In shifting world, post-Soviet states look back to a constant: Russia
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Fred Weir Special correspondent
| Moscow
Winds stirred up by shifting global realities are blowing across the former Soviet region, motivating some of those independent states to recalibrate their practical relations with Russia, even if that means postponing hopes of joining the European Union.
And those winds are likely to be just a bit chillier in the wake of Donald Trump鈥檚 election as president of the United States.
Many of the factors pushing some post-Soviet states into closer ties with Russia are long-standing ones, rooted in their common heritage as part of the U.S.S.R. for several decades. But the war in Ukraine has made it much more urgent.
Why We Wrote This
Many of the countries that formed out of the Soviet Union aspired to link their future with the West. But European troubles and Russian aggressiveness are pulling their focus back toward Moscow.
This comes partly from illustrating what can happen to a neighboring country that takes an overtly anti-Moscow path. But it also comes out of the creation of many profitable new business opportunities, as Russia reorients its international trade to avoid sanctions via countries that are more friendly and accessible as conduits.
The allure of the EU, which once shone brightly throughout the region, also seems to have faded amid the bloc鈥檚 many political and economic troubles, as well as its failure to help Ukraine sufficiently to stave off the Russians.
In the long tug-of-war between Russia and the West for the allegiance of post-Soviet countries, 鈥渟lowly, pragmatism seems to be winning the upper hand,鈥� says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Kremlin-funded Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow. 鈥淓conomic interests are becoming increasingly de-ideologized, and seen more as a matter of practical necessity.
鈥淔or a long time economic self-interest was subordinated to the idea that Europe represents civilization, which must be reached by pushing away from Russia whatever the cost,鈥� he says. 鈥淣ow it鈥檚 clear that Russia is a big, strong market whose business these countries need, and it can鈥檛 be substituted by European dreams.鈥�
Georgia in Russia鈥檚 shadow
The most obvious example of this trend is Georgia, a small nation in the South Caucasus that was the first, more than 20 years ago, to stage a 鈥�colored revolution鈥� to overthrow a pro-Moscow leader and declare joining the West its key strategic goal.
Georgia lost a brief war with Russia in 2008, and spent several subsequent years having virtually no relations with its giant neighbor. In recent years, the ruling Georgian Dream party has moved to mend economic fences with Russia, while still insisting its long-term goal is to join the EU.
But it has also begun requiring transparency from foreign-funded civil society groups, as many countries are doing, leading the EU to suspend the country鈥檚 accession bid and cut financial aid.
The Georgian Dream party won October parliamentary elections with 54%, a result fiercely disputed by the opposition but affirmed last week by the country鈥檚 election commission. Despite ongoing protests, and criticisms of the vote from the West, the outcome seems likely to hold. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe , but noted that 鈥渧oters were offered a choice between 18 candidate lists and candidates could generally campaign freely.鈥�
鈥淎verage Georgians are more concerned with economic issues and maintaining peace than anything else 鈥� both of which rely on having better relations with Russia,鈥� says Bryan Gigantino, a historian and lecturer at the Georgian American University in Tbilisi. He says the Georgian Dream party is not particularly 鈥減ro-Russian,鈥� as its critics often claim, but is seeking to navigate the difficult middle ground between East and West, while maximizing benefits for Georgia.
鈥淭his line of thinking is also common among some political forces in Europe, which explains why Georgian Dream aligns so strongly with Hungary,鈥� whose prime minister, Viktor Orb谩n, was the first foreign leader to visit Georgia after the election, says Mr. Gigantino.
Mr. Trump may be more understanding of this pragmatic attitude as well. Improving the very bad current relations between Washington and Tbilisi hinges on the hope that 鈥渁 Trump administration would be open to a relationship that is more transactional, and less dependent on abstract and ever-changing values,鈥� Mr. Gigantino adds.
鈥淕eography matters鈥�
The shifting mood is also visible in tiny Moldova. There pro-Western voters narrowly won a referendum in October on prioritizing the country鈥檚 EU membership, while pro-Western president Maia Sandu won against a candidate who espoused a Georgian-style pragmatic approach to relations with the West and Russia by a smaller margin than expected in November.
Many were shocked at the tight nature of both victories. Charges of Russian meddling, including by a Moldovan oligarch on the lam in Russia, could have substance. Barely a year earlier polls had found , while the referendum only passed after votes from Moldova鈥檚 diaspora in the West were counted.
Unlike Georgia, Moldova has large Russian-speaking populations, including the ethnically Turkic region of Gagauzia, which is home to about 5% of Moldovans, and聽the breakaway republic of Transnistria, a long strip along the Ukrainian border with another 10%. They tend to favor the direction Georgia has taken with Moscow.
鈥淢ost of the people in those Russian-speaking areas do not like the fact that Moldova joined the anti-Russian sanctions,鈥� says Alexander Corinenco, an independent political scientist in the capital of Chi葯in膬u. 鈥淭hey look at Georgia and see the politics they are pursuing is more in our national interests, while they think that Moldovan leaders just want to cozy up with Europe. In Gagauzia, the local leaders congratulated Trump very publicly on his victory, because they hope it signals a change in the political direction.鈥�
Similar trends can be seen in other post-Soviet states, such as Armenia and Kazakhstan, where post-Soviet links to the West remain strong, but the economic pull of Russia is a factor that cannot be evaded.
鈥淕eography matters,鈥� says Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the independent Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, Armenia. 鈥淲hile Georgia and Armenia aim for Europe, we know that Russia has to be taken into account.
鈥淓uropean values may be popular, especially among the youth, but Armenian business depends heavily on the Russian market, and cooperation is growing,鈥� he says. 鈥淧olitics is one thing, and import-export figures are quite another. For Armenia, both Russia and the West matter, and neither can be ignored.鈥�
