Putin鈥檚 nuclear threat: Now the West takes it seriously
-
Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Washington
For NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine amount to one thing 鈥� 鈥渘uclear blackmailing.鈥�
NATO partners will not bow to such nuke-rattling, the alliance leader said this week, and will not stop supporting Ukraine for fear of a Russian nuclear strike.
Yet as the United States and European powers confront what has rapidly become the most serious nuclear showdown in 60 years, their response has shifted from an almost blas茅 dismissal of Mr. Putin鈥檚 nuclear threats early in the war to planning for a swift and overwhelming response, should Russia actually resort to the previously unthinkable.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onWhat if Vladimir Putin鈥檚 veiled nuclear threats against Ukraine are not a bluff? Western allies seek a deterrent threat that will not lead to Armageddon.
President Putin 鈥渋s not joking when he talks about potential use of tactical nuclear weapons,鈥� President Joe Biden warned on Thursday. 鈥淔or the first time since the Cuban missile crisis, we have a direct threat of the use (of a) nuclear weapon if in fact things continue down the path they are going.鈥�
Whether Mr. Putin would actually move beyond threats to use is unknown, but it is clear that he seeks with his threats to weaken U.S. and European solidarity with Ukraine, much as he has played the energy card, some international analysts say.聽聽
鈥淲ith these threats Putin is trying to rattle the West鈥檚 resolve to support Ukraine, he鈥檚 planting seeds of fear,鈥� says Nikolas Gvosdev, a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. 鈥淏ut so far the West鈥檚 and certainly the U.S. response has been, 鈥楴o, resorting to the nuclear card is not going to work.鈥欌��
On Tuesday, President Joe Biden appeared to pointedly meet Mr. Putin鈥檚 talk of nuclear weapons with a phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in which he pledged a new round of military assistance, including more of the advanced armaments that are helping the Ukrainian military put Russia on the defensive.聽
Remembering the Cuban crisis
One key reason Washington and other Western capitals are taking Mr. Putin鈥檚 threat more seriously: The Russian leader has doubled down on his position that the war in Ukraine, which he launched, represents an existential challenge for Russia and its place as a great global power.
Russia鈥檚 nuclear doctrine allows for first use of nuclear weapons only 鈥渨hen the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.鈥� That gives added meaning to Mr. Putin鈥檚 statement on Sept. 30聽that the four Ukrainian regions he annexed are now 鈥渇orever鈥� part of Russia and would be defended like any other Russian territory, 鈥渂y all the means we possess.鈥�
Moreover, Mr. Putin has long made plain that he sees Russia鈥檚 nuclear arsenal 鈥� and a credible threat to use it 鈥� as a central pillar of his country鈥檚 superpower status.聽
The Pentagon has begun gaming steps it might take if Russian forces were to use a nuclear device, some official sources say. At the same time, the White House has employed back channels to hint to Moscow the kinds of devastating military ripostes 鈥� though nothing nuclear 鈥� it might expect if it resorted to using even low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
Sixty years ago this month, the Cuban missile crisis plunged the world into fear of a nuclear winter, when Washington caught the Soviet Union building nuclear missile launch sites less than 100 miles from the U.S. coastline, and blockaded the island. After 13 tense days, Moscow removed the missiles already in Cuba, and the crisis was defused.
Nuclear arms experts are quick to differentiate the current tensions from 1962, however. For one thing, Russia is not seen to be threatening to use the kind of strategic nuclear weapons that could take out major American cities, but rather the so-called 鈥渢actical鈥� nuclear weapons that can be fired from a rocket-launcher or truck bed to devastate a military base or a few city blocks.
Moreover, the U.S. is not threatening to respond in kind to an eventual tactical nuclear attack in Ukraine, thus minimizing the risk of escalation to nuclear Armageddon.聽 聽聽
Last month, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan warned that 鈥渁ny use of nuclear weapons will be met with catastrophic consequences for Russia,鈥� and that 鈥渢he U.S. and our allies will respond decisively.鈥�
鈥淚f Putin had the idea that somehow Jake Sullivan was going to ... march into the [president鈥檚 office] and say, 鈥榃e鈥檇 better stop the West鈥檚 support for Ukraine because of this nuclear threat,鈥� well, that was never going to happen,鈥� Dr. Gvosdev says.
Balancing acts on both sides
At the same time, the Biden administration has always recognized the risk of Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine evolving into a big-power confrontation 鈥� with potential nuclear implications 鈥� and has calibrated its response to avoid that outcome, some experts say.
鈥淔rom the beginning of this war, the administration has been trying to balance their response between two main goals, one being to help the Ukrainians ... and the other being to avoid a broader NATO-Russia war that could lead to some kind of nuclear confrontation,鈥� says Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine who is now affiliated with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University in California.
鈥淭hey鈥檝e done a pretty good job at finding that balance,鈥� he says, while cautioning that Mr. Putin is complicating that task by adding a nuclear dimension to his 鈥済ambit to create a new geopolitical reality in Europe.鈥�
Mr. Biden has stopped short of delivering to Ukraine the longer-range missile systems that could reach deep into Russia, and this week he cold-shouldered Mr. Zelenskyy鈥檚 declaration that Ukraine is already a de facto member of NATO.
Yet despite Mr. Putin鈥檚 heightened stridency, Dr. Gvosdev, a Russia scholar, says the Russian leader must perform a balancing act of his own.
鈥淗e鈥檚 faced with walking a pretty tricky line domestically and internationally,鈥� he says. On the one hand Mr. Putin must satisfy the desire among 鈥渉ardline Kremlin elites鈥� and a slice of the Moscow social media audience for tough action, and on the other 鈥渘ot provoke a U.S. and NATO response that could turn out badly for him.鈥�
In that light, Dr. Gvosdev says, recent unconfirmed reports of the Russian military moving some nuclear hardware around can be seen as directed at both of Mr. Putin鈥檚 key audiences 鈥� the Moscow hardliners he wants to assuage, and the West, which he wants to keep guessing.
Using a tactical nuclear bomb, however, would at most temporarily halt Ukraine鈥檚 territorial gains, some military analysts say, while it would almost certainly make Russia even more of an international pariah, souring relations even with friends like those in Beijing and New Delhi.
What鈥檚 needed now, says Ambassador Pifer, is probably occurring behind the scenes: quiet diplomacy and private communications between聽U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin; Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and their Russian counterparts聽to lay out the harsh consequences of any resort to nuclear weapons.
