Why Russian aid for Lukashenko doesn鈥檛 end Belarus crisis
| Moscow; and Minsk, Belarus
Despite a four-hour-long, mostly secret meeting Monday between Belarus鈥� disputed president, Alexander Lukashenko, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, a solution to Belarus鈥� month of tumultuous protests over alleged electoral fraud appears no closer.
But there is no longer the slightest doubt that Russia intends to back Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 claim to legitimacy, after Mr. Putin promised him a lot of cash, political support, and other forms of assistance that remain unspecified.
While this may increase Mr. Putin鈥檚 leverage over Mr. Lukashenko, who has promised much to the Kremlin over the years while delivering little, Belarusian and Russian experts say that it does not solve the most glaring, immediate problem for both Russia and the Belarusian opposition: Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 continued hold on power. Without an acknowledgment of the opposition, they say, a resolution to Belarus鈥� crisis will remain murky.
Why We Wrote This
Belarus is dependent on Russia to navigate out of its crisis. But experts indicate that despite his summit with Vladimir Putin, President Lukashenko is the most immediate concern for the Kremlin and protesters alike.
鈥淲hat we have learned is that Putin will unambiguously back Lukashenko with money and political support. There were probably some other informal agreements made to strengthen the union state,鈥� says Alexei Dzermont, a political analyst who heads Northern Eurasia, an independent think tank in Minsk. 鈥淭here is nothing inherently bad in the relationship between Putin and Lukashenko. Any way out of our predicament would require Russian help. ...
鈥淏ut Russia might also have made some efforts to establish relations with the Belarusian opposition as well. They could do that. But in Moscow it seems they see the opposition as anti-Russian, and they don鈥檛 believe claims by opposition leaders that they are not.鈥�
Russia鈥檚 involvement, EU鈥檚 absence
Mr. Putin publicly offered Mr. Lukashenko to rescue his struggling economy from imminent collapse, reaffirmed Russia鈥檚 commitment to the ill-defined 鈥渦nion state鈥� economic integration project, and vowed full allegiance to the NATO-like military alliance that binds Russia and Belarus. Mr. Putin vocally approved of Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 road map out of the crisis, which involves rewriting Belarus鈥� constitution, holding a public referendum to adopt the new document and then, after some time, fresh elections for a new president and parliament.
The Kremlin leader denied Belarus鈥� opposition protesters what they most wanted 鈥� recognition of their grievances and support for their demand that Mr. Lukashenko depart immediately 鈥� but offered vague assurances that Russia wishes to see Belarusians resolve their own differences free of external interference. Perhaps as an olive branch to Belarusian protesters, he from the Belarusian border of a 鈥渞eserve unit鈥� of Russian police that had been pledged to help restore order in the event of civic breakdown in the protest-hit country.
The Kremlin鈥檚 prominent role in resolving Belarus鈥� future highlights how dependent Belarus, with 9.5 million mostly Russian-speaking people, is upon the economic largess, political approval, and security weight of Russia. The cautious response of the West might also be an indicator of how much the world has changed in the past couple of decades.
Just six years ago the European Union offered full-throated support for Ukraine鈥檚 efforts to change its geopolitical allegiance, including EU association and massive financial assistance. Today, apparently more leery of getting directly involved, the EU declared Belarus鈥� Aug. 9 election invalid, sanctioned a few dozen top Belarusian officials, and will likely confine itself to verbal expressions of disapproval going forward. Only Lithuania has so far declared Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 main opponent in the election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to be the country鈥檚 legitimate leader.
For her part, Ms Tsikhanouskaya, who was forced to flee to Lithuania last month, addressed Mr. Putin with the warning that any deals he strikes with Mr. Lukashenko will be regarded as illegal and added, 鈥淚 regret that you have decided on dialogue with a dictator and not with the people of Belarus.鈥�
Valery Tsepkalo, former Belarusian ambassador to the U.S. and a business leader, would probably have been Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 top contender in the election if he hadn鈥檛 been barred from the ballot and forced to leave the country in July. He says that, given Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 record of perfidy 鈥� including arresting 33 Russians and accusing them of subversion before the elections 鈥� Mr. Putin should know better than to make any agreements with him.
鈥淲e want to see relations between the Belarusian and Russian people continue to reflect the level of trust and friendship that exists,鈥� he told the Monitor by phone. 鈥淟ukashenko has already deceived everyone many times, and can be expected to continue doing so ... It鈥檚 important to recognize that he is not legitimate in the eyes of the Belarusian people.鈥�
Russian financial aid to Mr. Lukashenko will only prop up his regime, he says. 鈥淭he salaries of most state employees have already been delayed. Huge amounts of money are being paid to riot police and security forces. They are receiving big bonuses, and we can see that the redistribution of resources is aimed at rewarding those whom Lukashenko鈥檚 regime relies upon. ...
鈥淚t seems to me that if Russia wants to be constructive, it should demand the release of political prisoners and the termination of criminal cases that were opened on absurd grounds,鈥� he says. 鈥淎s for the constitutional reforms, we need to discuss not just general terms but the nuts and bolts of the road map that Lukashenko is proposing. Otherwise it鈥檚 just empty talk that Lukashenko is giving to Belarusian society and the Russian leadership.鈥�
Lukashenko鈥檚 limbo, and after
Belarus has been joined in a largely theoretical union state with Russia since before the Putin era. The economic part of that arrangement has enabled Mr. Lukashenko to maintain his quasi-Soviet paternalistic regime in which everyone gets fed, housed, and educated, but most development is frozen. Belarusians have watched over the past 20 years as neighboring Poland and Lithuania joined the EU and radically improved their lives. Meanwhile next door Russia underwent a different transformation under Mr. Putin that brought order and relative prosperity. To the south, Ukraine is still going through a concerted effort to detach itself from Russia鈥檚 sphere that some Belarusians find inspirational, and others view as cautionary.
鈥淟ukashenko built his system on cheap Russian oil supplies, which were processed in Belarusian refineries and sold on to Europe. He, his family, and government profited from the margins,鈥� says Oleg Sosna, a business leader in Belarus鈥� information technology sector. 鈥淯sing the rhetoric of the union state, he received huge loans from Russia. Playing his 鈥榩endulum鈥� diplomacy [playing Russia against the West], he also negotiated big loans from the World Bank and the EU. ... Over 40% of our exports go to Russia, including things that would not be competitive in the EU, like our agricultural production and the vehicles produced by the .鈥�
But Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 economic model has been collapsing for some time. With global oil prices plunging and Russia growing weary of subsidizing his archaic system, an economic crisis has been creeping up. By many accounts, the Belarusian banking system is paralyzed, the ruble is sinking fast, and reforms are going to be necessary regardless of who is in charge.
The political trappings of the union state, which include a joint parliament and government agencies, have remained toothless talking-shops for almost two decades, and their only utility appears to be to provide sinecures for retiring politicians.聽The joke 鈥� or rumor, depending on who you ask 鈥� going around is that a special chair is being prepared for Mr. Lukashenko in that apparatus.
Polls in both countries show that majorities value good relations, but that enthusiasm for the union state has been falling, with almost half of Russians saying it鈥檚 not needed in by the state-funded Russian Public Opinion聽Research Center.
鈥淚 understand that Russia wants the level of our relations to remain. And this is a legitimate concern,鈥� says Mr. Tsepkalo. 鈥淲e should maintain our relations with Russia, but we should also seek normal trade and investment relations with the West. We also need to build new values inside our society: the principle of the separation of powers, the right to choose our own leaders, civil liberties. I鈥檓 sure that Russians can understand this. We can鈥檛 develop just in one direction, we need several vectors.鈥�
As Belarusian protesters continue to flood the streets, Russia holds many advantages in its efforts to maintain Belarus鈥� geopolitical allegiance, says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. But it lacks the ability to inspire the youth and professionals who yearn for greater freedom and civil rights, and risks alienating them if it continues to support Mr. Lukashenko.
鈥淏elarus is always going to be the object of geopolitical competition between East and West,鈥� he says. 鈥淛ust now there seems to be little appetite in the EU to get engaged with this crisis as they did in Ukraine a few years ago. That puts a damper on the hopes of pro-Western Belarusian liberals. But it doesn鈥檛 really help Russia. ...
鈥淩ussia has money, and raw power, but no good ideas. For those Belarusians who are transfixed by the aspirations of nation, liberal values, or joining the global mainstream, Russia has nothing to offer.鈥�
