classrooms are too cold. Fatigue is etched on all their faces.
But the deepest loss in this humble Ukrainian home is unseen. The couple鈥檚 son, Vadym, was killed in March 2023 while fighting Russian forces in Mariinka, a town in Ukraine鈥檚 industrial east that Moscow is trying to seize. As a result, the negotiation efforts being led by the United States to end the war, including the most recent round, which are now taking place in Geneva, hold little interest.
鈥淲hy should we care anymore?鈥 asks Mr. Zgurskyi. 鈥淭he most important thing is for the killing to stop.鈥
With the war in Ukraine having devolved into an inching advance by Russian forces this winter, the price of the conflict is borne by civilians, both near and far from the front lines. Air raid sirens no longer cause panic. Instead, people worry about staying warm, as Russian strikes on energy infrastructure trigger shortages amid freezing temperatures.
Over time, that pressure has shifted Ukrainian attitudes toward territorial concessions in the name of peace. But survey data show that the shift is toward conditional pragmatism rather than acceptance of Russian demands, say observers.
The question Ukrainians want answered is, 鈥淲hat will prevent future Russian aggression?鈥
The need for guarantees
Russia has consistently tied peace to Ukrainian territorial concessions, with Zaporizhzhia among the regions it seeks to absorb. A central challenge in the U.S.-led peace talks is the future of eastern Ukraine鈥檚 resource-rich areas, along with other territories Moscow has occupied and claims as its own.
Fast approaching its fourth anniversary,听the full-scale war triggered by Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has inflicted a staggering human toll. Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million killed or injured in the war, while gaining only marginal ground over the past year.
鈥淣o major power has suffered anywhere near these numbers of casualties or fatalities in any war since World War II,鈥 analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted . They estimated that the combined Russian and Ukrainian battlefield dead and wounded could reach 2 million by spring.
After an initial Ukrainian counteroffensive reclaimed swaths of territory, Russia reclaimed the initiative in 2024, but it has captured a tiny fraction of Ukrainian land 鈥 a few thousand square miles 鈥 since then. Major offensives have yielded advances so small they are counted in meters, not kilometers. The gap between effort expended and territory gained is widening for Moscow. But Ukraine is also battling fatigue and manpower shortages.
Despite the grinding toll, the majority of Ukrainians continue to reject territorial concessions (even in the hard-hit industrial regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively known as Donbas, which are largely under Russian control), according to nationwide surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in January.
鈥淭his proposal to exchange control over Donbas for security guarantees is still not supported by the majority of Ukrainians,鈥 says Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of the institute. 鈥淭here are two main problems. First of all, there is very low trust toward Russia and high expectations that Russians will attack Ukraine again in any ceasefire.鈥 The recent energy ceasefire, which ended with even more brutal attacks, has only reinforced that concern.
鈥淩elated to this problem, trust in our Western allies is low,鈥 he adds. 鈥淚f Trump says, 鈥業 give my word that Russia will not attack again,鈥 for Ukrainians that is not enough. ... [Most] Ukrainians are not expecting major breakthroughs from current negotiations. The majority still expect the war will continue for many, many months and perhaps years.鈥
Official recognition of occupied territories as Russian remains a red line. The majority also rejects any peace plan based directly on Russian demands. When respondents to a December survey were presented with a proposal that included withdrawal from Donbas, recognition of occupied territories, and demilitarization, only around 17% supported it.
Compared with two or three years ago, notes the sociologist, more people now accept the idea of freezing the front line, even without peacekeepers. But that acceptance comes with the proviso that there is enforceable support for Ukraine 鈥 not in the form of words, or billions of dollars or euros, but specific weapon systems and ammunition.
鈥淲e don鈥檛 have territories right now where the majority would say we are accepting peace under any conditions,鈥 says Mr. Grushetskyi. 鈥淚n the most recent survey, 54% rejected leaving Donbas in exchange for security guarantees, while 39% said they could accept such a scenario.鈥
鈥淭hey鈥檙e supporting this scenario not because they鈥檙e Russia lovers, but because they are psychologically tired or desperate,鈥 adds the sociologist. 鈥淚f the security guarantees ... include European and American forces in eastern Ukraine, near the front line, then I think over 50% would have accepted this scenario.鈥
A history of betrayed trust
Ukrainians鈥 insistence on meaningful security guarantees is rooted in history and lessons learned from previous negotiations. Mykhailo Podoliak, an adviser to Ukraine鈥檚 presidential office who joined peace negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, says success hinges on a clear-eyed assessment of Russian behavior.
Russia, he believes, has no interest in compromise at this stage because the war underpins the Kremlin鈥檚 political power, economic survival, and global relevance. The conflict allows Moscow to control its domestic population, profit through shadowy economic schemes, and force other countries to engage with it on the world stage.
鈥淩ussia is not ready for negotiations now, because war is Russia鈥檚 raison d鈥櫭猼re,鈥 Mr. Podoliak says. 鈥淭hey are not interested in peace. They are interested in endless war. As long as they receive more than they lose, they will not be interested in stopping.鈥
That is why Ukraine wants its Western partners to focus on a postwar security architecture that deters future Russian aggression, even if NATO is weak. That includes a strong Ukrainian military, European responsibility for regional security, investment in Ukraine鈥檚 defense industry, possible international contingents deployed on Ukrainian territory, and a leading guarantor role for the U.S.
Mariia Kucherenko, senior analyst at the Come Back Alive Initiatives Center, points to the cautionary lessons from the past. She cites Ukraine鈥檚 post-independence nuclear disarmament, when Kyiv gave up the world鈥檚 third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. That agreement proved subject to interpretation by the signatories, particularly the United States and Russia.
鈥淚n Ukrainian, it was written as 鈥榞uarantees,鈥 she says. 鈥淚n English, it was 鈥榓ssurances.鈥 That wording is absolutely crucial. ... [Russians] are brilliant when it comes to wording. They are playing with words.鈥
The result was a Ukraine left vulnerable to Russian attack, Ms. Kucherenko says, manifesting in the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
Russia intervened in the separatist uprising in Donbas soon after, which also opened a parallel battlefield in the words and framing of negotiations over that conflict. The creation of a trilateral contact group on Ukraine 鈥 which included Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 鈥 boosted the notion that the separatists were the only parties in the conflict, rather than proxies of Russia against Ukraine, she says.
Ukraine, Ms. Kucherenko insists, will never again agree to ceasefires without robust enforcement mechanisms. In her view, prior agreements听did not collapse because Ukraine rejected peace, but because violations carried no cost. 鈥淥SCE would note 100 violations,鈥 she argues. 鈥淎nd what happens next? Nothing. ... Security comes first. This principle is written by blood in our memory.鈥
Oleksandr Naselenko supported reporting for this article.